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On May 26, 2020, the forty-fifth President of the United States,
Donald Trump, tweeted: “There is NO WAY (ZERO!) that Mail-In
Ballots will be anything less than substantially fraudulent. Mail
boxes will be robbed, ballots will be forged & even illegally printed
out & fraudulently signed.” Later that same day, Twitter appended
an addendum to the President’s tweets so viewers could “get the
facts” about California’s mail-in ballot plans and provided a link.
In contrast, Facebook’s CEO Mark Zuckerberg refused to take action on President Trump’s posts. Only when it came to Trump’s support of the Capitol riot did both Facebook and Twitter suspend his
account. Differences in attitude between platforms are reflected in
their policies toward political advertisements. While Twitter bans
such ads, Facebook generally neither bans nor fact-checks them.
The dissemination of fake news increases the likelihood of users
believing it and passing it on, consequently causing tremendous reputational harm to public representatives, impairing the general public interest, and eroding long-term democracy. Such dissemination
depends on online intermediaries that operate platforms, facilitate
dissemination, and govern the flow of information by moderating,
providing algorithmic recommendations, and targeting third-party
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advertisers. Should intermediaries bear liability for moderating or
failing to moderate? And what about providing algorithmic recommendations and allowing data-driven advertisements directed toward susceptible users?
In A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, John Perry
Barlow introduced the concept of internet exceptionalism, differentiating it from other existing media. Internet exceptionalism is at the
heart of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which
provides intermediaries immunity from civil liability for content created by other content providers. Intermediaries like Facebook and
Twitter are thereby immune from liability for content created by users and advertisers. However, Section 230 is currently under attack.
In 2020, Trump issued an “Executive Order on Preventing Online
Censorship” that aimed to limit platforms protections against liability for intermediary-moderated content. Legislative bills seeking
to narrow Section 230’s scope soon followed. From another direction, attacks on the overall immunity provided by Section 230
emerged alongside the transition from an internet society to a datadriven algorithmic society—one that changed intermediaries’ scope
and role in information dissemination. The changes in the utility of
intermediaries requires reevaluation of their duties; that is where
this Article steps in.
This Article focuses on dissemination of fake news stories as a
test case. It maps the roles intermediaries play in the dissemination
of fake news by hosting and moderating content, deploying algorithmically personalized recommendations, and using data-driven targeted advertising. The first step toward developing a legal policy for
intermediary liability is identifying the different roles intermediaries
play in the dissemination of fake news stories. After mapping these
roles, this Article examines intermediary liability case law and reflects on internet exceptionalism’s current approach and recent developments. It further examines normative free speech considerations regarding intermediary liability within the context of the different roles they play in fake news dissemination and argues that the
liability regime must correspond with the intermediary’s role in dissemination. By targeting exceptions to internet exceptionalism, this
Article outlines a nuanced framework for intermediary liability. Finally, it proposes subjecting intermediaries to transparency
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INTRODUCTION
On May 26, 2020, the forty-fifth President of the United States,
Donald Trump, tweeted “The Governor of California is sending Ballots to millions of people, anyone . . . living in the state, no matter
who they are or how they got there, will get one. That will be followed up with professionals telling all of these people, many of
whom have never even thought of voting before, how, and for
whom, to vote. This will be a Rigged Election. No way!”1 Later that
same day, Twitter appended an addendum to the former President’s
tweets that stated viewers could “get the facts” about California’s

1

Trump’s tweet is no longer available due to his suspension. For a journal article citing
this Tweet, see Todd Spangler, Twitter Adds Warning Label to Donald Trump’s False
Tweets for the First Time, VARIETY (May 26, 2020, 3:22 PM), https://variety.com/2020/
digital/news/twitter-adds-warning-label-donald-trumps-false-tweets-for-first-time1234616642/ [https://perma.cc/N43M-ULL7].
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mail-in ballot plans and provided a link to the information.2 Twitter
continued flagging Trump’s tweets during the 2020 election cycle
and even continued after the election concluded.3
In contrast to Twitter’s moderation practices, Facebook avoided
labeling Trump’s post.4 Despite Facebook employees’ protests regarding the company’s lack of response to Trump’s posts,5 Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg continued to defend his decision not to
interfere with the President’s posts.6 However, after market pressure
from advertisers,7 Facebook announced it would flag all “newsworthy” posts by politicians that violate its community rules.8
2

See Politics: Trump Makes Unsubstantiated Claim That Mail-In Ballots Will Lead to
Voter
Fraud,
TWITTER
(May
26,
2020),
https://twitter.com/i/events/
1265330601034256384 [https://perma.cc/5RHN-Y8G9].
3
See Kim Lyons, Twitter Flags President Trump’s Tweets About Ballot-Counting,
VERGE (Nov. 7, 2020, 10:19 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/11/7/21554013/
twitter-flags-president-trumps-tweets-votes-counted-election-pennsylvania
[https://perma.cc/4EWK-KKK6]; see also Trump Falsely Claims Victory on Twitter Just
Ahead of Biden Win, QUINT (Nov. 7, 2020, 10:24 PM), www.thequint.com/news/world/
won-by-a-lot-president-trump-falsely-declares-victory-on-twitter-again
[https://perma.cc/3LXV-YKLS] (referring to Trump’s misleading tweet “I WON THIS
ELECTION, BY A LOT!”).
4
Audrey Conklin, Facebook Won’t Label Trump ‘Mail-In Ballot’ Post Like Twitter,
FOX BUS. (May 27, 2020), https://www.foxbusiness.com/technology/facebook-twitterlabel-trump-ballot [https://perma.cc/Q3HB-A33M].
5
Fanny Potkin et al., Facebook Staffers Walk Out Saying Trump’s Posts Should be
Reined In, REUTERS (June 1, 2020, 07:51 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usfacebook-trump-employee-criticism/facebook-staffers-walk-out-saying-trumps-postsshould-be-reined-in-idUSKBN2382D0 [https://perma.cc/YHJ4-E8RF].
6
Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Law of Facebook, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2353, 2363–64
(2021) (“Facebook decided not to restrict targeted political advertising or to fact-check
political ads (as opposed to commercial ads) . . . .”); see also Tony Romm et al., Facebook
Won’t Limit Political Ad Targeting or Stop False Claims Under New Ad Rules, WASH.
POST (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/01/09/facebookwont-limit-political-ad-targeting-or-stop-pols-lying/
[https://perma.cc/K5VM-AEBN];
Elizabeth Dwoskin, Mark Zuckerberg Defends Decisions on Trump as Facebook Employee
Unrest Grows, WASH. POST (June 2, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/
2020/06/02/facebook-zuckerberg-trump-defense/ [https://perma.cc/B3F3-CJWK].
7
Tiffany Hsu & Gillian Friedman, CVS, Dunkin’, Lego: The Brands Pulling Ads from
Facebook Over Hate Speech, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/26/business/
media/Facebook-advertising-boycott.html [https://perma.cc/Z34B-QJLJ] (July 7, 2020).
8
Barbara Ortutay, Facebook to Label All Rule-Breaking Posts—Even Trump’s, AP
NEWS (June 26, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-us-news-ap-top-newsmark-zuckerberg-ca-state-wire-b38818f48561889452c77fe736646454
[https://perma.cc/RPA4-QHLK].
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The differences between Facebook’s and Twitter’s treatment of
third-party content were again made apparent in a similar circumstance during the election. The Trump campaign released a thirtysecond video advertisement accusing opponent Joe Biden of allegedly promising to pay Ukraine to fire a prosecutor who investigated
a company with ties to Biden’s son, Hunter Biden.9 CNN refused to
air the advertisement, finding no evidence supporting the claims.10
Facebook, however, allowed the advertisement to remain on the
platform and declined the Biden campaign’s request to remove it.11
Thus, Facebook allowed this fake story to spread widely and proliferate.12
However, on January 5 and 6 of 2021, Trump used social media
to encourage a riot at the United States Capitol that was planned by
his supporters in an effort to overturn the 2020 presidential election
results by calling his supporters to “be there and to be wild.”13 As a
consequence, both Facebook and Twitter barred Trump’s social media accounts.14

9

See Eugene Kiely & Robert Farley, Fact: Trump TV Ad Misleads on Biden and
Ukraine, FACTCHECK.ORG (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.factcheck.org/2019/10/fact-trumpad-misleads-on-biden-and-ukraine/ [https://perma.cc/9R3D-FBKV].
10
Stephanie Baker et al., On Bidens and Ukraine, Wild Claims with Little Basis,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 9, 2019, 9:20 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201910-09/on-bidens-and-ukraine-wild-claims-with-little-basis-quicktake
[https://perma.cc/Q5JZ-XVWP].
11
See Emily Stewart, Facebook Is Refusing to Take Down a Trump Ad Making False
Claims About Joe Biden, VOX (Oct. 9, 2019, 2:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2019/10/9/20906612/trump-campaign-ad-joe-biden-ukraine-facebook
[https://perma.cc/J7ZK-9JMQ].
12
Id. But see, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, How to Regulate (and Not Regulate) Social Media,
1 J. FREE SPEECH L. 71, 92 (2021) (“Facebook’s case is instructive for how to think about
the problem. Facebook argues that it does not want to be the arbiter of public discourse. In
fact, it already is the arbiter of public discourse worldwide . . . .Facebook well understands
this: [i]t takes down lies about election dates and polling places . . . .”).
13
Dan Barry & Sheera Frenkel, ‘Be There. Will Be Wild!’: Trump All but Circled the
Date, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/06/us/politics/capitol-mob-trumpsupporters.html [https://perma.cc/4LXY-C6Z6] (July 27, 2021).
14
Mike Isaac & Kate Conger, Facebook Bars Trump Through End of His Term, N.Y.
TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/07/technology/facebook-trump-ban.html
[https://perma.cc/TNG3-9LQU] (May 18, 2021); see Brian Fung, Twitter Bans President
Trump Permanently, CNN BUS., https://edition.cnn.com/2021/01/08/tech/trump-twitterban/index.html [https://perma.cc/DK67-KW84] (Jan. 9, 2021, 2:19 PM).
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Candidates in election campaigns, along with their proponents
and other stakeholders, disseminate content and fund online political
advertisements to find voters to convert into donors, recruit volunteers, and mobilize individuals to vote on Election Day.15 Fake news
stories can be found in both organic content and paid advertisements16 that gain influence through popularization on online platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and even Google’s
search engine.
Fake news is amazingly powerful and dangerous when it
spreads. Further, it is difficult to clean up the tracks it leaves behind.
It has severe consequences on the reputations of public representatives and infringes public interest at large.17 Fake news pollutes the
flow of information as it spills into the digital ecosystem, caused by
users spreading such stories widely and extensively.18 Studies show
that fake stories circulate “significantly farther, faster, deeper, and
more broadly than the truth”19 because they hold the audience’s attention by eliciting surprise. The more frequently people are exposed to a fake news story, the more credibility ascribed to it.20 The
information begins to seem so true that readers deny its falsity

15

See Daniel Kreiss & Matt Perault, Four Ways to Fix Social Media’s Political Ads
Problem— Without Banning Them, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 16, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/16/opinion/twitter-facebook-political-ads.html
[https://perma.cc/S9LZ-9FX7].
16
See, e.g., Brian Fung, Trump Campaign Runs Hundreds of Misleading Facebook Ads
Warning of Super Bowl Censorship, CNN BUS., https://edition.cnn.com/2020/
01/24/media/trump-super-bowl-facebook-ad/index.html [https://perma.cc/348N-Y4HR]
(Jan. 24, 2020, 8:33 PM).
17
Cass R. Sunstein, Falsehoods and the First Amendment, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 387,
388 (2020) (“Some falsehoods are harmful. They ruin lives. They lead people to take
unnecessary risks or fail to protect themselves against serious dangers.”).
18
See Omri Ben-Shahar, Data Pollution, 11 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 104, 112–13 (2019)
(using a metaphor comparing “fake news” to “data pollution” that disrupts social
institutions and public interests, in a similar manner to environmental pollution).
19
Soroush Vosoughi et al., The Spread of True and False News Online, 359 SCI. 1146,
1146
(2018),
https://www.science.org/doi/abs/10.1126/science.aap9559
[https://perma.cc/9QDD-ETX2]; SINAN ARAL, THE HYPE MACHINE: HOW SOCIAL MEDIA
DISRUPTS OUR ELECTIONS, OUR ECONOMY, AND OUR HEALTH—AND HOW WE MUST ADAPT
28 (2020).
20
Gerd Gigerenzer, External Validity of Laboratory Experiments: The FrequencyValidity Relationship, 97 AM. J. PSYCH. 185, 185 (1984) (describing that repeating
information creates an illusion of truth).
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despite being shown contrary evidence.21 Further, fake news stories
that circulate on social media confirm existing user biases and start
a social dynamic of dissemination. Fake news can spread like wildfire when it reaches central “influential entities” in the social network that have more social connections and force than the average
user; 22 these influential entities then pass the stories along and increase support for a political candidate, consequently influencing
democracy.23
Network structures and dynamics within social networks influence how information spreads. Yet, intermediaries that operate social network platforms have an equally influential role in disseminating information. Sacha Baron Cohen recently coined social media platforms the “greatest propaganda machine in history,” and this
stands to reason.24
Intermediaries are more than mere middlemen. They moderate
users’ content, in turn influencing what users view,25 value, and
21

Whitney Phillips, The Toxins We Carry, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (2019),
https://www.cjr.org/special_report/truth-pollution-disinformation.php
[https://perma.cc/VY6N-YAWX] (“It shows that when people are repeatedly exposed to
false statements, those statements start to feel true, even when they are countered with
evidence. In short, a fact check is no match for a repeated lie.”).
22
YOCHAI BENKLER ET AL., NETWORK PROPAGANDA: MANIPULATION, DISINFORMATION,
AND RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 284–86 (2018) (explaining that in the 2016
U.S. election campaign, ideological rightwing political news sites, such as Breitbart,
adopted fake news and were in fact a springboard for its widespread dissemination. Even
though Breitbart is a website, not a social media platform, this example demonstrates the
importance the social network’s structure. A receptive (ideological) node on a social
network can make a difference and explain why negative fake news about Hillary Clinton
spread widely, while negative fake news about Donald Trump was disseminated far less.).
23
Id.; Katherine Haenschen & Jay Jennings, Mobilizing Millennial Voters with Targeted
Internet Advertisements: A Field Experiment, 36 POL. COMMC’N 357, 357–67 (2019)
(demonstrating that the internet can be used to access younger people via cookie targeting,
reach them with individually targeted advertisements from a local organization, and engage
them to vote locally).
24
See Sacha Baron Cohen, Read Sacha Baron Cohen’s Scathing Attack on Facebook in
Full: ‘Greatest Propaganda Machine in History’, GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 2019, 1:10 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/nov/22/sacha-baron-cohen-facebookpropaganda [https://perma.cc/G4FT-2SGZ].
25
See, e.g., Alex Hern, Twitter Hides Donald Trump Tweet for ‘Glorifying Violence’,
GUARDIAN (May 29, 2020, 12:57 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/
may/29/twitter-hides-donald-trump-tweet-glorifying-violence [https://perma.cc/6XZN8BA5].
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repost.26 Intermediaries have different terms of services and community guidelines.27 Further, there exists diversity among platforms
regarding attitudes toward moderating content. In addition to moderation, intermediaries seek to hold users’ attention as long as possible.28 To do so, they utilize algorithms which personalize and recommend organic content, exposing users to false information and
extremist political views.29 The algorithm learns users’ preferences
and encourages users to connect with like-minded people, thereby
creating “echo chambers” that confirm previously held beliefs.30
These dynamics not only affect the individual but change the entire
social dynamic within a network. 31
Moreover, intermediaries target political advertisements for
profit. Whereas personalizing organic content generally aims to enhance users’ engagement by exposing them to relevant content,
data-driven targeted advertising promotes specific types of content
and agendas, aiming to influence user consciousness and subvert
their choices. To target advertisements efficiently, intermediaries
collect information about users and utilize tools that allow the intermediary to engage in a new level of refined targeting. For example,
Facebook developed the Pixel tool—an interoperable code that
26

Michal Lavi, Taking Out of Context, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 145, 147 (2017).
See, e.g., TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET: PLATFORMS, CONTENT
MODERATION, AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE SOCIAL MEDIA 52–54 (2018)
(comparing social networks’ community standards regarding sexual content).
28
See ARAL, supra note 19, at 203 (expanding on the attention economy).
29
SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, ANTISOCIAL MEDIA: HOW FACEBOOK DISCONNECTS US AND
UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY 4–7 (2018). See Pauline T. Kim, Manipulating Opportunity, 106
VA. L. REV. 867, 869 (2020); Mark Bergen, YouTube Executives Ignored Warnings, Letting
Toxic Videos Run Rampant, BLOOMBERG (April 2, 2019, 11:29 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-04-02/youtube-executives-ignoredwarnings-letting-toxic-videos-run-rampant [https://perma.cc/CY83-NRD6].
30
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA
117 (2017). See Michael Wolfowicz, Examining the Interactive Effects of Personalization
Algorithms (The Filter Bubble) on Network Structure (The Echo Chambers) and the Impact
on Radical Beliefs, HEBREW UNIV. OF JERUSALEM, FEDERMANN CYBER CTR. (Oct. 30,
2019),
https://csrcl.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/csrcl/files/cybersadna.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HM96-LM6F] (describing an evidence based experiment on a related
context, focusing on the function of algorithm in creating a network of connections that
form filter bubbles that contribute to radical beliefs).
31
ARAL, supra note 19, at 226 (explaining that algorithms polarize social media users
into homogeneous communities and cause automatic herding markets “where people
follow the behavior of others” instead of making independent decisions).
27
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collects data to help advertisers track conversions from Facebook
ads, optimize those ads, and build a target audience for future ones.32
Another tool is “Custom Audiences . . . —a matching system pairing one mode of contact with that person’s Facebook profile.”33 These “dark ads” are seen only by their narrowly-targeted
recipients, unavailable for public scrutiny.34 Political fake news is
seriously impactful and has meaningful social costs when powerful
people pay intermediaries to distribute messages among specific target audiences. Fake news used in targeted advertisements leads to
false assumptions that can confuse or dissuade the electorate from
voting.35
Currently, Facebook neither unilaterally bans nor fact-checks
political advertisements. Further, the platform unequivocally allows
lies in political advertisements.36 Just before the 2020 election, Facebook “announce[d] a significant set of restrictions designed specifically to protect the integrity of the . . . election cycle, including a
flat ban on new political ads in the week before the election.”37
Google outlined restrictions on political ad targeting based on political affiliation.38 Twitter banned political advertisements with

32

Christina Newberry, The Facebook Pixel: What It Is and How to Use It, HOOTSUITE
(Apr. 26, 2021), https://blog.hootsuite.com/facebook-pixel/ [https://perma.cc/K9BRD6ED].
33
What Is a Facebook Custom Audience and How Can They Grow Online Stores?,
BIGCOMMERCE, https://www.bigcommerce.com/ecommerce-answers/what-is-a-facebookcustom-audience/ [https://perma.cc/T538-CGDD]; see also FRANK PASQUALE, NEW LAWS
OF ROBOTICS: DEFENDING HUMAN EXPERTISE IN THE AGE OF AI 89 (2020).
34
BENKLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 272–75.
35
Kreiss & Perault, supra note 15.
36
Mike Isaac & Cecilia Kang, Facebook Says It Won’t Back Down from Allowing Lies
in Political Ads, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/09/technology/facebookpolitical-ads-lies.html [https://perma.cc/MZ2B-D96D] (Sept. 4, 2020). See also Omer
Kabir, Facebook Will Not Restrict Political Lies Ahead of Israel’s March Election,
CALCALIST (Jan. 27, 2020, 5:18 PM), https://www.calcalistech.com/ctech/articles/
0,7340,L-3783290,00.html [https://perma.cc/J8G8-7SKU].
37
Bhagwat, supra note 6, at 2364.
38
Romm et al., supra note 6; Scott Spencer, An Update on Our Political Ads Policy,
GOOGLE (Nov. 20, 2019), https://blog.google/technology/ads/update-our-political-adspolicy/ [https://perma.cc/RF5M-HYE9]. Google lifted the restriction on political
advertisements after the election and enforced ad policies that focus on prohibiting
“demonstrably false information that could significantly undermine trust in elections or the
democratic process.” Megan Graham, Google Will Lift Its Ban on Political Ads Thursday,
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exceptions mainly applicable to organizations that were not directly
speaking about legislative issues.39
As technology advances, the dissemination of false information
has greater potential to subvert the truth. Deepfake pictures and
movies allow even greater manipulation of the truth.40 Artificial intelligence and machine-learning algorithms combined with facialmapping software enable the cheap and easy fabrication of content,
inserting individual faces into videos without permission.41 The result is believable videos of people doing and saying things they
never did.42 Liars can easily avoid accountability by claiming that
true statements are fake stories. In contrast, truth-tellers can be held
as liars.43 Though intermediaries try to remove deep fakes and other
manipulated videos from their platforms, such policies are limited.44

CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/09/google-will-lift-its-ban-on-political-adsthursday.html [https://perma.cc/N9QB-MDWU] (Dec. 9, 2020, 12:52 PM).
39
Kate Conger, What Ads Are Political? Twitter Struggles with a Definition, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 15, 2019), nyti.ms/2NSLDOh [https://perma.cc/89ET-5WV5] (explaining that what
counts as a political advertisement is in the eye of the beholder); Alex Kantrowitz, Here’s
the Major Exception to Twitter’s Political Ad Ban, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 11, 2019, 7:02
PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/alexkantrowitz/heres-the-major-exceptionto-twitters-political-ad-ban [https://perma.cc/5D7J-KYJS].
40
Lili Levi, Real “Fake News” and Fake “Fake News”, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 232,
253 (2017); Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for
Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. 1753, 1760 (2019) (explaining that
“the emergence of machine learning through neural network methods . . . [increases . . .
the] capacity to create false images, videos, and audio.”). Generative adversarial networks,
known as GANs, can lead to the production of increasingly convincing and nearly
impossible to debunk deep fakes. Chesney & Citron, supra. Neural networks can also be
used for AI creation of news stories that mimic the style and substance of real news stories.
See Rowan Zellers et al., Grover: A State-of-the-Art Defense Against Neural Fake News,
GROVER, https://rowanzellers.com/grover/ [https://perma.cc/6HV7-Z2QC].
41
Chesney & Citron, Deepfakes: A Looming Crisis for National Security, Democracy
and Privacy?, LAWFARE BLOG (Feb. 21, 2018, 10:00 AM) https://www.lawfareblog.com/
deepfakes-looming-crisis-national-security-democracy-and-privacy
[https://perma.cc/8RR5-HQAJ].
42
Id.
43
Chesney & Citron, supra note 40, at 1785–86 (describing how the difficulty in
separating truth from falsehood provides a “liar’s dividend,” because anyone can claim that
a true story is fake while his lies are the truth).
44
Facebook to Remove Deepfake Videos in Run-Up to 2020 U.S. Election, REUTERS,
(Jan. 7, 2020, 1:48 AM), reut.rs/35yOMZa [https://perma.cc/4H23-L9CZ]. However,
content would be removed if it “would likely mislead someone into thinking that a subject
of the video said words that they did not actually say” and not regarding to a post that tore
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In this era, it becomes almost impossible to separate true from
false, engage in honest discussions about matters of public importance, and formulate political views without manipulation. Fake
news stories can influence voter consciousness, threaten the political
security of citizens, erode faith in election results, and even harm the
long-term health of democracy and its institutions.45 Information is
disseminated without professional norms, making it difficult for individuals to trust one another.46 How does the law react to this widespread dissemination of fake news? Should intermediaries operating
platforms bear any liability for fake news stories? And if so, when?
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”)47 reflects the internet exceptionalism approach, as well as U.S. bias toward free speech.48 It directs that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker
of any information provided by another information content provider.”49 Courts have interpreted Section 230 to provide broad immunity to internet users and intermediaries that disseminate information created by others.50 Consequently, lawsuits against intermediaries are usually blocked.51 Recent debate over intermediaries’ obligations regarding organic content and advertisements, in tandem
with the attack on intermediaries’ moderation practices,52 calls for
reevaluation of the scope of intermediary-based immunity. This
up the original speech and took it out of context. Michael Levenson, Pelosi Clashes with
Facebook and Twitter Over Video Posted by Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/08/us/trump-pelosi-video-state-of-the-union.html
[https://perma.cc/WWB3-XU48] (quoting Facebook’s policy).
45
See Richard L. Hasen, Deep Fakes, Bots, and Siloed Justices: American Election Law
in a “Post-Truth” World, 64 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 535, 539 (2020); Karl Manheim & Lyric
Kaplan, Artificial Intelligence: Risks to Privacy and Democracy, 21 YALE J.L. & TECH.
106, 138 (2019).
46
ZEYNEP TUFECKI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS: THE POWER AND FRAGILITY OF
NETWORKED PROTEST 40 (2017).
47
47 U.S.C. § 230.
48
JEFF KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET 78, 146 (2019).
49
47 U.S.C. § 230.
50
See generally id.; see, e.g., Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 519, 528–29 (Cal.
2006) (observing that the plain language of Section 230 is evidence that Congress did not
intend for an internet user to be treated differently than an internet provider).
51
See infra Part III.A.
52
See Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (May 28, 2020), repealed by Exec.
Order No. 14,029, 86 Fed. Reg. 27,025 (May 14, 2021).
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Article focuses on the dissemination of fake news stories as a case
study and argues that the immunity regime must be contextualized
and nuanced to correspond with intermediaries’ actions and resulting effects. Further, this Article seeks to strike a balance between
intermediary liability and immunity.53
Part I describes the dynamics that lead individuals to disseminate fake news stories. It then outlines a roadmap of the different
roles intermediaries play in the dissemination of fake news, including hosting and moderating content, personalizing algorithmic recommendations on organic content, and deploying targeted advertisements for profit. It explains how intermediaries’ top-down influence
exacerbates dissemination of fake news. Identifying the role that intermediaries play is the first step toward formulating a liability policy.
Part II details the law governing secondary intermediary liability
and the concept of internet exceptionalism. Subsequently, it explores the gradual erosion of immunity, Trump’s Executive Order
on Preventing Online Censorship, and new legislative bills striving
to limit intermediary immunity.54 Finally, it examines the role intermediaries play in fake news dissemination in light of free speech
considerations.
Part III argues policymakers should contextualize internet exceptionalism. It targets the exceptions to exceptionalism and outlines a nuanced liability that avoids disproportionate collateral censorship. Additionally, it proposes transparency obligations for intermediaries’ moderation activities, requiring algorithmic impact assessments as part of consumer protection regulations.
I. HOW FAKE NEWS STORIES SPREAD
Individuals have diverse motivations for initiating publication of
fake news stories. Some are narrowly self-interested, aiming to

53

See Balkin, supra note 12, at 90.
See Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (May 28, 2020), repealed by Exec.
Order No. 14,029, 86 Fed. Reg. 27,025 (May 14, 2021). See also S. 4534, 116th Cong.
(2019); S. 4066, 116th Cong. (2020).
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promote a political candidate by spreading lies about competitors.55
Others spread fake stories to promote general interest and attract
more user attention.56 There are altruists who believe conspiracies
and publicize them without checking the facts.57 Finally, there are
malicious propagators who publish fake stories solely to infringe
public interest and inflict harm.58 While initial publication may have
a limited number of recipients, information recipients may then
share the false content with others, leading to extensive dissemination and severe harm.
Initiating a fake news story is one thing, but what prompts others
to spread it? First, there is a general “truth bias,” because people
tend to accept what they hear as truthful.59 However, the nature of
the internet’s social environment fuels the distribution of fake news
stories at minimal cost. Constant internet connection and ongoing
communication allows anyone who is connected to share information. “Thus, an idea can spread exponentially and reach a global
[audience] at the click of a button.”60 As a fake story circulates, it
gains credibility—the more individuals exposed to a particular statement, the more likely they are to perceive and believe it as a known

55

Michal Lavi, Publish, Share, Re-Tweet, and Repeat, 54 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 441,
450–51 (2021).
56
Id. at 451.
57
Id.
58
Id.; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ON RUMORS: HOW FALSEHOODS SPREAD, WHY WE BELIEVE
THEM, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE 14–15 (2009).
59
CASS SUNSTEIN, LIARS: FALSEHOODS AND FREE SPEECH IN AN AGE OF DECEPTION 73
(2021).
60
Lavi, supra note 55, at 451. The internet simplifies the dissemination of information
and allows sharing to a wide audience at the click of a button. See LEE RAINIE & BARRY
WELLMAN, NETWORKED: THE NEW SOCIAL OPERATING SYSTEM 67 (2012); DAVID A.
POTTS, CYBERLIBEL: INFORMATION WARFARE IN THE 21ST CENTURY? 30 (2011); Jacqueline
D. Lipton, “We, the Paparazzi”: Developing a Privacy Paradigm for Digital Video, 95
IOWA L. REV. 919, 919 (2010); see generally DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN
CYBERSPACE (2014).
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fact.61 Moreover, lies tend to spread faster than the truth because lies
often hold audience attention by inspiring fear and surprise.62
Not all fake stories spread as extensively as others; some are
only disseminated locally.63 Why do some fake stories spread
widely while others remain limited in reach? In order to provide an
answer, sociologists developed models of collective behavior. Mark
Granovetter maintains that the key concept of “threshold” explains
these processes.64 His model assumes that information and ideas become more valuable as more individuals accept and adopt them.65
An individual’s threshold for joining an activity is quantified by the
proportion of the group the individual would have to see join in on
the activity before doing so too.66 This model assumes that a person’s behavior depends on the number of other people already engaging in that particular behavior.67 “[O]ne’s social network has a
huge potential to affect one’s decisions to adopt and disseminate
certain ideas because people respond to the influences and preferences of others.”68

61

See NICHOLAS DIFONZO & PRASHANT BORDIA, RUMOR PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIAL AND
ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACHES 225 (2007); Gordon Pennycook et al., Prior Exposure
Increases Perceived Accuracy of Fake News, 147 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 1865 (2018)
(explaining that the more people hear information, the more likely they are to believe it
and spread it); Neil Levy, The Bad News About Fake News, SOC. EPISTEMOLOGY REV. &
REPLY COLLECTIVE, August 2017, at 20 (“[F]ake news is more pernicious than most of us
realize, leaving long lasting traces on our beliefs and our behavior even when we consume
it know it is fake or when the information it contains is corrected.”); Phillips, supra note
21 and accompanying text; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND OTHER
DANGEROUS IDEAS 25–27 (2014).
62
Vosoughi et al., supra note 19, at 1146; SUNSTEIN, supra note 61, at 76.
63
CHARLES KADUSHIN, UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL NETWORKS–THEORIES, CONCEPTS AND
FINDINGS 153 (2011).
64
See Mark Granovetter, Threshold Models of Collective Behavior, 83 AM. J. SOCIO.
1420, 1422 (1978) (explaining that “different individuals require different levels of safety”
for joining an activity, such as entering a riot, and vary in the benefits they derive from the
activity; the crucial concept for describing variation among individuals is that of a
“threshold.”).
65
See id. at 1424–28.
66
Id. at 1422.
67
Id.
68
Lavi, supra note 55, at 452 (quoting NICHOLAS A. CHRISTAKIS & JAMES H. FOWLER,
CONNECTED: THE SURPRISING POWER OF OUR SOCIAL NETWORKS AND HOW THEY SHAPE
OUR LIVES 127 (2009)). See also Michal Lavi, Content Providers’ Secondary Liability: A
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In addition to a collective threshold, every individual has a personal threshold for adopting and disseminating ideas.69 Three types
of individuals can be abstractly identified. First, individuals who
have prior convictions in favor of a new idea or share the same ideology are “receptives.”70 Receptives have the lowest threshold and
tend to adopt information they receive and subsequently disseminate
it.71 Second is the “neutrals,” who do not have an inclination in favor
of or against an idea.72 However, if neutrals notice a few people have
accepted and disseminated an idea, they may come to accept, join,
and disseminate it.73 Finally, there are the “skeptics”—individuals
with a prior disposition against certain ideas. Skeptics have a high
threshold for accepting and disseminating ideas and need a great
deal of information before doing so. “However, once the evidence
becomes overwhelming—[and this evidence may include] beliefs . . . shared by many others—[the] skeptics will join others in
accepting the idea.”74
The proliferation of a fake story depends heavily on the type of
individual it encounters at the outset.75 If the story reaches receptives, the neutrals are more likely to reach their threshold, and the
skeptics will follow suit and spread the idea further.76 When an
Social Network Perspective, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 855, 889
(2016).
69
Granovetter, supra note 64 and accompanying text.
70
See Edward Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, Does More Speech Correct Falsehoods, 43
J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 67 (2014) (explaining that people have “different prior beliefs and
hence different degrees of skepticism.” Individuals who believe that the messenger is a
truth-teller largely have their beliefs buttressed).
71
See SUNSTEIN, supra note 58, at 19–20 (explaining that the individual threshold
depends on a person’s prior disposition regarding the information).
72
Id. at 20.
73
See id.
74
Michal Lavi, Evil Nudges, 21 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 17 (2018); see also Lavi,
supra note 55, at 453.
75
See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 59; Lavi, supra note 74; Lavi, supra note 55, at
453; see, e.g., BENKLER ET AL., supra note 22 and accompanying text.
76
See SUNSTEIN, supra note 59, at 83; Lavi, supra note 55, at 453–54. Because
individuals influence one another, fake stories can spread through informational cascades.
Informational cascades are generated when individuals follow the statements or actions of
predecessors and do not express their opposing opinions because they believe their
predecessors are right. As a result, the social network fails to obtain important information.
See Cass R. Sunstein & Reid Hastie, Four Failures of Deliberating Groups 2 (Univ. Chi.
L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper, Paper No. 215, 2008),
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increasing number of people believe a fake news story, it begins to
appear credible, influencing others to believe it. Social pressure also
pushes people to spread information.77 Bots are active on many platforms and echo fake stories, exacerbating the likelihood of cascades
and fake stories’ dissemination.78 These algorithmic software programs, which run according to programmed instructions, can interact socially with users and enhance trust in online communication.79
The program creates an impression that many users shared a fake
story and triggers human engagement with the content.80 Consequently, it becomes more likely that individuals will reach their
thresholds to believe a fake story and follow the herd.
Many times, fake stories spread to an “influential entity” in a
social network, such as a political candidate.81 If this influential entity accepts and spreads a story, the likelihood increases exponentially that the story will reach a tipping point.82 This example
demonstrates the importance of influential entities, whether an individual or a central website, and the structure of the social network.83

https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1125&context=public_
law_and_legal_theory [https://perma.cc/4SLD-DXT9]. See, e.g., Matthew J. Salganik et
al., Experimental Study of Inequality and Unpredictability in an Artificial Cultural Market,
311 SCI. 854, 855 (2006).
77
In these cases, “people think they know what is right, or what is likely to be right, but
they nonetheless go along with the crowd in order to maintain” their status. See Sunstein
& Hastie, supra note 76, at 15. This is the phenomenon of reputation cascades. Id.
78
JARON LANIER, TEN ARGUMENTS FOR DELETING YOUR SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS
RIGHT NOW 55–58 (2018) (“If your extended peer group contains a lot of fake people,
calculated to manipulate you, you are likely be influenced without even realizing it.”).
79
Emilio Ferrara et al., The Rise of Social Bots, COMMC’NS THE ACM, July 2016, at 99;
ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST—INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION
AGE 90, 141 (2018) (expanding on bots that are designed to enable social communication,
motivating people to let down their guard against invasions of privacy).
80
ARAL, supra note 19, at 48 (“the early tweeting activity by bots triggers a
disproportionate amount of human engagement, creating cascades of fake news, triggered
by bots but propagated by humans through the Hype Machine’s network.”).
81
Id. (explaining that when influential people share content, they can legitimize it and
exacerbate its dissemination widely on a social network).
82
WALDMAN, supra note 79, at 146; see also MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT:
HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE 60 (2000) (referring to individuals who
possess a great deal of information as “mavens”).
83
See BENKLER ET AL., supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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The proliferation of a story thereby depends heavily on the individuals who encounter its inception.84 It is difficult, however, to predict these tipping points when ideas are widely spread, as every individual in the network has a different threshold.85 Changes in a social network’s composition, social structures, and the transition path
of an idea can significantly alter the likelihood of widespread dissemination.86
A. Roadmap: Intermediaries’ Roles in Information Dissemination
and the Harm
Twenty-first century intermediaries are not merely passive conduits; they take on active roles in the dissemination of content and
influence the likelihood that individuals will cross their personal
thresholds for disseminating fake news stories. This Part maps the
roles intermediaries play in withholding or accelerating the dissemination of information: (1) hosting and providing content-neutral
tools and interfaces for dissemination; (2) moderating; (3) deploying
algorithmically personalized recommendations on organic content;
and (4) using targeted advertising to generate profit.
1. Basic Intermediation: Hosting and Providing ContentNeutral Tools and Interfaces for Dissemination
Intermediaries offer platforms for creating content and encourage ongoing engagement with their sites. They utilize technologies
and design tools that allow users to sort through vast amounts of
information, as well as share various kinds of content. However, users can abuse the platforms to spread lies and fake news.87 Intermediaries are not passive hosts; they incentivize users to share and disseminate more information because social engagement keeps users

84

See id. at 155, 156 fig.5.6.
See Granovetter, supra note 64, at 1423 (exemplifying this point through the diffusion
of rumors).
86
CHRISTAKIS & FOWLER, supra note 68, at 7 (explaining that social networks and the
connections that compose them have dramatic influence over our choices).
87
See, e.g., Hannah Ritchie, Read All About It: The Biggest Fake News Stories of 2016,
CNBC,
cnbc.com/2016/12/30/read-all-about-it-the-biggest-fake-news-stories-of2016.html [https://perma.cc/CVJ6-XR9w] (Dec. 30, 2016, 2:04 AM) (discussing a fake
news story spread on social media that claimed the pope endorsed Donald Trump).
85

2021]

TARGETING EXCEPTIONS

83

engaging with the platforms longer.88 As participation increases, intermediaries earn more revenue from advertisers.89 Continuing participation allows intermediaries to collect more user information,
target personalized advertisements, and maximize profit.90
Intermediaries encourage user participation and social sharing
by enhancing motivation to spread content, making it easier to share
content and triggering users to do so.91 Although these strategies
88

ANDREW MARANTZ, ANTI-SOCIAL: ONLINE EXTREMISTS, TECHNO-UTOPIANS AND THE
HIJACKING OF THE AMERICAN CONVERSATION 80 (2019) (“Facebook’s larger goal, which
always went unstated, was not to spread high-quality content; it was to entice more users
into spending more time on Facebook.”); see Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform
Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 140 (2017).
89
MARY ANNE FRANKS, THE CULT OF THE CONSTITUTION 171 (2019) (“The more content
users voluntarily provide (posts, shares, likes etc.), the more users interact on the platform,
and the more companies like Facebook can target users with increasingly personal
advertising. If harmful content provided by a user generates a high level of engagement
from a large number of users, then the advertising benefit of that post goes up, which means
more money in Facebook’s pocket.”).
90
This Article will describe this in Part II.I.C. See generally Jack M. Balkin, Free
Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and New School Speech
Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149 (2018); SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF
SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF
POWER 9 (2019) (coining the term “surveillance capitalism” to describe tracking users’
engagement to enhance commercial profits); Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Mobs,
Disinformation, and Death Videos: The Internet as It Is (and as It Should Be), 118 MICH.
L. REV. 1073, 1085–86; FRANKS, supra note 89; JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND
POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 65 (2019) (“Platformbased, massively intermediated environments enable people seeking connection with each
other to signal their affinities and inclinations using forms of shorthand—’Like,’ ‘Follow,’
‘Retweet,’ and so on—that simultaneously enable data capture and extraction.”).
91
See B.J. FOGG, PERSUASIVE TECHNOLOGY: USING COMPUTERS TO CHANGE WHAT WE
THINK AND DO 198 (2003) (referring to socio-technical tools for enhancing user motivation
and capability to spread content, used by intermediaries to trigger users to spread
information); WALDMAN, supra note 79, at 90; Cohen, supra note 88, at 140; NICHOLAS
CARR, THE BIG SWITCH: REWIRING THE WORLD, FROM EDISON TO GOOGLE 154–57 (2009);
JOSEPH TUROW, THE DAILY YOU: HOW THE NEW ADVERTISING INDUSTRY IS DEFINING
YOUR IDENTITY AND YOUR WORTH 72, 102 (2012). This Part describes common
intermediary strategies to push users to share more posts, news, and information, regardless
of the content shared. Yet, intermediaries can influence the content of information that
users share, as the Cambridge Analytica scandal demonstrated. This Part focuses on how
intermediaries influence user decisions to share more information, regardless of content.
For further discussion of the Cambridge Analytica Scandal, see Sam Meredith, Here’s
Everything You Need to Know About the Cambridge Analytica Scandal, CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/21/facebook-cambridge-analytica-scandal-everythingyou-need-to-know.html [https://perma.cc/TY8R-GE4R], (Mar. 23, 2018, 9:21 AM).
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enhance the dissemination of both lies and truths, lies are more
likely to spread than truths.92 The platform’s architecture influences
decisions to generate and disseminate content.93 Just a few tweaks
in the design of an intermediary’s interface can make a huge difference in how it is used and its potential for widespread circulation of
ideas. Intermediaries utilize insights gleaned from sociology, psychology, and management that allow them to predict cognitive biases and social dynamics, deploy new socio-technical systems, and
influence the flow of information.94 Much like the gaming industry,
design and technology turn the use of social media into an inherent
need.95 This causes users to become addicted to the platform, keeping them on the website.96 To make their platforms “sticky” and enhance dissemination, intermediaries “[organize] everything around
friending, clicking, retweeting, . . . responding,”97 and exhibiting to
others.98 Pictures, names, and other informal touches give the impression that online contacts are well-known friends. This choice
architecture and framing not only increases users’ addiction to a

92

Vosoughi et al., supra note 19 (explaining how researchers revealed that fake stories
are disseminated significantly “farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly” than true ones).
93
See FOGG, supra note 91, at 5.
94
TUROW, supra note 91, at 74; Lavi, supra note 55, at 461.
95
ZUBOFF, supra note 90, at 466 (explaining that “[j]ust as ordinary consumers can
become compulsive gamblers at the hands of the gaming [industry],” behavioral
technology can draw ordinary young people into an unprecedented vortex of social
information); Lavi, supra note 55, at 451.
96
ZUBOFF, supra note 90, at 466.
97
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, EXPOSED: DESIRE AND DISOBEDIENCE IN THE DIGITAL AGE 41
(2015).
98
Id. at 41, 90; Daniel Susser et al., Online Manipulation: Hidden Influences in a Digital
World, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1, 29–30 (2019) (“Both the information [we] knowingly
disseminate about [ourselves . . . when we] visit websites, make online purchases, and post
photographs and videos on social media[,] and the information [we] unwittingly
provide . . . as] those websites record data about how long [we] spend browsing them,
where [we] are when [we] access them, and which advertisements [we] click on[,] reveals
a great deal about who [we . . . are], what interests [us], and what [we] find amusing,
tempting, and off-putting.”).
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platform,99 but also the likelihood that an individual will reach his
threshold and share information he would not otherwise share.100
Moreover, intermediaries make it easier than ever to disseminate
any kind of content. For example, “share” and “re-tweet” buttons
make re-posting content incredibly easy by enabling users to share
content at the click of a button.101 Thus, users need not go through
the more cumbersome copy-and-paste process to spread content.
Due to the low cost of sharing information, it is more likely that
individuals will cross their thresholds and join others already engaged in information dissemination.102 Simplifying “the re-posting
process” encourages users to share information intuitively and instinctively, bypassing reflective thinking about the consequences of
dissemination.103 This choice architecture engineers social behavior
and influences decisions to share information.104

99

HARCOURT, supra note 97, at 122 (referring to the collection of information using the
metaphor, “the glass mirror”); LANIER, supra note 78, at 21–23, 29 (“[A]ddiction is a big
part of the reason why so many of us accept being spied on and manipulated by our
information technology.”); see also Katie Mettler, A Lawmaker Wants to End ‘Social
Media Addiction’ by Killing Features That Enable Mindless Scrolling, WASH. POST (July
30, 2019), wapo.st/2KBQ3X5 [http://perma.cc/2WF6-WXU2]; WOODROW HARTZOG,
PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 198
(2018) (expanding on architecture that causes users to become addicted to engagement);
ZUBOFF, supra note 90, at 466 and accompanying text.
100
See Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Sharing, and Trust: The Facebook Study, 67 CASE
W. RSRV. L. REV. 193, 203 (2016); Ari Ezra Waldman, Safe Social Spaces, 96 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1537, 1565 (2019); Ari Ezra Waldman, Cognitive Biases, Dark Patterns, and the
“Privacy Paradox”, 31 CURRENT OPINION IN PSYCH. 105, 108–09 (2020) (explaining that
platforms deliberately create social cues to encourage sharing); HARCOURT, supra note 97,
at 86, 99; NICHOLAS CARR, THE GLASS CAGE: AUTOMATION AND US 177–82 (2014); James
Grimmelmann, Accidental Privacy Spills, 12 J. INTERNET L. 3, 6 (2008); see generally
Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1880 (2013).
101
Lavi, supra note 55, at 464.
102
SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 108.
103
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 237 (2011) (explaining the two
systems of thinking, or modes of thought: intuitive thinking (“System 1”) and deliberative
analytical thinking (“System 2”)).
104
BRETT FRISCHMANN & EVAN SELINGER, RE-ENGINEERING HUMANITY 70, 235 (2018)
(“The smart social media environment that has emerged in the past decade of which
Facebook is an important part—encourages people to accept what [is] presented to them
without pushing for reflection or deliberation.”).
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2. Moderation
Intermediaries shape the flow of information, influencing what
is viewed, valued, and disseminated. Moderation of users’ content
is one way platforms shape public discourse. It “promotes adherence
to the platforms’ terms of use statements, site guidelines, and legal
regimes. It is a key part of the production chain of commercial sites
and social media platforms.”105 Professor Tarleton Gillespie posits
that intermediaries must moderate content; in fact, he demonstrates
that moderation is a fundamental aspect of any platform.106 Many
interviews with moderators show that moderation is necessary for
proper operation of online platforms, and intermediaries recognize
that moderation is a critical part of their production chain.107 “Social
media companies often regulate speech in many different ways, using different tools.”108 Companies govern speech, enforce policies
and terms of services, and moderate harmful content,109 such as fake
news and incitement, even though they are not obligated to do so.
They can moderate content before it is published on their sites (exante moderation) or after (ex-post moderation).110 Moderation may
be reactive, such as when users send notice to moderators of inappropriate content, or proactive, such as when moderators seek out
published content for removal.111 It can be done automatically by
software or manually by humans.112 Moderators that operate without
sufficient transparency can remove or obscure content, making it

105

Michal Lavi, Do Platforms Kill?, 43 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 477, 496 (2020) (citing
SARAH T. ROBERTS, BEHIND THE SCREEN: CONTENT MODERATION IN THE SHADOW OF
SOCIAL MEDIA 71 (2019)).
106
GILLESPIE, supra note 27, at 5–6.
107
ROBERTS, supra note 105, at 203.
108
Lavi, supra note 105, at 497; see also Eric Goldman, Content Moderation
Remedies, MICH. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 1) (on file with author)
(reviewing the range of options to “redress content or accounts that violate the applicable
rules”).
109
See Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing
Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1625–30 (2018) (explaining that the reasons for
moderation are corporate responsibility and economics).
110
Id. at 1635.
111
Id.
112
Id.
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less visible.113 They can also suspend accounts.114 “Intermediaries
can and do moderate content” to enforce violations of the platforms’
terms of services and community guidelines and to mitigate the effects of harmful content in various contexts, such as incitement, defamation, and fake stories.115 However, intermediaries’ approaches
toward moderation are inconsistent within the given platform116 and
differ among social media sites.117 The diverging attitudes of Twitter
and Facebook toward Trump’s tweets118 exemplifies such differences. Moderation can influence the visibility of fake news stories
and other related harmful content, withhold dissemination, accelerate dissemination, and influence the likelihood of users noticing and
believing it.
B. Algorithmically Personalized Recommendations on Organic
Content
Intermediaries can promote specific content in users’ newsfeeds
via algorithmic recommendations on organic user content.119 They
generally optimize relevant content to deliver to users, improving
the experience and enhancing engagement.120 This practice is often
113

See, e.g., Hern, supra note 25; Niva Elkin-Koren & Maayan Perel, Guarding the
Guardians: Content Moderation by Online Intermediaries and the Rule of Law, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK ONLINE INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY 669, 674 (Giancarlo Frosio ed., 2020)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3542992
[https://perma.cc/P7E2WL98].
114
See Goldman, supra note 108, at 37.
115
Lavi, supra note 105, at 497 (describing moderation practices regarding incitement of
terror).
116
GILLESPIE, supra note 27, at 117 (“Because this work is distributed among different
labor forces, because it is unavailable to public or regulatory scrutiny, and because it is
performed under high-pressure conditions, there is a great deal of room for slippage,
distortion, and failure.”).
117
Id. at 20 (“Platforms vary, in ways that matter both for the influence they can assert
over users and for how they should be governed.”); see also Lavi, supra note 105, at 498
(giving a contextually related example: Twitter and Facebook have different attitudes
toward moderation of incitement of terror).
118
See, e.g., Spangler, supra note 1.
119
See, e.g., FRISCHMANN & SELINGER, supra note 104, at 117–18 (describing Facebook’s
experiment in which the company displayed negative posts by “friends,” and omitted
positive posts).
120
COHEN, supra note 90, at 85 (“Platform-based providers of search, and content
aggregation, and social networking services operate at the intersection of behavioral
microtargeting and content optimization for engagement.”).
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problematic,121 and can result in recommendations for fake news
stories and conspiracy theories presented directly to susceptible users.122
Although it may appear as if the system operates without human
intervention, the algorithm’s operation depends on the programmer’s discretion.123 The system’s designers can limit algorithmic
functions.124 Intermediaries can prioritize content according to users’ characteristics and activities. However, the intermediary can
also preference an algorithm programmed without content neutrality
and promote specific types of content or agendas according to its
own strategic preferences. For example, according to testimony
from former Facebook product manager Frances Haugen in front of
the Senate committee, Facebook is aware that its algorithm promotes harmful content, and the company still avoids deploying
counter-measures.125 Moreover, the intermediary can tinker with its
algorithm to decrease the visibility of specific content or increase
the exposure of other items, thereby influencing the likelihood that
users will further disseminate the information.126 For example,
Google tinkers with search results to favor specific businesses.127
121

VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 29, at 54–55 (explaining that what makes Facebook
good also makes it bad, and demonstrating that Facebook has grown into the most reckless
and irresponsible system in the commercial world).
122
Manheim & Kaplan, supra note 45, at 147.
123
Ari Ezra Waldman, Power, Process, and Automated Decision-Making, 88 FORDHAM
L. REV. 613, 615 (2019) (explaining that the operation of the algorithm is part of the
neoliberal managerial project).
124
Philip S. Thomas et al., Preventing Undesirable Behavior of Intelligent Machines,
366 SCI. 999, 1003 (2019); Lauren E. Willis, Deception by Design, 34 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
115, 181 (2020).
125
Ryan Mac & Cecilia Kang, Whistle-Blower Says Facebook ‘Chooses Profits Over
Safety’, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/03/technology/whistle-blowerfacebook-frances-haugen.html [https://perma.cc/NSK5-GJT4 ] (Oct. 27, 2021, 5:51 PM).
126
See generally Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Taming the Golem: Challenges of
Ethical Algorithmic Decision-Making, 19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 125, 137–38 (2017)
(differentiating between “policy-neutral algorithms” that can, in some cases, reflect
existing entrenched societal biases and historic inequalities, and in contrast, “policydirected algorithms” that are purposefully designed to advance a predefined policy
agenda).
127
Google’s algorithms are subject to regular “tinkering” by executives and engineers to
generate specific search results, including algorithms affecting topics such as vaccinations
and autism. See Kirsten Grind et al., How Google Interferes with Its Search Algorithms
and Changes Your Results, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 15, 2019, 8:15 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
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Similarly, intermediaries can use algorithms to favor specific candidates in elections, systematically prefer specific businesses, and
spread algorithmic propaganda to influence users in favor of specific
viewpoints.128
Intermediaries are engineered to promote items that generate reactions and elicit strong emotions through algorithmic recommendations. This includes fake news stories and extremist content.129
They influence the type of content users see and increase the likelihood of reaching users’ thresholds to pass along content. The Facebook cognition experiment demonstrates this: Facebook displayed
only negative posts with negative words to some users, while displaying positive posts to others. Users exposed only to negative
posts created similar posts and shared them at higher rates than other
types of content.130 Users exposed only to positive posts disseminated more positive posts.
Even when intermediaries use algorithms not aimed at promoting specific types of content, the algorithm is never absolutely neutral.131 It personalizes recommendations users see on their news
articles/how-google-interferes-with-its-search-algorithms-and-changes-your-results11573823753 [https://perma.cc/YAW5-GJ3S].
128
See generally LANIER, supra note 78, at 81–92.
129
Jonah Berger & Katherine L. Milkman, What Makes Online Content Viral?, 49 J.
MKTG. RES. 192, 193–205 (2012); MARANTZ, supra note 88, at 79 (“Content that evokes
high-arousal emotion is more likely to be shared . . . .”); see id. at 118 (“The algorithms
were not designed to gauge whether an idea was true or false, prosocial or antisocial; they
were designed to measure whether a meme was causing a spike of activating emotions in
a large number of people.”); VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 29, at 5–9 (describing how
Facebook develops algorithms that favor highly charged content and depends on selfserving advertising systems that precisely target ads using massive surveillance and
personal dossiers); LANIER, supra note 78, at 23, 120–21; Citron, supra note 90; ZUBOFF,
supra note 90, at 301; Mark Bergen, YouTube Executives Ignored Warnings, Letting Toxic
Videos Run Rampant, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 2, 2019, 11:29 AM), bloom.bg/36UCOLi
[https://perma.cc/AFX6-QRXK].
130
Adam D. I. Kramer et al., Experimental Evidence of Massive-Scale Emotional
Contagion Through Social Networks, 111 PNAS 8788, 8788 (2014); FRISCHMANN &
SELINGER, supra note 104, at 117–18 (describing the impact of Facebook’s cognition
experiment on user emotions); see also Manheim & Kaplan, supra note 45, at 147
(“Google’s YouTube also profits nicely from fake news. Its ‘recommendation algorithm’
serves ‘up next’ video thumbnails that its AI program determines will be of interest to each
of its 1.5 billion users.”).
131
FRANKS, supra note 89, at 186 (“[W]hile algorithms are built on data, they also
‘optimize output to parameters the company chooses, crucially, under conditions also
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feeds based on collected information, social network engagement,
social cues—such as clicks on content, “likes,” and “shares”—and
past activity on the platform.132 Intermediaries can also characterize
users by their social relations and friends within a social network.
Such information allows artificial intelligence algorithms to show
users personalized recommendations for relevant content. By “systemization of the personal,”133 intermediaries influence and even
control with whom users connect, what they see online, and the visibility of specific content.134 Thus, intermediaries selectively influence the content users see on their newsfeeds and do not present
content chronologically.135
Personalizing content does not offer equal choice to all users.
The intermediary’s algorithm determines what recommendations
and content will be available to whom.136 Thus, different people see
different content and have varied online experiences.137 Personalized prioritization of content can result in socio-technological engineering and have self-reinforcing power.138 Algorithmically

shaped by the company’ . . . .Algorithms, in other words, are human choices all the way
down.”).
132
Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech Is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011, 2027 (2018)
(“The creation of personalized feeds is inevitably content based—social media sites have
to decide what content is likely to be most interesting to their end users.”).
133
Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1021 (2014).
134
For a related context of discrimination, see Karen Levy & Solon Barocas, Designing
Against Discrimination in Online Markets, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1183, 1183 (2017)
(“[P]latforms necessarily exercise a great deal of control over how users’ encounters are
structured—including who is matched with whom for various forms of exchange.”).
135
Balkin, supra note 132 and accompanying text.
136
ARAL, supra note 19, at 211 (expanding on optimization algorithms); id. at 220
(“algorithmic emphasis on trending make the New Social Age rife with inequality”).
137
Olivier Sylvain, Discriminatory Designs on User Data, COLUMBIA U. KNIGHT FIRST
AMEND. INST. (Apr. 1, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/discriminatory-designsuser-data [https://perma.cc/PQ85-RRG2] (“[M]any intermediaries analyze, sort, and
repurpose the user content they elicit. Facebook and Twitter, for example, employ software
to make meaning out of their users’ ‘reactions,’ search terms, and browsing activity in order
to curate the content of each user’s individual feed, personalized advertisements, and
recommendations about ‘who to follow.’”).
138
Id.; see also ZUBOFF, supra note 90, at 19 (“New automated protocols are designed to
influence and modify human behavior at scale as the means of production is subordinated
to a new and more complex means of behavior modification.”); LANIER, supra note 78, at
28–29 (referring to this algorithmic propaganda as “BUMMER”—Behavior of Users
Modified and Made into Empire for Rent).
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personalized recommendations can influence future users’ choices
and the likelihood users will change their minds.139 Because algorithmic recommendations are tailored to the user’s characteristics,
they usually reinforce pre-existing beliefs. In other words, the user
is “receptive” to information that confirms prior dispositions and
more likely to accept such information as true.140 Algorithmic recommendations do not end with influencing individual beliefs. Rather, they affect dissemination throughout the network, resulting in
a feedback loop that reinforces the individual’s cluster of connections who share similar characteristics.141 As the algorithm narrows
information available to a user and his social connections, it helps
create filters applied to individuals echoing similar opinions.142 As
a result, the marketplace of ideas is hampered.

139

Michal S. Gal, Algorithmic Challenges to Autonomous Choice, 23 MICH. TECH. L.
REV. 59, 60–61 (2018); see also ZUBOFF, supra note 90, at 20; Danielle Keats Citron &
Neil M. Richards, Four Principles for Digital Expression (You Won’t Believe #3!), 95
WASH. U. L. REV. 1353, 1360 (2018) (“[D]igital expressive opportunities are neither
limitless nor uniform.”).
140
See COHEN, supra note 90, at 85 (“[S]ocial networking providers like Facebook and
microblogging platforms like Twitter function as de facto aggregators for a wide range of
content and deliver feeds optimized to everything that is known or inferred about particular
users’ opinions and beliefs.”) For more information on the confirmation bias, see
SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 122–24; BENKLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 76 (explaining that
individuals “look for media outlets and politicians that will inform them as best as possible
without suffering too much cognitive discomfort.”).
141
See Julie E. Cohen, The Emergent Limbic Media System, in LIFE AND THE LAW IN THE
ERA OF DATA-DRIVEN AGENCY 61, 72 (Mireille Hildebrandt & Kieron O’Hara eds., 2020);
Julie E. Cohen, Internet Utopianism and the Practical Inevitability of Law, 18 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 85, 88 (2019) (referring to the feedback loop caused by algorithmic
recommendations and targeting, noting “[a]lgorithmic processes optimized to boost clickthrough rates and prompt social sharing heighten the volatility of online interactions, and
surveillant assemblages designed to enhance capabilities for content targeting and
behavioral marketing create powerful—and easily weaponized—stimulus-response
feedback loops.”).
142
See SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 98–136. It should be noted that Eli Pariser was one
of the first to warn that algorithms show links that users are more likely to click. ELI
PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: WHAT THE INTERNET IS HIDING FROM YOU 35–48 (2011); See
also MARANTZ, supra note 88, at 76 (explaining that filter bubbles are not a bug, “but a
central feature of social media. It is hard to see how [ . . . it] could flourish without
[them].”); PARISER, supra, at 157–58 (“[E]ach social network developed its own set of
content-sorting algorithms, many of which, despite the good intentions of the engineers
who built them, would start to function as filter bubbles or radicalization engines.”).
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C. Targeting Advertisements for Profit
Facebook will run any “political” ad you want, even if it’s a lie.
And they’ll even help you micro-target those lies to their users for
maximum effect. Under this twisted logic, if Facebook were around
in the 1930s, it would have allowed Hitler to post [thirty]-second ads
on his “solution” to the “Jewish problem.”143
Intermediaries directly profit from targeting advertisements.144
This type of influence on the information flow is different from algorithmically personalized recommendations on organic content.
Whereas recommendations regarding organic content provide users
with relevant content and enhance engagement by using policy-neutral algorithms, targeted advertisements aim to promote the advertisers’ agendas. They use policy-directed algorithms and tools biased in favor of the advertisers’ agenda and are anything but neutral
to content.145 The social media advertising ecosystem is a persuasion
market.146 In this capacity, intermediaries develop special strategies
for refined targeting and create a different context for the information. By leveraging the enormous amount of user data they collect, analyzing it, and developing cutting edge micro-targeting tools,
intermediaries offer advertisers the opportunity to display “the right
ad, to the right person, at the right time,”147 thereby influencing user
consciousness and subverting user decision-making. The following
Part describes these stages.

143

Cohen, supra note 24.
ARAL, supra note 19, at 203 (“Platforms like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube provide
connections, communication and content to get consumers’ attention. They then sell that
attention to brands, governments, and politicians who want to change people’s perceptions,
opinion and behaviors with ads.”).
145
Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 126, at 137–39 (differentiating between “policyneutral algorithms” and “policy directed algorithms”).
146
ARAL, supra note 19, at 133 (“[S]ocial media advertising ecosystem is a persuasion
market. Brands, governments and political campaigns invest in it to persuade us to change
our behavior, from how we vote to what products we buy.”).
147
People-Based Marketing: Thinking People-First Planning and Measurement,
FACEBOOK IQ (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.facebook.com/business/news/insights/thefuture-of-marketing-people-based-planning-and-measurement [https://perma.cc/8UV8LLJV]; see also COHEN, supra note 90, at 180 (“Targeted advertising can ensure that
consumers see only certain options, and cutting-edge behavioral microtargeting techniques
that identify points of vulnerability can be used to shape and refine targeting strategies.”).
144
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1. Data Collection
Intermediaries seduce users into sharing more information by
using interfaces designed to encourage sharing, subsequently exposing users to robust collection of personal data.148 For example, platforms can offer personality questionnaires and draw information on
users’ traits for profiling.149 In addition to information users willfully disseminate while engaging with others, intermediaries are
constantly collecting user data incidental to everyday user activity
without the individual’s awareness.150 The rapid move into a world
dominated by the Internet of Things (“IoT”) merges individuals’
online activities with their offline activities and enables companies
to collect data in domains traditionally perceived as offline
realms.151 “Every minute of every day, everywhere on the planet,
dozens of companies . . . are logging the movements of millions of
people with mobile phones and storing the information in gigantic
data files,”152 providing intermediaries with troves of user data. 153
As the recent Facebook leak demonstrated, companies can collect data for one purpose and share it with third parties for other

148

See infra Part II.A.
See Meredith, supra note 91.
150
See ZUBOFF, supra note 90, at 80–81; COHEN, supra note 90, at 42. Ninety-two percent
of websites have embedded Google trackers, so that the company knows about every place
a person visits on the internet—whether or not he has a Google account or uses any Google
services. See Ibrahim Altaweel et al., Web Privacy Census, TECH. SCI. (Dec. 14, 2015),
https://techscience.org/a/2015121502/ [https://perma.cc/UB69-6K8C]; ARAL, supra note
19, at 206 (explaining that microtargeting models are powered by reams of personal data
about consumers’ demographics, behaviors, preferences, and psychological profiles).
151
GILAD ROSNER & ERIN KENNEALLY, UNIV. CAL. BERKELEY CTR. FOR LONG-TERM
CYBERSECURITY, PRIVACY AND THE INTERNET OF THINGS 7 (2018) (“As the Internet of
Things expands, this type of granular data collection is moving into domains that have
traditionally been considered ‘offline.’”).
152
Stuart A. Thompson & Charlie Warzel, Twelve Million Phones, One Dataset, Zero
Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019), nyti.ms/2Zfby6E [https://perma.cc/K3D7-TBKV]; see
COHEN, supra note 90, at 57 (“[S]ubsequent continuing extensions of surveillance
capability have been more deliberate. The primary vehicles for those extensions have been
the marketplace shifts toward smart mobile devices, wearable computing, and the internet
of things.”).
153
ROSNER & KENNEALLY, supra note 151, at 5. This scale of collection is made possible
through smart connected devices, such as wearables, digital assistants, smart speakers,
fitness trackers, and other gadgets that include sensors that sense and monitor our every
utterance.
149
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purposes.154 A person can share information with an application that
is later transferred to Facebook.155 In many cases, users consent to
data collection without understanding the implications. This can be
attributed to dark patterns in the platform’s architecture that intentionally confuse users into clicking “I agree.”156 In other cases, individuals have no choice but to consent, because there is no equivalent alternative to the service.157
2. Analyzing and Profiling
Intermediaries translate raw data they collect into behavioral insights about users and third parties.158 They collect data from a variety of sources, and users allow them to identify and extract unpredictable value from such data by exploiting new capabilities in data
154

Sebastian Klovig Skelton & Bill Goodwin, Lawmakers Study Leaked Facebook
Documents Made Public Today, COMPUT. WKLY. (Nov. 6, 2019, 1:21 PM),
https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252473540/Lawmakers-study-leaked-Facebookdocuments-made-public-today [https://perma.cc/E956-8ATG] (revealing the document
leak and explaining that “Facebook planned to use its Android app to match users’ location
data with mobile-phone base station IDs to deliver ‘location-aware’ products without users’
consent.” Facebook also gave preference to certain deals to partners who shared their user
data with Facebook.); see also Facebook Sold a Rival-Squashing Move as Privacy Policy,
Documents Reveal, GUARDIAN (Nov. 6, 2019, 01:48 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
us-news/2019/nov/06/facebook-privacy-switcharoo-plan-emails [https://perma.cc/LS549DPV].
155
Calo, supra note 133, at 1004; see, e.g., Sam Schechner & Mark Secada, You Give
Apps Sensitive Personal Information. Then They Tell Facebook., WALL ST. J. (Feb. 22,
2019, 11:07 AM), on.wsj.com/2HsnY40 [https://perma.cc/GL83-YW8H].
156
Waldman, Cognitive Biases, Dark Patterns, and the “Privacy Paradox”, supra note
100, at 107 (“designers intentionally make it difficult for users to effectuate their privacy
preferences.”); id. at 108 (“Dark patterns can hide disclosure dangers while simultaneously
highlighting the powerful social cues to share.”); Jamie Luguri & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz,
Shining a Light on Dark Patterns, 13 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 43, 43 (2021) (“Dark patterns are
user interfaces whose designers knowingly confuse users, make it difficult for users to
express their actual preferences, or manipulate users into taking certain actions. They
typically prompt users to rely on System 1 decision-making rather than more deliberate
System 2 processes.”).
157
CARISSA VELIZ: PRIVACY IS POWER: WHY AND HOW YOU SHOULD TAKE BACK
CONTROL OF YOUR DATA 39 (2020) (explaining that during COVID-19 lockdowns
individuals were in fact forced to agree to Zoom’s terms of service in order to work and to
allow their children to attend distance learning; in fact, the service became indispensable
in order to be full participants in society).
158
Jack M. Balkin, The Fiduciary Model of Privacy, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 11, 17 (2020)
(“As digital companies know more about a given person, they can also know more about
other people who are similar to that person or are connected to that person.”).
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analysis.159 Complex algorithms mine the information, integrate it,
find connections and correlations between data items, identify patterns, and draw conclusions about individuals.160 Analyzing “likes”
on Facebook allows intermediaries to evaluate a wide range of personality traits, emotional states,161 and psychographic traits162 and
discover facts about users—even facts users never meant to share
with anyone.163
Beyond obtaining knowledge about a user’s present emotional
state and reactions, processing data on user behavior can forecast
future feelings and thoughts.164 The result is not just a feedback but
also a feed-forward by looking backwards.165 For example, Cambridge Analytica used information about users’ personality traits
drawn from personality questionnaires to develop a model for

159

COHEN, supra note 90, at 56 (“‘Big Data,’ was fast-evolving group of techniques for
converting voluminous, heterogeneous flows of physical, transactional, and behavioral
information about people.”); see also id. at 66 (“After personal data have been cultivated
and harvested, they are processed to generate patterns and predictions about data subjects’
preferences and behavior.”); Max N. Helveston, Consumer Protection in the Age of Big
Data, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 859, 867 (2016) (articulating the distinguishing characteristics
of Big Data analytics: volume, velocity, and variety); Fred H. Cate & Viktor MayerSchönberger, Notice and Consent in a World of Big Data, 3 INT’L DATA PRIV. L. 67, 69
(2013) (discussing the ubiquity of data collection and technological developments that
expand the ability to analyze, identify, and extract new value from seemingly worthless
data).
160
VIKTOR MAYER SCHÖNBERGER & THOMAS RAMGE, REINVENTING CAPITALISM IN THE
AGE OF BIG DATA 77–78 (2018).
161
See Michal Kosinski et al., Private Traits and Attributes Are Predictable from Digital
Records of Human Behavior, 110 PNAS 5802, 5802 (2013); Youyou Wu et al., ComputerBased Personality Judgments Are More Accurate Than Those Made by Humans, 112
PNAS 1036, 1037–38 (2015).
162
Psychographic profiles were at the core of the Cambridge Analytica Scandal. See
Hannes Grassegger & Mikael Krogerus, The Data That Turned the World Upside Down,
VICE (Jan. 28, 2017, 9:15 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/mg9vvn/how-our-likeshelped-trump-win [https://perma.cc/HZC2-MX29]; VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 29, at
150–54; see generally Terrell McSweeny, Psychographics, Predictive Analytics, Artificial
Intelligence & Bots: Is the FTC Keeping Pace?, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 514 (2018).
163
ZUBOFF, supra note 90, at 274–77; Gregory Park et al., Automatic Personality
Assessment Through Social Media Language, 108 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH., 934,
943–44 (2015).
164
ZUBOFF, supra note 90, at 95 (referring to data on the behavior of technology users as
“behavioral surplus”).
165
HARCOURT, supra note 97, at 145–46.
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predicting voter behavior and used it to target political messages.166
The more data intermediaries collect, the more accurate their predictive algorithms are. More predictive algorithms result in intermediaries’ powerful ability to influence users through digital advertising.167
3. Developing Targeting Tools
Intermediaries build powerful tools for political and commercial
campaigns.168 They can target advertisements to voters based on
data from multiple sources. First, intermediaries can use data they
collect as described. Second, they can use data from third-party companies.169 Third, they can use data shared by advertisers. Analyzing
such data allows intermediaries to assign attributes to individual users, define specific target audiences for advertisements, and narrow
distribution to the audience most likely to respond.170
Intermediaries also develop interfaces that make it easier for advertisers to collect user data and refine their advertisements and potential target audiences.171 Facebook offers advertising tools for collecting information and provides a vast array of targeting options.172
The Pixel tool serves as a good example. This code can be operationalized in every website, collecting data to help advertisers track
166

VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 29, at 155.
Balkin, supra note 12, at 84; Kim, supra note 29, at 878 (explaining that mass data
collection and analysis makes thousands of user attributes available for advertisers to refine
their target audiences).
168
BENKLER et. al., supra note 22, at 271–75.
169
For example, until the Cambridge Analytica scandal, Facebook cooperated with data
broker companies like Experian and Acxiom to use their data for more accurate ad
targeting. Kurt Wagner, Facebook Is Cutting Third-Party Data Providers Out of Ad
Targeting to Clean Up Its Act, VOX (Mar. 28, 2018, 6:11 PM), https://www.vox.com/
2018/3/28/17174098/facebook-data-advertising-targeting-change-experian-acxiom
[https://perma.cc/6QAY-KSP3].
170
Kim, supra note 29, at 878 (explaining that the collection of data allows intermediaries
to target advertisements based on geographic location, interest, affiliations, or behaviors).
171
Kreiss & Perault, supra note 15 (“Facebook allows advertisers to bring their own data
to their platforms for targeting purposes, and Twitter has similar tools for commercial
ads.”). See MARANTZ, supra note 88, at 78 (discussing companies such as Upworthy that
specialize in creating clickable and sharable headlines and test them against one another
algorithmically to determine which is most popular).
172
ARAL, supra note 19, at 207 (explaining that microtargeting can depend on
demographics, behavior, preferences, and psychological profiles).
167
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conversions from Facebook advertisements, optimize those ads, and
build target audiences for future ads.173 It works by placing and triggering cookies that track users as they interact with the advertisers’
websites and Facebook ads.174 This tool allows for data collection
and audience targeting through different parameters.175 For example, the “Lookalike Audience” tool176 allows advertisers to provide
Facebook with information about an existing group—the source audience—which represents its target audience and serves as the basis
for targeting. Facebook also provides “Custom Audiences . . . —a
matching system pairing one mode of contact with that person’s Facebook profile,” that allows businesses to interact with relevant users across multiple channels.177 In most cases, businesses can expect
thirty to seventy percent of their contacts to have matching profiles
on the platform; Custom Audiences can thereby reach highly targeted individuals.178
Likewise, Twitter developed targeting tools based on users’ spoken languages, genders, interests, followers of relevant accounts,
and devices used.179 Behavioral targeting is then based on users’ activity patterns.180 Moreover, intermediaries provide interfaces that
allow ad campaigns to measure responses to advertisements181 and

173

Newberry, supra note 32.
Id.
175
ARAL, supra note 19, at 207; Rebecca Uliasz, “Optimize User Experience”:
Optimization Techniques and the Simulation of Life, from the Model to the Algorithm, 21
REV. COMMC’N 129, 137 (2021) (“The pixel permits an advertiser to track, organize, and
interpret information about user behaviors on a webpage to target potential customers.
Audience data are algorithmically processed by Facebook internally to achieve different
optimization aims, such as increasing conversions on a specific ad or maximizing highvalue purchases.”).
176
About Lookalike Audiences, FACEBOOK BUS., https://www.facebook.com/
business/help/164749007013531?id=401668390442328 [https://perma.cc/WS6S-TVNE];
Kim, supra note 29, at 879.
177
See What Is a Facebook Custom Audience and How Can They Grow Online Stores?,
supra note 33.
178
Id.
179
See Twitter Ads Targeting, TWITTER BUS., https://business.twitter.com/en/advertising/
targeting.html [https://perma.cc/B3U2-UPC9].
180
See id.
181
Micah L. Berman, Manipulative Marketing and the First Amendment, 103 GEO. L.J.
497, 518 (2015) (explaining that neuro-marketing specialists measure the brain’s response
to marketing stimuli in real time, allowing companies to determine “individuals’ emotional
174
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refine their targeting. These interfaces make it possible to quickly
evaluate how well different versions of the same message elicit engagement in the target audience and increase the advertisements’
relevance.182 Intermediaries can experiment with levels of influence,
assess feedback, and select the most effective tool.183
Targeting tools enable intermediaries to identify specific voters,
geographic regions, and demographic segments184 based on users’
personal data.185 Due to accurate targeting, only the narrowly tailored, intended recipients see “dark ads,” making these ads unavailable for public scrutiny.186 Therefore, it becomes more difficult for
watchdogs such as journalists and civil society organizations to detect these advertisements and alert the public to fake news, including
politicians’ lies.
4. Strategies of Targeting
Targeting susceptible users is only part of the story. The influence strategies that intermediaries utilize are beyond persuasion,187
responses to brands and brand preferences, even when the individual may be unaware of
the brand’s effect on his subconscious decision making.”).
182
See, e.g., Facebook for Business: Make Smarter Business Decisions with Actionable
Insights., FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/business/measurement [https://perma.cc/
DYL5-HC87] (providing a service that includes A/B testing to compare versions of a single
variable in advertisements).
183
Tal Z. Zarsky, Privacy and Manipulation in the Digital Age, 20 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 157, 170 (2019).
184
Platforms can change ad targeting to avoid some legal violations related to targeting,
such as discrimination. However, the change is aimed at the segments of targeting and not
the content of the advertisements and strategies of targeting, and therefore the problem of
accurate targeting of fake news stories remains. See Kim, supra note 29, at 878 (“After
several lawsuits alleged these tools could be used to discriminate, Facebook agreed in
March 2019 to a settlement restricting the types of attributes that can be used to select an
audience for employment, housing, and credit advertisements.”); Galen Sherwin & Esha
Bhandari, Facebook Settles Civil Rights Cases by Making Sweeping Changes to Its Online
Ad Platform, ACLU (Mar. 19, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/womensrights/womens-rights-workplace/facebook-settles-civil-rights-cases-making-sweeping
[https://perma.cc/UZ4R-9757].
185
BENKLER ET AL, supra note 22, at 271–75; see also Kim, supra note 29, at 871 (“[Even
if] an advertiser uses neutral targeting criteria and intends to reach a diverse audience, an
ad-targeting algorithm may distribute information about opportunities in a biased way.”).
186
BENKLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 272–75.
187
Cohen, Internet Utopianism and the Practical Inevitability of Law, supra note 141
and accompanying text.
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as they turn advertisements into compelling, personalized narratives
and create a context of vulnerability.188 Intermediaries and advertisers use cognitive psychology to influence human decisions in unsuspecting ways.189 They target the intuitive, emotional, and instinctive
mode of thought (“System 1”), while bypassing the deliberative
mode (“System 2”).190 To do so, they use non-informational marketing strategies.191
First, they stimulate users’ feelings, causing emotional responses to advertisements,192 such as sadness, happiness, fear,193 or
anxiety,194 thereby increasing the advertisements’ impact.195
Second, intermediaries can utilize artificial intelligence entities
(“AI agents”) in advertising to provide a persuasive, interactive experience by imitating human feedback.196 AI agents are designed to
engage on a social level, create a natural interactive experience between humans and algorithms, and confuse users into trusting them
188

HARTZOG supra note 99, at 202 (“Precision advertising can be used to exploit biases
and perpetuate falsehoods in significantly corrosive ways.”).
189
Berman, supra note 181, at 517–18 (referring to subconscious targeting).
190
KAHNEMAN, supra note 103 and accompanying text; see also Shmuel I. Becher &
Yuval Feldman, Manipulating, Fast and Slow: The Law of Non-Verbal Market
Manipulations, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 101, 112 (2016).
191
Berman, supra note 181, at 522 (discussing the collapse of the informational paradigm
in marketing) (“[M]arketers (1) are most successful when emotional content—not
information—is presented to consumers, (2) can carefully craft marketing appeals (using
humor and other non-informational techniques) to increase the viewer’s/reader’s
receptivity to the marketing message while disengaging critical faculties, and (3) can
influence consumer behavior without consumers being aware of the powerful effect of
advertising.”); Becher & Feldman, supra note 190, at 119–21 (referring to non-verbal
market manipulation, such as the colors on shopping sites and music played in shopping
centers).
192
Tamara R. Piety, Advertising as Experimentation on Human Subjects, 19 ADVERT. &
SOC’Y Q., no. 2, 2018, at 18 (“[M]arketers often rely on stimulating fear, anxiety, jealousy,
lust, avarice, hunger, and insecurity; in short, a whole repertoire of emotions and desires.”).
193
Id. at 34 (“Advertising professionals readily admit that fear can sell products. Indeed,
a great deal of research has been directed at attempting to find the ‘optimal’ level of fear.
As one textbook puts it, ‘the appeal to fear is especially effective as a means of enhancing
motivation.’”).
194
Id. at 35 (“A good deal of the fear that advertising attempts to stimulate is perhaps
more appropriately described as ‘anxiety’—usually about conforming to social norms in
dress, grooming, attractiveness, and weight.”).
195
See MARANTZ, supra note 88, at 79 (“There are as many ways to attract a person’s
attention as there are to bait a mousetrap, and some baits work better than others.”).
196
PASQUALE, supra note 33, at 89–91 (2020); ARAL, supra note 19, at 218–20.
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as human,197 rendering users vulnerable to manipulation.198 Consequently, intermediaries have greater power than traditional advertisements to alter user experience and decision-making in support of
a politician.
Third, intermediaries can enhance the “quality” of a message
through fake “likes” and “shares.” For instance, potential voters may
assume that many people support a politician due to a sea of likes
and re-tweets created by an army of bots.199 They can also lead users
to believe that a central entity in the social network, such as an
“opinion leader,” supports a politician.200Advertisers may create
deepfakes that seem reliable, even though they do not reflect the
truth.201 For example, they can target deepfake videos of an opinion
leader supporting a politician, even though it never happened.202
Further, intermediaries can plant messages in the social network
without disclosing they are posting on behalf of the platform or an
advertiser.203 This strategy induces subliminal trust based on false

197

Madeline Lamo & Ryan Calo, Regulating Bot Speech, 66 UCLA L. REV. 988, 993
(2019) (“[B]ots are software programs that run according to instructions. We use the term
here to refer to automated agents that initiate communication online, by phone, or through
other technologically mediated means.”); Alexander Tsesis, Marketplace of Ideas, Privacy,
and the Digital Audiences, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1585, 1621 (2019).
198
WALDMAN, supra note 79, at 136 (2018) (referring to the false trust that social robots
create. Waldman focuses on physical bots, but the insights also apply to virtual robots
(bots)).
199
It should be noted that similarly, in a commercial context, advertisers lead consumers
to make a false assumption that there is a high demand for a product. See Arunesh Mathur
et al., Dark Patterns at Scale: Findings From a Crawl of 11K Shopping Websites, 3 PROC.
ASS’N COMPUTING MACH. ON HUM.-COMPUT. INTERACTION 81:1, 81:21 (2019),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1907.07032.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZLR-LTPC].
200
For discussion on the importance of the message’s source, see Everett M. Rogers &
David G. Cartano, Methods of Measuring Opinion Leadership, 26 PUB. OP. Q. 435, 435
(1962) (“Opinion leaders” are individuals who “exert an unequal amount of influence on
the decisions of others.”).
201
ARAL, supra note 19, at 54 (“[T]hat’s the future of reality distortion in a world with
exponentially improving GANs technology . . . .”).
202
Chesney & Citron, supra note 40, at 1760 (raising the problem of deep fakes that are
created by general adversarial neural networks and seem to be reliable despite not reflecting
the truth); Mary Anne Franks & Ari Ezra Waldman, Sex, Lies, and Videotape: Deep Fakes
and Free Speech Delusions, 78 MD. L. REV. 892, 894 (2019); Hasen, supra note 45, at 542.
203
See ROBERTS, supra note 105, at 141 (2019) (“OnlineExperts’ content moderation
employees [also actually created . . . ] new content, seeding sites with messages and
discussion points designed to encourage customer participation and engagement, and to
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assumptions.204 As a result, information cascades occur at the social
network level205 and enhance structural vulnerabilities.206
Data collection and analysis, targeting tools, and vast influence
strategies can subvert decision-making.207 As targeting improves,
the likelihood of mobilizing voters to favor specific politicians for
the wrong reasons increases. Negative fake news advertisements
concerning politicians can have severe consequences on both a politician’s reputation and the public interest, infringing citizens’ political security and eroding democracy.208 Therefore, combating fake
news advertisements is crucial.
Following the public’s concern over fake news advertisements,
Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey announced that Twitter would ban political advertisements completely.209 Yet Twitter’s ad ban has exceptions: advertisements not mentioning legislation were permitted.210
Unlike Twitter, Facebook did not ban political ads. Hundreds of
Facebook employees objected to this policy and signed a letter to
CEO Mark Zuckerberg, decrying the company’s decision to allow
politicians to post false claims in advertisements on the platform.211

bring a positive face of the brand or product. All of this activity was done surreptitiously
without OnlineExperts’ employees ever identifying themselves as such.”).
204
For more on this practice, see Laura E. Bladow, Worth the Click: Why Greater FTC
Enforcement Is Needed to Curtail Deceptive Practices in Influencer Marketing, 59 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1123, 1128 (2018).
205
For discussion of informational cascades, see Sunstein & Hastie, supra note 76, at 12.
Informational cascades are generated when individuals follow the statements or actions of
predecessors and do not express their opposing opinions because they believe their
predecessors are right. Id. at 12–14.
206
Susser et al., supra note 98, at 40 (explaining structural vulnerabilities). For
information on the influences of the social network, see Jonathan Zittrain, Engineering an
Election, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 335, 335 (2014).
207
ARAL, supra note 19, at 168 (referring to five main targeting strategies: network
targeting, referral marketing, social advertising, viral design, and influencer marketing).
208
Lavi, supra note 55, at 444; Anthony J. Gaughan, Illiberal Democracy: The Toxic Mix
of Fake News, Hyperpolarization, and Partisan Election Administration, 12 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 57, 68 (2017).
209
It should be noted that there is no clear definition of the term “political advertisement”
for these purposes. “[W]hat is or is not a political message is often in the eye of the
beholder.” See Conger, supra note 39.
210
Kantrowitz, supra note 39.
211
Read the Letter Facebook Employees Sent to Mark Zuckerberg About Political Ads,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2019), nyti.ms/350LEW6 [https://perma.cc/6GD8-HJQL] (arguing
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This letter, however, did not change Zuckerberg’s decision, and he
has continued to rationalize his decision on the grounds of protecting
freedom of expression.212 One week before the election, Facebook
began banning new political ads from running.213 After the election,
Facebook lifted the ban on political ads and now, the site neither
bans nor fact-checks political advertisements.214 How does the law
react to dissemination of fake news? The next Part provides an overview of United States law governing intermediary liability for dissemination of defamatory false content.
II. INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY: THE LAW AND NORMATIVE
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION CONSIDERATIONS
A. American Internet Exceptionalism: The Law in the United
States
In “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” John
Perry Barlow pronounced that cyberspace is not subject to traditional laws and regulations, representing a new approach known as
internet exceptionalism.215 Under this approach, because the internet
that free speech and paid speech are not the same thing. By allowing politicians to lie in
advertisements, the platform does not protect voices. Instead, it allows politicians to use
the platform as a weapon “by targeting people who believe that the content posted by
political figures is trustworthy.”).
212
Josh Constine, Zuckerberg Defends Politician Ads That Will Be 0.5% of 2020
Revenue, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 30, 2019, 5:32 PM), tcrn.ch/32YnHxn [https://perma.cc/
P7XK-XRPL]; Isaac & Kang, supra note 36.
213
Steve Kovach, Facebook to Ban New Political Ads in Week Before Presidential
Election, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/03/facebook-to-ban-political-ads-inweek-before-presidential-election.html [https://perma.cc/T5BE-XY5M] (Sept. 3, 2020,
8:24 AM).
214
Kurt Wagner, Facebook Still Won’t Fact-Check Political Ads Headed into Election
Season, TIME (Jan. 9, 2020, 11:40 AM), https://time.com/5762234/facebook-political-adselection/ [https://perma.cc/A3YH-SGP3]; Facebook to End Ban on Political Ads in United
States, NBC NEWS, https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/facebook-end-banpolitical-ads-united-states-rcna336 [https://perma.cc/4CU5-KSDL] (Mar. 3, 2021, 4:44
PM).
215
John Perry Barlow was a cyber-libertarian and digital rights activist that founded the
Electronic Frontier Foundation, a nonprofit organization for preserving personal
freedoms and online civil liberties. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence
of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), projects.eff.org/~barlow/
Declaration-Final.html [https://perma.cc/F7Q4-BH68]. This Article was written after the
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is different from other media that preceded it, “the government
should not burden it with traditional laws and regulations.”216 Internet exceptionalism is at the heart of Section 230, which directs:
“[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider.”217 Under subsection (c), titled “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material,”218 Congress declared that online intermediaries
could never be treated as “publishers” of material they did not develop.219
In passing Section 230, Congress sought to overrule Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,220 in which Prodigy’s good
faith efforts to monitor its site resulted in increased liability.221 Legislators sought to promote self-regulation, free speech, and foster the
rise of vibrant internet enterprises.222 According to Section 230, intermediaries, such as Facebook and Twitter, are immune from liability for third-party content, including content provided by advertisers.
Courts have interpreted Section 230 broadly and blocked lawsuits against intermediaries.223 This overall immunity reflects the
U.S.’s strong bias toward free speech above other values and its presumption against speech restrictions.224
enactment of the Communications Decency Act in 1996, arguing that that the cyberspace
legal order would reflect the ethical deliberation of the community instead of the coercive
power that characterized real-space governance. See KOSSEFF, supra note 48, at 78.
216
KOSSEFF, supra note 48, at 78.
217
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
218
47 U.S.C. § 230(c). The “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’” subsection aims to
promote self-regulation by intermediaries and encourage screening of offensive materials
without bearing liability. See Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will
Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 407
(2017).
219
See 47 U.S.C. §230(c).
220
1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
221
Id., at *13; KOSSEFF, supra note 48, at 46–55.
222
See Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639, 651–52
(2014).
223
KOSSEFF, supra note 48, at 146; Eric Goldman, Why Section 230 Is Better Than the
First Amendment, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 33, 36 (2019).
224
Oreste Pollicino & Marco Bassini, Free Speech, Defamation and the Limits of
Freedom of Expression in the EU: A Comparative Analysis, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
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1. Failure to Censor Harmful Content
In Zeran v. America Online, Inc.,225 an anonymous user advertised on an America Online, Inc. (“AOL”) message board that Zeran
was selling t-shirts glorifying the Oklahoma City bombing—even
though he did nothing of the sort—and instructed people to call Zeran’s home phone number.226 Consequently, angry AOL subscribers
rang Zeran’s phone incessantly.227 Zeran sued AOL in federal court,
claiming the company negligently failed to immediately remove the
false harmful post upon notification.228 The Fourth Circuit held that
distributors constituted a subset of publishers and were therefore immune from liability in accordance with Section 230.229 Under this
interpretation, Section 230 grants immunity to site hosts even if they
fail to act upon knowledge of potentially illegal content on their
sites.230
After Zeran, Section 230 repeatedly shielded web enterprises
from lawsuits in a plethora of cases.231 For example, in Blumenthal
v. Drudge,232 the court upheld immunity even when the intermediary
(AOL) paid an independent contractor to write gossip columns for

EU INTERNET LAW 508, 519, 540 (Andrej Savin & Jan Trzaskowski eds., 2014)
(demonstrating that in the U.S., freedom of speech protections are stronger than in the EU;
the different balance courts provide between free speech and reputation is even more
prominent in the digital context). For criticism, see FRANKS, supra note 89, at 172 (referring
to the broad interpretation of online free speech as the “cult of constitution” that uses free
speech to protect powerful media giants at the expense of the free speech of victims of
harmful speech).
225
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328–29, 332 (4th Cir. 1997); KOSSEFF, supra
note 48, at 83.
226
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329.
227
Id.
228
Id. at 330.
229
Id. (“By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action
that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user
of the service.”).
230
Id. at 334.
231
See Lavi, supra note 68, at 867–70 (2016); see generally Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc.,
167 F. Supp. 3d 1056 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (holding that the immunity applies even when the
intermediary knew of the defamatory content and did not remove it); Herrick v. Grindr,
LLC, 765 F. App’x 586 (2d Cir. 2019).
232
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 51, 53 (D.D.C. 1998); KOSSEFF, supra note
48, at 101.
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the site that contained defamatory statements.233 AOL was not liable
even though the intermediary could exercise editorial control over
its contractors.234 Judge Friedman explained that Congress made a
policy choice to provide immunity in these cases, even where the
interactive service provider has an active role in making available
content prepared by others.235
2. Editorial Decisions to Remove, or Restrict Content and
Accounts
Major platforms are “crafted around two different precepts: proportionality and probability. That is, content moderation [is] a question of systemic balancing,” considering the inevitability of error
and choosing what kinds of errors to prefer.236 Immunity applies
when intermediaries restrict user content.237 In contrast to Section
230(c)(2) which specifically grants immunity for online services
blocking or removing third-party content,238 Section 230(c)(1) does
not subject intermediaries to a good faith obligation in doing so.239
In fact, Section 230(c)(1) “encourages online publishers to exercise
their editorial discretion, [which] ensures the publishers will ‘discriminate’ against some content in favor of other content.”240 Thus,
courts rejected lawsuits against intermediaries that restricted usermade content.
233

Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 52.
Id.
235
Id.
236
Evelyn Douek, Governing Online Speech: From “Posts-As-Trumps” to
Proportionality and Probability, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 759, 763 (2021).
237
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)–(2).
238
Eric Goldman, The Ten Most Important Section 230 Rulings, 20 TUL. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 1, 6–7 (2017) [hereinafter Goldman, The Ten Most Important Section 230
Rulings]; Eric Goldman, Online User Account Termination and 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2), U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 659, 666 (2012) [hereinafter Goldman, Online User Account Termination]
(“Several § 230(c)(2) cases have held that good faith is determined subjectively, not
objectively. In that circumstance, courts should accept any justification for account
termination proffered by the online provider, even if that justification is ultimately
pretextual.”).
239
See generally Goldman, The Ten Most Important Section 230 Rulings, supra note 238.
240
Eric Goldman, Per Section 230, Facebook Can Tell This Plaintiff to Piss Off—Fyk v.
Facebook, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (June 14, 2020), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/
archives/2020/06/per-section-230-facebook-can-tell-this-plaintiff-to-piss-off-fyk-vfacebook.htm [https://perma.cc/8GUZ-8PEQ].
234
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In Prager University v. Google LLC, YouTube placed videos
published by Prager University in a “restricted mode,” blocking
third parties from advertising on videos and restricting the videos’
availability.241 In response, Prager filed an action against YouTube’s
editorial decision, claiming infringement of their First Amendment
rights and asserting that YouTube was biased against conservative
content in their video restrictions.242
The court in the Northern District of California rejected the
claim, summarizing that decisions to restrict or make available content do not transform YouTube into a content developer.243 Thus,
the court affirmed YouTube’s immunity.244 Prager also failed to persuade the Court that YouTube’s services are functionally equivalent
to a traditional public forum, because platforms necessarily reflect
editorial discretion rather than serving as an open “town square.”245
The Ninth Circuit upheld the dismissal of the lawsuit against Google
and YouTube, concluding that YouTube was a “private forum” despite its “ubiquity” and public accessibility.246 Thus, hosting videos
did not make YouTube a “state actor” for purposes of the First
Amendment.247
Courts have continued to find that Section 230 immunizes intermediaries for editorial decisions to moderate content. In Fyk v. Facebook, Inc.,248 the Ninth Circuit concluded that blocking pictures
of a man urinating was protected by the First Amendment and that
“nothing in [Section] 230(c)(1) turns on the alleged motives underlying the editorial decisions.”249
As previously mentioned, after Trump’s social media use relating to the Capitol riot,250 both Facebook and Twitter banned his
241

Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 2018 WL 1471939 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018), aff’d, 951
F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2020).
242
Id. at *5.
243
Id. at *6.
244
Id. at *15.
245
Id. at *5–6.
246
Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 2020).
247
Id.
248
Fyk v. Facebook, Inc., 808 F. App’x 597, 598 (9th Cir. 2020); Goldman, supra note
240.
249
Fyk, 808 F. App’x at 598.
250
Barry & Frenkel, supra note 13.
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accounts on their respective platforms.251 Accordingly, Twitter and
Facebook cannot bear liability for this decision.252 Moreover, as in
the case of riot incitement, where content severely violates community standards, a platform’s decision to suspend an account may be
a proportionate response considering the high probability that more,
similarly violative posts could follow. Accordingly, Facebook’s
Oversight Board253 recently upheld Trump’s suspension; albeit criticism followed regarding the imposition of “the indeterminate and
standardless penalty of indefinite suspension.”254
However, when a state actor or government official moderates a
public account, courts have held the First Amendment applies to
protect viewpoint-based user content. In fact, government officials’
accounts or platforms can be considered public forums.255 In Knight
First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. Trump,256 the
Second Circuit concluded that Trump’s blocking of social media users violated the users’ First Amendment rights. Accordingly, by using his personal Twitter account, Trump acted in his official governmental capacity. Blocking certain users from seeing or interacting
with his tweets was sufficient to establish state action and trigger
First Amendment protections applicable when the government restricts speech in a public forum.257 Trump appealed this decision to
the Supreme Court. After his term expired, the Court vacated the
decision and remanded it to the Second Circuit with instructions to
dismiss the case because Trump was no longer President.258

251

Isaac & Conger, supra note 14; Fung, supra note 16.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
253
For further information on the oversight board, see generally Kate Klonick, The
Facebook Oversight Board: Creating an Independent Institution to Adjudicate Online Free
Expression, 129 YALE L.J. 2418 (2020).
254
Oversight Board Upholds Former President Trump’s Suspension, Finds Facebook
Failed to Impose Proper Penalty, OVERSIGHT BD. (May 2021), https://oversightboard.com/
news/226612455899839-oversight-board-upholds-former-president-trump-s-suspensionfinds-facebook-failed-to-impose-proper-penalty/ [https://perma.cc/F8LR-3TMK].
255
See, e.g., Knight First Amend. Inst. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019); Davison
v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019); Attwood v. Clemons, 526 F. Supp. 3d 1152 (N.D.
Fla. 2021).
256
Knight First Amend. Inst., 928 F.3d at 234.
257
Id. at 238.
258
Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1221 (2021) (Thomas, J.,
concurring), cert. granted Knight First Amend. Inst. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019).
252
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It should be noted that Justice Thomas’ concurring opinion referred to the moderation power of social media platforms and criticized the discretion given to these platforms under Section 230 to
screen content and block material.259 He emphasized that “[i]t seems
rather odd to say that something is a government forum when a private company has unrestricted authority to do away with it.”260 Further, he predicted that the Court will have to address the current position of the few digital platforms dominating large amounts of
speech.261 Finally, Justice Thomas stated the Court also needed to
consider the ways in which legal doctrines will apply, including doctrines such as common carrier status and public accommodation to
“highly concentrated, privately owned information infrastructure.”262
In summary, platforms have editorial discretion to screen user
content, suspend accounts, and block profiles. However, platforms
could potentially lose complete immunity to do so if Justice
Thomas’ concurring opinion is adopted by the Supreme Court in the
future, or if common carrier-style regulations are promulgated by
Congress, narrowing platforms’ discretion to moderate.263
3. Immunity Beyond Moderation
In Batzel v. Smith,264 an operator of a website and electronic
listserv for Museum Security Network (“MSN”)—used for publishing posts about stolen art and other security related topics of interest
to museum managers—received an email recounting a conversation
in which Ellen Batzel allegedly bragged about being the
For expansion, see Eric Goldman, Deconstructing Justice Thomas’ Pro-Censorship
Statement in Knight First Amendment v. Trump, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Apr. 12, 2021),
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2021/04/deconstructing-justice-thomas-procensorship-statement-in-knight-first-amendment-v-trump.htm [https://perma.cc/AXQ2SSWC].
259
Biden, 141 S. Ct. at 1221.
260
Id.
261
Id.
262
Id.; Goldman, supra note 258.
263
Abby Lemert & Klaudia Jaźwińska, Justice Thomas Gives Congress Advice on Social
Media Regulation, LAWFARE (Apr. 12, 2021, 4:21 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
justice-thomas-gives-congress-advice-social-media-regulation [https://perma.cc/R7X53H99].
264
333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003).
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granddaughter of Heinrich Himmler (Hitler’s right-hand man).265
The person who sent the email claimed Batzel hung hundreds of old
European paintings on her walls and told him she inherited them.266
The writer believed these paintings were looted during World War
II and rightfully belonged to the Jewish people.267 Soon after receiving the email, the MSN operator made slight editorial changes and
posted the defamatory and false email on their network and website,
thereby making it public even though the sender did not intend to
share the email.268 Consequently, many of Batzel’s clients stopped
working with her.269 Batzel sued the listserv’s editor and the Netherlands Museum Association.270 The defendants sought to dismiss
the case on Section 230 grounds, but the court interpreted the term
“interactive computer services” narrowly and did not to apply it to
MSN, resulting in liability.271
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit debated the operator’s responsibility for including the defamatory email in a public listserv; the court
shielded it from liability, concluding that the operator should not be
held responsible if a reasonable person in the same position would
have believed that the sender provided the information for distribution purposes.272 The court concluded that the listserv operator was
an “interactive computer service provider” under Section 230 and
immune from liability, despite its editorial control over the listserv
messages.273
Judge Gould dissented from the majority’s analysis, explaining
that by providing immunity to parties that disseminate writings authors do not intend to publish, the court developed a rule that
265

Id. at 1020–21.
Id.; KOSSEFF, supra note 48, at 108.
267
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1021.
268
Id. at 1022.
269
Id.
270
Batzel v. Smith, No. CV-00-9590, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8929, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal.
June 5, 2001).
271
Id. at *21–22 (“Although several cases have held that, by virtue of the Act, internet
service providers cannot be sued for defamation, none are applicable here because, unlike
MSN/Cremers, the qualifying entities were true internet service providers, like America
Online, that provided individuals with access to the internet.”); KOSSEFF, supra note 48, at
109.
272
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1034.
273
Id. at 1031.
266
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encourages spreading harmful lies with impunity.274 Judge Gould
concluded that the very selection and publication of particular information on the internet forms the impression that such content is worthy of dissemination.275
a) Gradual Erosion of the Immunity
The first decade of Section 230’s enactment represents an expansion of immunity, while the subsequent decade represents its
gradual erosion.276 First, courts determined that platforms are immune from liability only for information provided by other content
providers.277 “Information content provider” is defined as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation
or development of information provided through the internet or any
other interactive computer service.”278 If a plaintiff can show that a
website acted as an information content provider, then the website
would receive immunity.279 Second, Section 230 only prevents
courts from treating the platform as a publisher or speaker. If a plaintiff can demonstrate that his lawsuit stemmed from an action other
than publishing or speaking, a court might decide that Section 230
does not block the lawsuit.280
274

Id. at 1038 (Gould, J., dissenting). For similar criticism of immunity for online
republication, see generally Lavi, supra note 26, at 165; Samsel v. Desoto Cnty. Sch. Dist.,
242 F. Supp. 3d 496 (N.D. Miss. 2017).
275
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1038 (Gould, J., dissenting) (explaining that the focus should not
be on the author’s intent, but on the defendant’s actions. Thus, a defendant who has actively
elected to disseminate defamatory content should not be entitled to immunity); KOSSEFF,
supra note 48, at 113.
276
KOSSEFF, supra note 48, at 166.
277
Id.
278
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (emphasis added).
279
See, e.g., La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79, 83–84 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that a
defendant who authored the content that accompanied the photograph of La Liberate and
did not merely republish the photograph from another “information content provider”
would still be liable).
280
KOSSEFF, supra note 48, at 166; Agnieszka McPeak, Platform Immunity Redefined,
62 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1557 (2021); Gregory M. Dickinson, Rebooting Internet
Immunity, 89 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347 (2021) (referring to online marketplaces and arguing
that “[w]here a claim is preventable other than by content moderation—for example, by
redesigning an app or website—a plaintiff could freely seek relief, just as in the physical
world. This approach empowers courts to identify culpable actors in the virtual world and
treat like conduct alike wherever it occurs.”); see, e.g., HomeAway.com, Inc. v. City of
Santa Monica, 918 F.3d 676, 682–84 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that liability arose from
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In 2008, a federal appellate court adopted a broader reading of
the terms “responsible” and “development” under Section 230, narrowing the scope of immunity.281 In Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, LLC,282 a popular roommate-matching website allowed
users to find roommates.283 The website’s design required users to
fill out a personal profile and answer several questions, including
information about gender, sexual orientation, and parental status.284
It also required users to express their preferences with respect to
roommates on each of these issues.285
Users selected some of the answers from drop-down menus and
used an internal search engine to find roommates while filtering unfit matches according to their preferences.286 The website also included an open-ended “additional comments” section.287 The site
periodically sent its users emails with potential roommate
matches.288 The Fair Housing Council (“FHC”), a nonprofit organization that fights housing discrimination, sued Roommates.com.
The FHC alleged that the drop-down menu questions, the internal
search engine, the filtering service, and the open comment section
led to discrimination and violated the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”).289
On appeal, the FHC argued that by conditioning participation in
the service upon reporting restricted information, Roommates.com
was an information content developer within the meaning of the statute—not a passive conduit.290 In fact, both the website’s design and

facilitating unlicensed booking transactions because a local regulation did not require the
platforms to monitor or remove third-party content; it does not treat them as publishers,
and thereby falls outside the preemptive scope of Section 230); Oberdorf v. Amazon.com
Inc., 930 F.3d 136, 153 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that Amazon is not immune against claims
premised on other actions or failures in the sales or distribution processes), vacated en
banc, 936 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2019) (certifying questions to 818 F. App’x 138 (3d Cir.
2020)); Bolger v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2020 WL 4692387 (Cal. App. Ct. Aug. 13, 2020).
281
KOSSEFF, supra note 48, at 168; Lavi, supra note 74, at 36–41.
282
Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
283
Id. at 1161.
284
Id.
285
Id.
286
Id. at 1165.
287
Id. at 1162.
288
Id.
289
Id. at 1165, 1173.
290
Id. at 1165.
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questions encouraged the creation of illegal content.291 The Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, declining to grant
Roommates.com immunity.292
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Kozinski stressed that although the CDA established immunity, it “was not meant to create a
lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet.”293 By providing a limited
set of prepopulated, discriminatory answers and requiring users to
choose one, Roommates.com was an information content provider.294 The site’s questionnaire containing preidentified answer
choices made it a developer,295 rather than a mere “passive transmitter” of information.296 The court also declined to grant immunity
for the site’s internal search engine and email mechanism because
those components did not use neutral tools, but rather channeled the
distribution of discriminatory content.297 The court upheld immunity only for materials posted in the open comment section.298 In its
decision, the court referred to the “material contribution to illegality” test.299 This test denies immunity where a defendant’s own actions materially contribute to the illegality.300 The court concluded
that using neutral tools to carry out what may be an unlawful or
illicit search does not amount to “development” for Section 230

291

Id. at 1165, 1167; see KOSSEFF, supra note 48, at 170.
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1175.
293
Id. at 1164; see KOSSEFF, supra note 48, at 175.
294
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d. at 1165.
295
Id. at 1164–65.
296
Id. at 1166 (“By requiring subscribers to provide the information as a condition of
accessing its service, and by providing a limited set of pre-populated answers, Roommate
becomes much more than a passive transmitter of information provided by others; it
becomes the developer, at least in part, of that information.”).
297
Id. at 1167; see also Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921, 929
(9th Cir. 2007) (“By categorizing, channeling and limiting the distribution of users’
profiles, Roommate provides an additional layer of information that it is ‘responsible’ at
least ‘in part’ for creating or developing.”), aff’d in part en banc, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.
2008).
298
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1173–74.
299
Id. at 1167–68.
300
Id. (“[W]e interpret the term ‘development’ as referring not merely to augmenting the
content generally, but to materially contributing to its alleged unlawfulness. In other words,
a website helps to develop unlawful content, and thus it falls within the exception to Section
230, if it contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct.”).
292
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immunity.301 In contrast, the drop-down menus led to the development of illegal, discriminatory content, and for that reason, the majority held Roommates.com liable for the discriminatory content.302
The dissenting opinion took a narrower view of what it means to
“develop” information online.303 Under this view, providing a dropdown menu would not constitute “creating” or “developing” information in and of itself.304 Instead, the dissent opined that courts
should examine whether the topics in drop-down menus are directly
unlawful—for example, when the inquiry is a statutory violation or
includes a defamatory statement.305
Four years later, the Ninth Circuit adopted a narrower construction, excluding roommate selection from the FHA. They reasoned
that, “even though Section 230 did not protect Roommates.com
from liability, the site did not commit illegal discrimination because
the housing laws did not apply to roommate selection.”306 Thus, the
rationale for denying immunity may no longer be applicable because
discriminatory statements can be lawful in this context.307 Yet, it is
still unclear whether the previous decision barred Roommates.com
from enjoying Section 230 immunity due to its general contribution
to the creation of discriminatory content or because of the nature of
301

Id. at 1169–72 (distinguishing between the facts of this case and other cases where
intermediaries designed drop-down menus and used neutral tools); see also Carafano v.
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003); Lindsey A. Datte, Note,
Chaperoning Love Online: Online Dating Liability and the Wavering Application of CDA
§ 230, 20 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 769, 781 (2014); Mark D. Quist, Comment, “Plumbing
the Depths” of the CDA: Weighing the Competing Fourth and Seventh Circuit Standards
of ISP Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 20 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 275, 297 (2012).
302
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1172.
303
Id. at 1176–82 (McKeown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The
majority’s unprecedented expansion of liability for Internet service providers threatens to
chill the robust development of the Internet that Congress envisioned.”).
304
Id. at 1182.
305
See id. at 1189.
306
KOSSEFF, supra note 48, at 179; see Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 666
F.3d 1216, 1223 (9th Cir. 2012).
307
See Roommates.com, 666 F.3d at 1222 (“Because we find that the FHA doesn’t apply
to the sharing of living units, it follows that it’s not unlawful to discriminate in selecting a
roommate.”); Tim Iglesias, Does Fair Housing Law Apply to “Shared Living Situations”?
Or the Trouble with Roommates, 22 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 111, 112
(2014).
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the questions and filtering criteria themselves,308 leaving ambiguity
regarding the scope of the immunity.309
In FTC v. Accusearch, the Tenth Circuit also issued a narrow
reading of Section 230 immunity.310 Accusearch operated
Abika.com, which offered customers access to private information,
such as a specific cell phone’s GPS location information,311 telephone call records, and social security numbers.312 Abika.com connected customers to third-party researchers, who obtained the desired information, and gave consumers access to the private information through Abika.com or email.313Abika.com publicized and
promoted the purchase of details about phone calls and even offered
monthly reports on call activity.314 The Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) sued Accusearch for engaging in unfair business practices,
alleging violation of Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.315 The FTC claimed the site used, or caused others to use, confidential information without the data subject’s authorization.316 Accusearch argued that it was merely an interactive computer service
and that the independent researchers were entirely responsible for
developing the investigation reports.317
In a Wyoming district court, Judge Downes held that Section
230 did not immunize Accusearch because the FTC did not seek to
308

See JACQUELINE D. LIPTON, RETHINKING CYBERLAW: A NEW VISION FOR INTERNET
LAW 136 (2015); Olivier Sylvain, Intermediary Design Duties, 50 CONN. L. REV. 203, 259–
60 (2018) (“We might understand the Roommates opinion to suggest that a provider cannot
be immune when it has knowingly designed its service or application in order to elicit illegal
third-party content. . . . As with most website developers, the company was probably very
attentive to the substantive preference options from which it allowed users to choose, as
well as the way it presented the choices for selection (i.e., choice architecture). But the
Roommates court did not frame its opinion in this way.”).
309
See generally Varty Defterderian, Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com: A New
Path for Section 230 Immunity, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 563, 592 (2009); Jeff Kosseff, The
Gradual Erosion of the Law That Shaped the Internet: Section 230’s Evolution Over Two
Decades, 18 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 37 (2016).
310
FTC v. Accusearch, 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009).
311
KOSSEFF, supra note 48, at 181.
312
Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1191–92.
313
Id. at 1190–92; KOSSEFF, supra note 48, at 181.
314
KOSSEFF, supra note 48, at 181.
315
15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
316
Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1190.
317
Id. at 1201.
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“treat” the company as the publisher of content.318 Moreover, even
if the FTC’s complaint “treated” Accusearch as a publisher, immunity would still not apply because Accusearch took part in the phone
records’ development by connecting users with third-party information providers and receiving an administrative fee.319 On appeal,
the Tenth Circuit affirmed Judge Downes’ ruling that Section 230
did not shield Accusearch from liability under the FTC complaint.320
The majority relied solely on Judge Downes’ second line of reasoning, finding the only way Accusearch could have violated privacy
laws is by publishing the private data on its website.321 Therefore,
the FTC did treat Accusearch as a publisher.322 However, Accusearch developed the content and made it visibly active or usable,
seeking consumer requests and coordinating with researchers.323
The third judge denied immunity because the FTC complaint did not
treat Accusearch as the publisher of the information.324
After Roommates.com and Accusearch, courts expressed doubts
regarding internet exceptionalism and the scope of immunity,325
leading to many contradictory judicial decisions.326 For example, in
Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Group, Inc.,327 the Ninth Circuit
318

FTC v. Accusearch, No. 06-CV-105-D, 2007 WL 4356786, at *6 (D. Wyo. Sept. 28,
2007).
319
Id. (“Even if the FTC’s Complaint were interpreted as ‘treating’ Defendants as a
publisher within the meaning of the CDA, the Court believes that Defendants’ claim for
CDA immunity nonetheless fails to meet the requirement that the published information
must have been provided by ‘another information content provider.’”).
320
Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1201; KOSSEFF, supra note 48, at 185.
321
Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1197; see Accusearch 2007 WL 4356786, at *6.
322
Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1197.
323
Id. at 1198.
324
Id. at 1197; KOSSEFF, supra note 48, at 187.
325
See KOSSEFF, supra note 48, at 188; Kosseff, supra note 309, at 22 (“My analysis
demonstrates that the erosion that began with the 2008 Roommates.com decision has
accelerated, to a point where platforms have little certainty that they will be immune from
claims arising from user content.”).
326
Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., 934 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2019) (applying
immunity for tools that facilitate illegal purchases); c.f. Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., 995 F.3d
1085 (9th Cir. 2021) (allowing an independent negligent design claim against Snapchat to
move forward because the claim did not depend on what message a Snapchat user actually
sends due to a negligent design of this tool); Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 913 N.W.2d 211,
224 (Wis. Ct. App. 2018) (denying immunity for website design features that facilitated
illegal purchases), rev’d, 926 N.W.2d 710 (2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 562 (2019).
327
Dyroff, 934 F.3d at 1093.
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affirmed the lower court’s decision328 and upheld immunity where
an intermediary engaged in data-mining and deployed machine
learning algorithms, allowing it to analyze user data and channel
user participation toward particular groups and specific content.329
The court concluded that by recommending user groups and sending
email notifications, Ultimate Software acted as a publisher of others’
content.330 These functions—recommendations and notifications—
are tools meant to facilitate user-to-user communication and are not
content in and of themselves.331 The court concluded that the recommendation and notification functions helped facilitate this userto-user communication, but did not materially contribute to the allegedly unlawful content.332 The Supreme Court denied Dyroff’s
certiorari request.333
In Daniel v. Armslist, the website Armslist.com allowed potential buyers and sellers of firearms and ammunition to contact each
other, either by clicking a link on the website or by using contact
information provided by other parties.334 This design facilitated illegal firearm purchases, one of which was used in a lethal shooting.335 The plaintiff alleged the design and operational features of
Armslist.com affirmatively “encouraged” transactions in which
328

Id. Data mining and machine learning allowed the intermediary to personalize
recommendations to users regarding content and discussion groups that might be of interest
to the user. In some cases, the recommendations channeled users to unlawful content. In
one instance, the recommendations steered a user to a discussion group dedicated to the
sale of narcotics. The communication on the website allowed the user to buy heroin, who
later died from consuming the heroin. Id. at 1094–95. The court dismissed the case ruling
that recommendations to users are an ordinary, neutral function of social network websites.
The intermediary used neutral tools that merely provided a framework that could be utilized
for proper or improper purposes. As such, it did not “create” or “develop” the information
even in part. Therefore, immunity was upheld. Id. at 1096–98. The situation in Dryoff is
similar to the email service in Roommates.com. Id. at 1099; see Fair Hous. Council v.
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 2007). The court was able to reach
a different conclusion because the platform gained new information from users’ content
and behavior in order to create a site architecture that affects behavior. See id. at 1165–67.
329
Dryoff, 934 F.3d at 1094–95.
330
Id. at 1098.
331
Id.
332
Id. at 1101.
333
See Dryoff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2761 (2020).
334
Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 913 N.W.2d 211, 215 (Wis. Ct. App. 2018), rev’d 926
N.W.2d 710, 714 (Wis. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 562 (2019).
335
See id. at 217.
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prohibited purchasers acquired firearms.336 The Court interpreted
Roommates.com broadly and did not grant immunity to website design features that facilitated illegal firearm purchases, even though
some sales were legal on the buyer’s side.337 However, on appeal,
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the decision, reasoning
that the defendant provided neutral tools that could be used for lawful purposes; the third parties used them to create unlawful content.338 The court also explained that Section 230(c)(1) does not contain a good faith requirement.339 According to the Wisconsin court,
immunity applies even if the intermediary has knowledge of unlawful content on its platform and even if it designs the website to facilitate unlawful activity by omitting phone or email verification.340

336

Id. at 215–16 (summarizing Armslist’s alleged misconduct as (1) facilitating private
sales by allowing users to limit searches to private sellers; (2) failing to flag “criminal” or
“illegal” content; (3) warning against illegality but failing to offer specific legal guidance;
(4) encouraging user anonymity; and (5) enabling buyers to evade a state waiting period
that required federally-licensed firearms dealers to wait forty-eight hours after receiving a
response from the background check system before transferring the firearm).
337
Design features may thereby allow plaintiffs to bypass Section 230 and result in
judicial denial of motions to dismiss, even if the design is neutral to illegality. See id. at
222–23; see also Harrington v. Airbnb, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1092 (D. Or. 2018)
(requiring a user to display his picture in his profile may violate anti-discrimination law).
338
See Daniel, 926 N.W.2d at 714.
339
Id. at 721.
340
“That Armslist may have known that its site could facilitate illegal gun sales does not
change the result. Because § 230(c)(1) contains no good faith requirement, courts do not
allow allegations of intent or knowledge to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 726. The
plaintiff filed a petition to the United States Supreme Court on this case but the petition
was denied. See Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 562 (2019). See also Alexis Kramer,
Armslist Online Gun Sale Case Won’t Get Supreme Court Review, BLOOMBERG LAW (Nov.
25, 2019, 9:36 AM), bit.ly/2Q2BEWk [https://perma.cc/AQ5U-J3RG]. Similarly, Armslist
won another ruling regarding a shooting of a police officer that was committed with a gun
that was illegally purchased on Armslist. See Stokinger v. Armslist, LLC, No.
1884CV03236-F, 2020 Mass. Super. LEXIS 69, at *17 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2020);
see also Dickinson, supra note 280, at 391–92 (arguing that the overall immunity of
Section 230 should not apply for the commercial marketplace). But see Danielle Keats
Citron & Mary Anne Franks, The Internet as a Speech Machine and Other Myths
Confounding Section 230 Reform, 2020 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 45, 51 (“Section 230’s liability
shield has been extended to activity that has little or nothing to do with free speech, such
as the sale of dangerous products. Consider Armslist.com, the self-described ‘firearms
marketplace.’ Armslist helps match unlicensed gun sellers with buyers who cannot pass
background checks . . . .”).
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Recently in Lemmon v. Snap Inc.,341 three boys died after losing
control of the wheel driving at 123 miles per hour.342 The accident
occurred after they used a Snapchat speed filter—a smartphone app
designed to calculate the users’ speed and show it in a photograph.343
The parents alleged that Snapchat negligently designed unsafe products that facilitated speeding and led to the accident.344 Based on
Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com,345 the Ninth Circuit allowed the claim against Snapchat to move forward as an independent negligent design claim that does not depend on the message a
Snapchat user sends.346 This differentiated it from claims concerning content published by other content providers.347
As the caselaw demonstrates, courts are generally inclined to
find that defendants are not information content providers—choosing to err on the side of immunity. However, some courts have challenged traditional interpretations of Section 230. Overall, the standards for excluding intermediaries from immunity remain unclear.
4. Trump’s Executive Order and New Legislative Bills—an
Attack on the Immunity for Moderation
The gradual erosion of immunity focused on “development of
user content” and biased tools for content creation. However, recent
attacks on Section 230 turned a different direction—moderation
practices. After Twitter added a fact-checking label to the former
President’s tweets,348 Trump attempted to curb online platforms’
341

Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., 995 F.3d 1085, 1088 (9th Cir. 2021).
Id.
343
Id.
344
Id. at 1089.
345
521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
346
Lemmon, 995 F.3d at 1093.
347
Id. at 1094 (“In short, Snap ‘is being sued for the predictable consequences of’
designing Snapchat in such a way that it allegedly encourages dangerous behavior.
Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1170. The CDA does not shield Snap from liability for such
claims.”). For further information on this ruling, see Eric Goldman, The Ninth Circuit’s
Confusing Ruling Over Snapchat’s Speed Filter–Lemmon v. Snap, TECH. & MKTG. L.
BLOG (May 12, 2021), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2021/05/the-ninth-circuitsconfusing-ruling-over-snapchats-speed-filter-lemmon-v-snap.htm
[https://perma.cc/EHX5-YLZM].
348
See Makena Kelly, Twitter Labels Trump Tweets as ‘Potentially Misleading’ for the
First Time, VERGE (May 26, 2020, 6:04 PM) https://www.theverge.com/2020/5/26/
342
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protection for “good Samaritans.”349 On May 28, 2020, Trump issued the Executive Order on Preventing Online Censorship (“the
Order”) pertaining to online platforms.350 Following a policy statement addressing the need to “seek transparency and accountability
from online platforms, and . . . preserve the integrity and openness
of American discourse and freedom of expression,”351 the Order outlined a narrow interpretation of Section 230. It clouded the legal
landscape for content moderation decisions, explaining that Section
230(c)(2) applies only to good faith moderation decisions.352 Thus,
it stripped the shield provided for moderation decisions that the government did not see as moderation in “good faith.”353 The Order further directed “all executive departments and agencies” to “ensure
that their application of [S]ection 230(c) properly reflect[ed] the narrow purpose of the section and take all appropriate actions in this
regard.”354

21271207/twitter-donald-trump-fact-check-mail-in-voting-coronavirus-pandemiccalifornia [https://perma.cc/CW2C-ENZH].
349
Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079, 34,080 (May 28, 2020), repealed by
Exec. Order No. 14,029, 86 Fed. Reg. 27,025 (May 14, 2021) (“When an interactive
computer service provider removes or restricts access to content and its actions do not meet
the criteria of subparagraph (c)(2)(A), it is engaged in editorial conduct. It is the policy of
the United States that such a provider should properly lose the limited liability shield of
subparagraph (c)(2)(A) and be exposed to liability like any traditional editor and publisher
that is not an online provider.”).
350
Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (May 28, 2020), repealed by Exec.
Order No. 14,029, 86 Fed. Reg. 27,025 (May 14, 2021).
351
Id.
352
See id. at 34,080 (“[U]nder the law, this provision is not distorted to provide liability
protection for online platforms that—far from acting in ‘good faith’ to remove
objectionable content—instead engage in deceptive or pretextual actions (often contrary to
their stated terms of service) to stifle viewpoints with which they disagree. Section 230 was
not intended to allow a handful of companies to grow into titans controlling vital avenues
for our national discourse under the guise of promoting open forums for debate, and then
to provide those behemoths blanket immunity when they use their power to censor content
and silence viewpoints that they dislike. When an interactive computer service provider
removes or restricts access to content and its actions do not meet the criteria of
subparagraph (c)(2)(A), it is engaged in editorial conduct. It is the policy of the United
States that such a provider should properly lose the limited liability shield of subparagraph
(c)(2)(A) and be exposed to liability like any traditional editor and publisher that is not an
online provider.”).
353
Id.
354
Id. at 34,081.
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In addition, the Order directed each executive department and
agency to review media advertising expenses of online platforms
and restricted platforms’ receipt of advertising dollars.355 The Department of Justice was to assess viewpoint-based speech restrictions imposed by each online platform and determine whether
such platforms were problematic vehicles for government speech
due to viewpoint discrimination, deception to consumers, or other
bad practices.356 The Order further provided that the White House
“will submit” reports of purported “online censorship” received
through its “Tech Bias Reporting Tool” to the Department of Justice
and FTC.357 The latter could “consider taking action” under applicable law, including under Section 5 of the FTC Act,358 which
makes unfair methods of competition unlawful.359
Legal experts agree that the Order lacked legal foundation, enforceability, and impact.360 Recently, the Center for Democracy &
Technology filed a lawsuit against it seeking invalidation.361 In addition, the Northern District of New York ruled that the Order precluded a private right of action even if defendants arbitrarily removed a plaintiff’s account or prevented him from creating a new
account.362 Recently, President Biden revoked the Order and invalidated it.363 Therefore, it is likely that immunity provided to
355

See id.
See id.
357
Id. at 34,081–82.
358
Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 45.
359
Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079, 34,082 (May 28, 2020), repealed by
Exec. Order No. 14,029, 86 Fed. Reg. 27,025 (May 14, 2021); see also 15 U.S.C. § 45.
360
See Jan Wolfe, Trump’s Order Taking Aim at Twitter Is ‘Bluster’: Legal Experts,
REUTERS (May 28, 2020, 2:17 PM), reut.rs/304Bm7W [https://perma.cc/BW8F-ZY4E];
Eric Goldman, Trump’s “Preventing Online Censorship” Executive Order Is ProCensorship Political Theater, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (May 29, 2020), bit.ly/2B33vSk
[https://perma.cc/T4N5-WMN6].
361
See generally Complaint, Ctr. for Tech. and Democracy v. Trump, No. 20-1456 (D.C.
Cir. June 2, 2020).
362
See generally Gomez v. Zuckenburg, No. 20-633, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130989
(N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2020). “Zuckenburg” refers to Mark Zuckerberg and is a spelling error
in the original complaint. See also Eugene Volokh, No Claim Against Facebook Based on
President’s Social Media Executive Order, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 31, 2020, 1:27
PM), bit.ly/33vRWQ8 [https://perma.cc/AZ3W-B3AA].
363
See Revocation of Certain Presidential Actions and Technical Amendment, Exec.
Order 14,029, 86 Fed. Reg. 27,025 (May 14, 2021); Eric Goldman & Jess Miers, Online
356
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platforms under Section 230 will remain strong where platforms
host and moderate third-party content.
In addition to the Order, recent legislative bills strive to narrow
Section 230’s immunity, attacking it from different angles and
“modify[ing] the scope of protection from civil liability for ‘good
Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material.”364 Recently, a bill in Florida sought to prohibit intermediaries from deplatforming Floridian political candidates.365 Indeed, a federal court
struck the bill down.366 Following a similar effort by Florida Governor Ron DeSantis, Texas Governor Greg Abbott signed a bill prohibiting large tech companies from blocking or restricting people
and posts based on viewpoint.367 Like the Florida law, this law will
Account Termination/Content Removals and the Benefits of Internet Services Enforcing
Their House Rules, 1 J. FREE SPEECH L. 191, 193 n.5 (2021).
364
See Online Freedom and Viewpoint Diversity Act, S. 4534, 116th Cong. (2020); see
also Protecting Constitutional Rights from Online Platform Censorship Act, H.R. 83, 117th
Cong. § 2 (2021) (making it unlawful for platforms to moderate “protected” content and
by implication excluding illicit material from the definition of “protected”); Hannah BlochWehba, Content Moderation as Surveillance, 36 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2022)
(manuscript at n.231)
(available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3872915) [https://perma.cc/W5L8-HMQU]) (referring to Stop the Censorship
Act, H.R. 4027, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019), discussing “eliminat[ion] [of] platforms’
immunity for moderating content that it deems objectionable but preserving immunity for
taking down ‘unlawful content’ . . . .”). But see Platform Accountability and Consumer
Transparency Act, S. 4066, 116th Cong. § 5(c)(1)(A) (2020) (mandating that platforms
conform with all court-ordered removal of content deemed illegal within twenty-four
hours); see generally Kiran Jeevanjee et al., All the Ways Congress Wants to Change
Section 230, SLATE (Mar. 23, 2021, 5:45 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2021/03/
section-230-reform-legislative-tracker.html [https://perma.cc/WUB2-CQ8V].
365
See Transparency in Technology Act, S.B. 7072, 2021 Leg., (Fla. 2021); see also Eric
Goldman, Florida Hits a New Censorial Low in Internet Regulation (Comments on SB
7072), TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (June 3, 2021), https://bit.ly/3AAgrcO [https://perma.cc/
5UZT-VYMJ]. For further information, see Goldman & Miers, supra note 363, at 191.
366
See, e.g., NetChoice, LLC v. Moody, No. 21-220, 2021 WL 2690876, at *12 (N.D.
Fla. June 30, 2021); Eric Goldman, Florida Social Media Censorship Law ENJOINED–
NetChoice v. Moody, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (June 30, 2021), https://bit.ly/3hNFsZA
[https://perma.cc/RC7N-W8WP]. Florida’s appeal is pending. See Appeal, NetChoice, No.
21cv220 (N.D. Fla. July 12, 2021).
367
See H.B. 20, 87th Leg., 2d Special Sess. (Tex. 2021). For further information, see
Kailyn Rhone, Social Media Companies Can’t Ban Texans Over Political Viewpoints
Under New Law, TEX. TRIB. (Sept. 2, 2021, 4:00 PM), texastribune.org/2021/09/02/Texassocial-media-censorship-legislature/ [https://perma.cc/X7QY-CNT2]; Eric Goldman,
Texas Enacts Social Media Censorship Law to Benefit Anti-Vaxxers & Spammers, TECH.
& MKTG. L. BLOG (Sept. 12, 2021), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2021/09/texas-

122

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXII:1

likely be struck down as unconstitutional.368 However, in the
shadow of potential laws, both the Order and other legislative bills
might impair how intermediaries moderate content, hinder efficient
moderation of harmful content (incentivizing intermediaries to act as
common carriers), or chill more protected speech.369
B. Normative Analysis
Providing a legal structure to identify constitutional values and
outlining the right balance between these values can be a difficult
judgment call, albeit a crucial one. The following Part focuses on
dissemination of fake news and primary situations that require nuanced examination: (1) basic intermediation; (2) moderation; (3) algorithmically personalized recommendations on organic content;
and (4) targeting advertisements for profit.
Intermediary liability for defamatory fake news stories threatens
freedom of speech370 and the intermediary’s freedom to conduct
business using economic, technical, and financial resources.371
However, fake news stories may also threaten public figures’ reputations as members of society.372 Furthermore, fake news stories can

enacts-social-media-censorship-law-to-benefit-anti-vaxxers-spammers.htm
[https://perma.cc/38RX-MJKR].
368
Goldman, supra note 367.
369
See Complaint at para. 45, Ctr. for Tech. and Democracy v. Trump, No. 20-1456 (D.C.
Cir. June 2, 2020) (available at https://cdt.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/1-2020-cv01456-0001-COMPLAINT-against-DONALD-J-TRUMP-filed-by-CENTER-FO-etseq.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UZF-CGBR]) (“The Order will interfere significantly with the
freedom of speech of all Americans. Intermediaries that host content online will be forced
to shape and apply their content moderation policies according to government officials’
desires, depriving Americans of access to online forums free from government interference
with their constitutionally protected speech.”).
370
The Preamble to the Constitution contains a national mandate to secure the public
defense. See U.S. CONST. pmbl.
371
This Charter articulates the universal values on which the EU was founded, such as
dignity, solidarity, freedom, and equality. In the US, an individual’s right to conduct a
business or pursue an occupation is a property right. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union, Dec. 7, 2000, art. 16, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1; cf. United States v. Arena,
180 F.3d 380, 394 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Santoni, 585 F.2d 667, 673 (4th Cir.
1978); Garrison v. Herbert J. Thomas Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n., 438 S.E.2d 6, 14 (W. Va. 1993).
372
See Peter G. Danchin, Defaming Muhammad: Dignity, Harm, and Incitement to
Religious Hatred, 2 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE 5, 17 (2010) (referring to the values
that defamation law protects).
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infringe on public interest, impair public faith in the electoral system
and public institutions, and harm long-term democracy.373 How
should democracies balance competing interests to protect both reputation and the public interest? In the U.S., freedom of speech enjoys
stronger protections than in other Western democracies.374 U.S. free
speech jurisprudence is substantively the most speech-protective
country in the world and is methodologically exceptional.375 The
purpose of this right is to shield the public from government censorship376 and ensure the public’s right to receive information.377
Courts and scholars have developed numerous theories concerning
the reason for such special free speech protections.378 Freedom of
speech promotes individual autonomy and self-fulfillment,379 as well
373

See Anthony J. Gaughan, Illiberal Democracy: The Toxic Mix of Fake News,
Hyperpolarization, and Partisan Election Administration, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 57, 68 (2017); see generally Hasen, supra note 45; Manheim & Kaplan, supra note
45.
374
See COHEN, supra note 90, at 261; Pollicino & Bassini, supra note 224, at 519. But
see FRANKS, supra note 89, at 196–9890 (arguing that legislators, courts, and civil rights
organizations have interpreted the First Amendment selectively, much like religious
fundamentalists, infringing on the rights of minorities and the weak and shifting even more
power from vulnerable populations to powerful ones); Woodrow Hartzog & Neil Richards,
Privacy’s Constitutional Moment and the Limits of Data Protection, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1687,
1730 (2020) (“[I]n the United States, the fundamental right of free expression protected by
the First Amendment is not subject to proportionality analysis—if a court finds that there
is a First Amendment right, then the First Amendment applies to the state action, and strict
scrutiny normally applies.”).
375
See Douek, supra note 236, at 772 (“First, the decisionmaker asks whether or not the
speech fits into a category covered by the First Amendment. Second, a series of fairly
outcome-determinative rules are applied based on this categorization.”).
376
See NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 10 (2015) (“The Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment broadly
to prevent the government from censoring our speech, pushing us directly for its content,
or creating legal rules that allow us to be sued for speaking the truth.”).
377
See Susan Nevelow Mart, The Right to Receive Information, 95 LAW LIBR. J. 175, 175
(2003) (“The right to receive information has evolved from its early place as a necessary
corollary to the right of free speech . . . .”); see also Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
141, 143 (1943).
378
See RICHARDS, supra note 376 (reviewing influential theories that lay out justifications
for the right to free speech); Balkin, supra note 12, at 72.
379
See Joseph Raz, Free Expression and Personal Identification, 11 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
303, 311–16 (1991) (arguing freedom of expression enables the self-determination of an
individual by familiarizing the public at large with his ways of life, allowing his preferences
to gain public recognition and acceptability, and reassuring that he is not alone because his
experiences are known to others).
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as the search for truth.380 A free marketplace of ideas is essential for
a liberal democracy.381 Contemporary theories on democracy focus
on protecting and promoting a democratic participatory culture.382
Accordingly, freedom of speech is necessary to ensure an individual’s ability to participate in the production and distribution of culture. This theory stresses both individual liberty and collective selfgovernance.383
The digital age and the transition from an “internet society” to
an “algorithmic society” pushes freedom of expression to the forefront, raising old concerns regarding this right. The correct balance
must be struck between the benefits of freedom of expression and
the potential harms of fake news stories to reputation and the public
interest. Intermediaries host fake news stories, providing interfaces
and tools to enhance information dissemination.384 They also use
editorial discretion to decide what content to remove from the platform and what content to leave for all to see. They use algorithmic
recommendations on relevant organic content that may enhance the
flow of harmful content.385 Moreover, intermediaries even target advertisements for profit by using user data and other tools and strategies to target particular advertisements to identified individuals.386
In doing so, intermediaries allow political stakeholders to present
their political messages to specific, vulnerable individuals, even
though the messages may include fake news and distortions of truth.
By enabling vast influence on voter consciousness, intermediaries
can impair public faith in election results and erode long-term

380

See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 5–9 (4th ed. 1869); see generally JOHN MILTON,
AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING (1958).
381
See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
83–87 (1948).
382
See Jack M. Balkin, Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2004).
383
Id. at 3 (“Democratic culture is about individual liberty as well as collective selfgovernance; it is about each individual’s ability to participate in the production and
distribution of culture.”).
384
See Part III.A.
385
See Part III.C.
386
See Part III.D.
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democracy.387 When people spread false statements about public officials and institutions, democracy itself suffers.388
Arguably, the law should impose liability on intermediaries.
However, imposing liability on intermediaries for fake news stories
may result in collateral censorship,389 because intermediary liability
affects users’ practical ability speak.390 A traditional, individualistic
understanding of speech rights does not compute new manners of
free expression. Speech on social media is governed by content
moderation. In such a system, allocating greater liability to digital
intermediaries would cause human and algorithmic moderation to
remove more legitimate content, resulting in false positives.391 Due
to liability risks, intermediaries might censor not only unprotected
speech,392 but legitimate political speech393 that might include lies
not quite reaching a level of defamation.394 Even though scholars
387

See Hasen, supra note 45, at 539.
See Sunstein, supra note 17, at 394.
389
See Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity, 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293, 295–96 (2011) (arguing collateral censorship occurs when a
private intermediary suppresses the speech of others in order to avoid liability that
otherwise might be imposed because of that speech).
390
See Balkin, supra note 132, at 2029–32.
391
See Douek, supra note 236, at 802 (explaining that traditional free speech theory does
not fit exactly to the new system of moderation, which is not based on the individual right,
but rather on proportionality and probability to err).
392
See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002) (“The freedom of
speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain categories of speech, including
defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced with real children.”). Such
categories are not entitled to freedom of expression protection because “the evil to be
restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no
process of case-by-case adjudication is required,” and “the balance of competing interests
is clearly struck.” Lavi, supra note 105, at 530 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
763–64 (1982)); see also United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (noting that
unlike defamation, lies are protected expressions).
393
Cf. Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship
Creep, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1043–45 (2018) (explaining that legal liability and
sanctions could result in censorship and consequently, legitimate speech may also be
removed).
394
The US Supreme Court struck down a portion of the Stolen Valor Act, a federal law
criminalizing false statements about having a military medal, and in fact protected lies
within the First Amendment. See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 729–30; see generally Louis W.
Tompros et al., The Constitutionality of Criminalizing False Speech Made on Social
Networking Sites in a Post-Alvarez, Social Media-Obsessed World, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
65 (2017). In addition, expressions can benefit from defamation law defenses, especially
388
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propose to narrow First Amendment protection to exclude lies,395
courts continue to protect fake news, as broader liability might lead
to censorship of even slight inaccuracies.396 Increased liability risks
could even cause intermediaries to screen content algorithmically
before it appears on the platform without transparency about the
screening process, infringing speakers’ autonomy, impairing the
public’s right to receive information, disrupting the exchange of
ideas, and undermining civic and cultural participation.397 Liability
could decrease the number of relevant recommendations users receive on organic content and lead to a ban on paid political advertisements, narrowing expression opportunities for those vying for
public office.398 In addition, one might argue that by imposing liability on intermediaries, the government infringes intermediaries’
rights to free speech as a speaker.
Yet, a chilling effect may be beneficial to some degree.399 Without it, fake news stories could deplete trust and threaten the very
values freedom of expression aims to protect.400 The public’s inability to distinguish truths from falsehoods could impair voters’ autonomy to make informed choices.401 Moreover, spreading falsehoods
within online social networks could undermine truthful statements
and distort competition in the marketplace of ideas.402 Due to the
when they are about public figures. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279–80 (1964).
395
See Sunstein, supra note 17, at 421 (“The government can regulate or ban deepfakes,
consistent with the First Amendment, if (1) it is not reasonably obvious or explicitly and
prominently disclosed that they are deepfakes, and (2) they would create serious personal
embarrassment or reputational harm.”).
396
Id. at 398 (“If the government is allowed to punish or censor what it characterizes as
false, it might actually end up punishing or censoring truth. The reason is that its own
judgments may not be reliable.”).
397
Contra Elkin-Koren & Perel, supra note 113, at 669, 672.
398
See Kreiss & Perault, supra note 15.
399
See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 58.
400
See generally Balkin, supra note 12, at 79 (explaining that when people can no longer
distinguish between true and false and cease to trust others, the very same values of free
speech will be impaired).
401
See Gaughan, supra note 373, at 68.
402
See FRANKS, supra note 89, at 119 (“[E]ven if people had strong preferences for the
truth, there is no reason for confidence that the marketplace would help them discover it.
As the ‘fake news’ epidemic has amply demonstrated.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Believing False
Rumors, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY, AND REPUTATION 91, 102 (Saul
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technological environment and intermediaries’ influence on the
flow of information, fake news stories can spread widely and users
are more likely to perceive them as credible.403
However, the balance between conflicting fundamental rights
should respond to intermediaries’ different roles. The role an intermediary plays in the dissemination of information should affect the
preemptive measures taken to combat the dissemination of fake stories.
1. Basic Intermediation
Hosting user content, designing a platform’s architecture, and
utilizing different communication tools all facilitate the flow of information. Basic intermediation generally enhances freedom of expression. Facilitating information dissemination, whether the content is true or false, is neutral to content but essential to a vibrant
marketplace of ideas.404 Even if a platform’s interface attracts users
to the service and encourages them to share more information, it
typically does not aim to promote harmful speech. There are ways
to nudge users into thinking reflectively before sharing harmful information; policymakers should encourage intermediaries to implement these strategies voluntarily.405 However, holding intermediaries liable for their site’s architecture and neutral communication
tools is not the solution to preventing the dissemination of harmful
content. Holding intermediaries liable for encouraging content sharing will disproportionately chill the flow of information. Without
useful architecture and communication tools, the internet will resemble a library without a catalogue, making it difficult for users to

Levmore & Martha Craven Nusbaum eds., 2010); Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy:
The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155
U. PA. L. REV. 11, 40 (2006).
403
Lavi, supra note 55, at 443 (“Within seconds, a message or a post can travel around
the world and be viewed by thousands of users.”); ARAL, supra note 19, at 28 (expanding
on the rapid dissemination of lies on Twitter and how many accept them as credible).
404
This Article focuses on general purpose platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and
YouTube. Indeed, intermediaries can operate ideological platforms for spreading political
content on specific candidates and form focal points for a politician. Focal points for
specific types of content are beyond the scope of this Article. Cf. Lavi, supra note 74.
405
Cf. Lavi, supra note 55, 497–510.
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find relevant information.406 Immunity for basic intermediation is
therefore necessary to promote a vibrant marketplace of ideas.
2. Moderation
Moderating users’ content is one way to shape public discourse.
It promotes adherence to the platforms’ terms of use statements, site
guidelines, and legal regimes. It is a key part of the production chain
of commercial sites and social media platforms and a fundamental
aspect of any platform.407 Imposing intermediary liability for failure
to remove defamatory fake news stories would force intermediaries
to serve as arbiters of truth for content they neither authored nor
aimed to promote. Intermediaries may remove content just because
someone reported it as fake news, even if the content is not defamatory and thereby protected by the First Amendment.408 A
knowledge-based regime could result in collateral censorship, curtailing political content’s availability and variety and undermining
free speech. Moreover, to minimize risks, intermediaries might remove content automatically or proactively by using learning algorithms without sensitivity to context, leading to “false positives.”409
Consequently, important political criticism, satire, parody, or other
statements that benefit from defamation law defenses would likely
be removed.410
406

See Seth Stern, Note, Fair Housing and Online Free Speech Collide in Fair Housing
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 559, 589–90
(2009) (“If all websites strictly follow the Ninth Circuit’s guidance, the Internet will
eventually resemble a gigantic library with no cataloging system.”).
407
See Part III.B.
408
The First Amendment protects lies that do not reach the level of defamation. See
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 721 (2012).
409
TUFECKI, supra note 46, at 150–51 (explaining the shortcomings of algorithmic
moderation and lack of sensitivity to context); see, e.g., GILLESPIE, supra note 27, at 98
(“These systems are just not very good yet . . . given that offense depends so critically on
both interpretation and context.”); NATASHA DUARTE ET AL., CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY &
TECH., MIXED MESSAGES? THE LIMITS OF AUTOMATED SOCIAL MEDIA CONTENT ANALYSIS
1, 4 (2017), https://cdt.org/files/2017/11/Mixed-Messages-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/
FKE6-4GRE].
410
See DAPHNE KELLER, STAN. CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y, DOLPHINS IN THE NET:
INTERNET CONTENT FILTERS AND THE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S GLAWISCHNIG-PIESCZEK V.
FACEBOOK IRELAND OPINION 18–19 (2019) (comparing false positives to “dolphins in the
net” and referring to the consequences of imposing an obligation on intermediaries to
automatically screen harmful content).

2021]

TARGETING EXCEPTIONS

129

Subjecting immunity to “good faith” requirements, as outlined
in Trump’s Order, is also undesirable.411 It is unclear what decisions
would constitute “moderation in good faith.” Such scienter would
undermine the motivation for “good Samaritan”412 moderation practices and lead intermediaries to refrain from voluntary moderation
in hopes of mitigating exposure to liability. Furthermore, intermediaries might not outline community guidelines to avoid viewpointbased speech restrictions that could be perceived as “unfair” by the
FTC.413 As a result, platforms would be overused by spammers and
filled with cacophony. Consequently, it would be harder for participants to find relevant content. Platforms are also likely to be abused
by bad actors, filling platforms with negative content. This would
make it difficult to differentiate between “wise” and “unwise” ideas
and counter false statements.414 Moreover, moderation restrictions
would impair diversity among platforms and the marketplace of
ideas.
Granting immunity for certain moderation roles is essential to
prevent a disproportionate chilling effect on free expression and
business models, mitigate cacophony and platform abuse, and promote diverse moderation practices between platforms—all leading
to a robust marketplace of ideas. Thus, the law should neither require
intermediaries to censor user content nor intervene with editorial
discretion in content moderation practices. Instead, the law should
continue to protect good Samaritan moderation practices.

411

See Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079, 34,080 (May 28, 2020), repealed
by Exec. Order No. 14,029, 86 Fed. Reg. 27,025 (May 14, 2021) (“[U]nder the law, this
provision is not distorted to provide liability protection for online platforms that—far from
acting in ‘good faith’ to remove objectionable content—instead engage in deceptive or
pretextual actions (often contrary to their stated terms of service) to stifle viewpoints with
which they disagree.”).
412
47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (explaining current “good Samaritan” immunity).
413
See 15 U.S.C. § 45.
414
See ROBERTS, supra note 105, at 165 (“If you open a hole on the internet . . . it gets
filled with shit.”); See James Grimmelmann, The Virtues of Moderation, 17 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 42, 53–54 (2015).
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3. Algorithmically Personalized Recommendations
Algorithmically personalized recommendations focus user attention on relevant content and connections.415 An algorithmic conclusion that a user advocates for a particular political party results in
more content recommendations for the user’s preferred political
party, including related fake news stories.416 Users are exposed to
content affirming their previous dispositions and are thus more
likely to reach their threshold to pass on ideas. Prioritizing content
creates echo chambers and enhances polarization by reinforcing and
exacerbating users’ natural inclinations.417 By recommending personalized content, the algorithm creates feedback loops that prevent
equal representation of ideas.418
Algorithmic recommendations are never neutral; the intermediary sets the parameters for prioritization.419 However, intermediaries
can use “policy neutral” algorithms that prioritize content according
to inherent characteristics, activity, and inclinations of each user
without aiming to recommend unlawful content in particular.420 In
contrast, intermediaries can program a “policy directed” algorithm

415

See Part I.A.3.
ARAL, supra note 19, at 59 (referring to this feedback loop as “the Hype Loop,” which
“through the interplay of machine an human intelligence, controls the flow of information
over the substrate; and its medium (the smartphone, at least for now), which is the primary
input /output device through which we provide information to and receive information
from the Hype Machine.”).
417
See ZUBOFF, supra note 90, at 466–67.
418
MARANTZ, supra note 99, at 160.
419
FRANKS, supra note 89, at 186 (“While algorithms are built on data, they also
‘optimize’ output to parameters the company chooses, crucially, under conditions also
shaped by the company.”).
420
See Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1034 (2017)
(focusing on a related context of racist completion results and explaining that the
autocomplete function reflects hidden biases that exist in society and “questions that large
numbers of people are asking ‘when they think no-one is looking.’”).
416
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without neutrality421 or tinker with the results ex post,422 favoring
one topic over another and promoting a specific agenda. For example, they can preference content advocating a specific political candidate, prioritize fake news stories over truths, and make unlawful
content more visible.423
Arguably, the intermediary should bear liability for recommending defamatory content and fake news stories even if their algorithm
is policy neutral. This should certainly be the case where a platform’s algorithm is policy directed. The intermediary has control
over its algorithmic recommendations, contrasting with the relatively limited control it has in hosting users’ content. Therefore, the
intermediary can reduce recommendations of unlawful fake news
stories by designing the algorithm ex-ante, limiting the function to
avoid recommendations of specific topics or unlawful views.424 In

421

Lavi, supra note 26, at 203; Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 126, at 137–38
(differentiating between policy-neutral algorithms that can in some cases reflect existing,
entrenched societal biases and historical inequalities and, in contrast, policy-directed
algorithms that are purposefully designed to advance a predefined policy agenda); cf.
Tarleton Gillespie, The Relevance of Algorithms, in MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES: ESSAYS ON
COMMUNICATION, MATERIALITY, AND SOCIETY 167, 192 (Gillespie et al. eds., 2014);
Waldman, supra note 123, at 614.
422
In a related context, it was revealed that Google’s executives and engineers tinkered
with the search results without neutrality, favoring specific businesses or increasing or
decreasing the visibility of specific types of content. See Grind et al., supra note 127.
423
Differentiating policy neutral algorithms from policy directed algorithms can be
challenging because algorithms are guarded trade secrets; therefore, there are legal
difficulties in imposing disclosure obligations upon them. However, as Part III shall
demonstrate, using impact assessment to evaluate harm caused by biased recommendations
might mitigate the problem to some degree. See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX
SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 142–43
(2015); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 21 (2014); Waldman, supra note 123, at 614.
424
Apple’s Siri is an example of such a system with limitations by design. RONALD K. L.
COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, ROBOTICA: SPEECH RIGHTS AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
27 (2018) (“[S]he sidesteps medical, legal, or spiritual counsel; she eschews criminal
advice; and she prefers the precise and factual to the ambiguous and evaluative.”); see also
PASQUALE, supra note 33, at 12 (“Regulators will need to require responsibility-by-design
to complement extant models of security-by-design and privacy-by-design.”). This may
involve requiring certain hard-coded audit logs, or licensing practices that explicitly
contemplate problematic outcomes. Such initiatives will not simply regulate robotics and
AI post hoc, but will also influence systems development by foreclosing some design
options and encouraging others. Cf. Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age
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this way, YouTube has already restricted its system in an effort to
reduce harmful recommendations.425
Indeed, imposing liability in these cases may result in over-censorship of legitimate recommendations for political candidates. Yet
self-censored recommendations differ from external censorship of
user speech. Recommendations are machine speech, directing users
to content they did not specifically seek out. However, it can be argued that content prioritization and algorithmic recommendations
are a key part of commercial websites’ production chains. It is the
intermediary’s right to conduct business and design platforms as it
sees fit. Imposing liability on algorithmic recommendations could
undermine the intermediary’s freedom of expression.426
It can be argued that software, algorithms, and artificial intelligence have only secondary free speech protections.427 Even if algorithmic recommendations constitute free speech, one should differentiate between recommendations that are policy neutral and those
that are policy directed. Policy neutral algorithmic recommendations depend on user characteristics and activities.428 Such
of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1224 (2017); Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A.
Bamberger, Saving Governance-by-Design, 106 CALIF. 697, 701 (2018).
425
Continuing Our Work to Improve Recommendations on YouTube, YOUTUBE (Jan. 25,
2019),
https://youtube.googleblog.com/2019/01/continuing-our-work-to-improve.html
[https://perma.cc/GMT9-DUEN] (“[W]e’ll begin reducing recommendations of borderline
content and content that could misinform users in harmful ways.”).
426
See Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1533 (2013); cf. Toni M.
Massaro et al., Siri-ously 2.0: What Artificial Intelligence Reveals About the First
Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2481, 2483–84 (2017) (suggesting ways in which AI may
inspire critical engagement with free speech theory and doctrine).
427
PASQUALE, supra note 33, at 109 (“Free speech protections are for people, and only
secondarily (if at all) for software, algorithms, and artificial intelligence.”). See also
Lawrence Lessig, The First Amendment Does Not Protect Replicants, in SOCIAL MEDIA
AND DEMOCRACY (Lee Bollinger & Geoffrey Stone eds., forthcoming 2022) (manuscript
at 13) (available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3922565)
(“[T]he replicant targeting the ads in Facebook’s algorithm would have no presumptive
constitutional protection.”).
428
Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 126, at 138 (“‘[P]olicy-neutral algorithms,’ comprise[]
algorithmic processes that are largely expected to provide a neutral, objective,
mathematical result. What is the most profitable location for a new business? Which result
do users click on when they search for the word ‘Jew?’ Here, users would be surprised to
discover they are being presented a manicured, edited vision of the world.”); see, e.g.,
Ignacio Siles et. al, The Mutual Domestication of Users and Algorithmic Recommendations
on Netflix, 12 COMMC’N, CULTURE & CRITIQUE 499, 508 (2019) (“Netflix makes specific
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recommendations increase the magnitude ascribed to the content but
do not aim to alter the proportion of unlawful and legitimate recommendations. Neutral recommendations rely on users’ personal property and activities.429 Imposing liability on intermediaries in such
cases may cast too heavy a burden on the flow of information, resulting in collateral censorship of legitimate recommendations and
making it more difficult for users to find relevant information.
In contrast, policy directed algorithms bolster the proportion of
specific types of content and views.430 Due to the centrality of social
media platforms, the process underlying the marketplace of ideas
may work poorly when algorithms promote a biased agenda, as the
power of intermediaries creates structurally unequal access to information.431 If the algorithm promotes fake stories, people will focus
on falsehoods rather than truths, and competition among ideas will
become ineffective.432 Policy directed algorithms do not promote
users’ free speech and instead can inflict severe harm.433 Liability
does not give rise to concerns about collateral censorship because
liability is directed at the intermediary’s own recommendations.434
recommendations to shape these rituals, based on the technologies users employ and the
content they watch when they perform the rituals.”).
429
ARAL, supra note 19, at 61 (“Machine intelligence ingests our thoughts, behaviors and
options and, in turn, curates the stories we see in our newsfeeds, the pictures we see on
Instagram, the colleagues and dated suggested to us on LinkedIn and Tinder, and the ads
we are shown alongside this content.”).
430
See, e.g., FRISCHMANN & SELINGER, supra note 104, at 117–18 (discussing the
Facebook cognition experience in which the algorithm showed users only negative, or only
positive stories).
431
Helen Norton, Powerful Speakers and Their Listeners, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 441, 446
(2019).
432
Sunstein, supra note 402, at 92.
433
Policy directed algorithms can promote specific harmful content, political content, or
commercial content, make it more prominent, and mislead the audience regarding its
importance. Facebook’s advertising algorithms already use categories of targeting that can
promote hate speech. See Kerri A. Thompson, Commercial Clicks: Advertising Algorithms
as Commercial Speech, 21 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1019, 1020–21 (2019) (noting that
the intermediary can promote specific content without directly targeting it and without
transparency that misleads the audience).
434
An intermediary that reaps social benefits from speech has the same incentives as the
original speaker and does not need the incentives that immunity provides to facilitate
speech. Whenever intermediaries function as speakers, the rationale for immunity
diminishes. See Wu, supra note 389, at 297 (explaining that immunity is not the appropriate
response to situations in which collateral censorship is not the problem).
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Some chilling effect on the intermediary’s recommendations is expected, yet this is necessary to strike the right balance between the
user’s fundamental right to receive information and the third party’s
right to reputation.435
One can argue that algorithmic recommendations are speech.
Accordingly, a balance must be struck between the intermediary’s
right to free speech and the rights of third parties.436 Imposing liability for failing to reduce recommendations on defamatory fake news
and harmful content can influence the public’s access to political
information. Due to algorithms’ limitations, restrictions on specific
words would cause a decrease in recommendations on political matters in general,437 and the efficiency of the algorithm as a functional
tool will decrease.438 The costs to freedom of expression outweigh
the benefits of reducing harmful recommendations by policy neutral
algorithms.

435

Selective dissemination is much like algorithmic policy directed recommendations.
Cf. Lavi, supra note 26, at 182–83 (explaining that liability can be imposed on an
intermediary’s functions of selective dissemination).
436
See Massaro et al., supra note 426, at 2483–84 (suggesting ways in which AI may
inspire critical engagement with free speech theory and doctrine); Wu, supra note 426, at
1533; see also Julie E. Cohen, Tailoring Election Regulation: The Platform Is the Frame,
4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 641, 641 (2020) (“[A]lthough one might wonder whether the datadriven, algorithmic activities that enable and invite such manipulation ought to count as
protected speech at all, the Court’s emerging jurisprudence about the baseline coverage of
constitutional protection for speech seems poised to sweep many such information
processing activities within the First Amendment’s ambit.”).
437
Algorithms are not sensitive enough to context; therefore, trying to avoid specific
recommendations would reduce effective recommendations that are important for the
public’s right to information. Trying to avoid recommendations of fake news is likely to
result in a decline in important political speech. In another place, I proposed that
intermediaries should make efforts to reduce recommendations on unprotected speech that
constitutes incitement to terrorism. In such cases, incitement can cost human lives. Indeed,
avoiding unprotected recommendations of content containing incitement may also reduce
protected speech and not just incitement to terror. However, the costs to free speech in
cases of incitement are lower with regard to recommendations on political speech because
reducing recommendations on content that encourages violence, even if it is protected,
might not be as bad as reducing recommendations on useful political content that should
enjoy higher degree of First Amendment protection. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S.
709 (2012); cf. Lavi, supra note 105.
438
See Wu, supra note 426, at 1517–24 (differentiating between speech and functional
tools).
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However, recommendations that depend on intermediary preferences to promote specific types of content and agendas are a different story. Such recommendations extend far beyond functional
tools. The recommendation tool itself is an expression of the intermediary’s ideas439 or advice to users.440 Assuming recommendations should be treated as speech, intermediaries cannot have it both
ways:441 they cannot claim to be active speakers when seeking First
Amendment protection and mere navigation tools when facing tort
liability. By enjoying free speech rights, intermediaries undermine
their Section 230 immunity and bear liability for unlawful recommendations as speakers.442
4. Targeting Advertisements for Profit
Targeting advertisements deliberately promotes a political
agenda or advocates for a specific politician, without neutrality and
without adhering to professional norms.443 A political advertisement
439

Yet, Wu still tends to believe that they are functional tools. See id. at 1525 (referring
to software navigation and map programs as cases that are harder to differentiate between
communication of ideas and functionality). Another approach is that algorithms represent
the message of their developers and are tied to human editorial judgement. See Stuart Minor
Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445, 1479 (2013). In Part III,
Collins and Skover explain that the First Amendment should protect communications in all
forms relevant to human utility. See COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 424, at 42 (explaining
that for constitutional purposes, what really matters is that the receiver experiences
speech—including robotic speech—as meaningful and potentially useful and valuable).
440
In fact, this machine speech repeats user speech and at times, mimics it. Thus, this
repetition promotes free speech. See Lavi, supra note 26, at 179; see also James
Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868, 895 (2014) (explaining that
algorithmic communication deserves protection primarily because it provides advice to
users).
441
However, courts have reached different conclusions regarding search engines. See
Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 629–31 (D. Del. 2007) (recognizing an
intermediary’s right to free speech in the context of page-rank and rejecting their liability
for optimization); see also Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. 02-1457, 2003 WL
21464568, at *4, (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003); Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal
Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1193 (2008). These rulings have been criticized in literature. See
PASQUALE, supra note 423, at 167; Frank Pasquale, Reforming the Law of Reputation, 47
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 515, 524–27 (2015); PASQUALE, supra note 423; Wu, supra note 426, at
1496–1503, 1527 (describing the potential harm of computer-generated speech that invites
regulation).
442
See RICHARDS, supra note 376, at 87.
443
See Balkin, Keynote, supra note 12.
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aims to inflate the proportion of individual’s holding specific views
and the magnitude ascribed to such views. Targeting political advertisements influences the context of the message by controlling the
target audience, the timing of the advertisement, and how it is distributed for maximum effect. Advertisers and intermediaries have
more information and power than their audiences. Therefore, equal
access to “wise” and “unwise” ideas will become impossible and
make it difficult to counter speech with more speech.444 Mass targeting of fake news stories would overwhelm users and disrupt their
sense of reality.445 Moreover, secret microtargeting makes it difficult to engage in “counter speech.”446
When an advertisement includes a negative fake news story,447
it directs false claims to specific “receptive” individuals, thereby increasing the story’s believability and likelihood of further circulation.448 Consequently, it can inflict tremendous reputational harm,
distort the truth, and infringe public interest.449 Such negative, false
advertisements do not serve the values undergirding free expression.
They erode trust in political discourse and in democratic participation, providing minimal benefits to the marketplace of ideas.450 Because the intermediary collects and analyzes user data and uses special targeting tools to promote a specific agenda, fake news advertisements can disrupt the user’s sense of reality and distort the marketplace of ideas.451

444

See Dan Laidman, When the Slander Is the Story: The Neutral Reportage Privilege in
Theory and Practice, 17 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 74, 99 (2010); Philip M. Napoli, What If More
Speech Is No Longer the Solution? First Amendment Theory Meets Fake News and the
Filter Bubble, 70 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 55, 69 (2018); Norton, supra note 431, at 442.
445
See Jonathan D. Varat, Truth, Courage, and Other Human Dispositions: Reflections
on Falsehoods and the First Amendment, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 35, 48–49 (2018).
446
Bhagwat, supra note 6, at 2378–79.
447
See Stewart, supra note 12.
448
Targeting advertisements to individuals with low thresholds for accepting ideas can
start a cascade, thus other individuals will soon follow and spread the idea as well. See
Lavi, supra note 55, at 454 (“The spreading and adoption of a rumor depends on
encountering individuals with low thresholds who are willing to spread it further.”).
449
See Hasen, supra note 45, at 544; Sunstein, supra note 17, at 394 (“[I]f people spread
false statements—most obviously about public officials and institutions—democracy itself
will suffer.”).
450
See Berman, supra note 181, at 515; Tsesis, supra note 197, at 1597.
451
See Varat, supra note 445, at 48–49.
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Allowing intermediaries to micro-target fake news advertisements with impunity can lead to undesirable consequences for reputations, freedom of speech at large, and the public interest. Liability
for such targeting can be justified, seeing as collateral censorship’s
logic does not apply to advertiser-content in the same way.452 Unlike
user-made content, which is published immediately, intermediaries
solicit advertisements and determine when to target them.453 They
can fact-check and verify advertisements before targeting or require
advertisers to confirm the content’s validity; alternatively, they can
remove advertisements upon notice.454 This does not cause collateral censorship of advertisements because intermediaries make
much of their profit from advertisements; therefore, they will still be
incentivized to run advertisements even with the risk of liability.455
Arguably, liability infringes upon the intermediary’s free speech
rights because targeting advertisements to specific audiences at the
most effective time and manner is not only a functional tool, but
rather a form of commercial speech by the intermediary.456 However, much like policy directed algorithmic recommendations, the
intermediary’s right to free speech undermines its immunity to civil
liability.457

452

Cf. Wu, supra note 389, at 330.
See, e.g., Joss Fong, Facebook Showed This Ad Almost Exclusively to Women. Is That
a Problem?, VOX (July 31, 2020, 2:33 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/7/31/
21349793/facebook-ad-targeting-bias-discrimination [https://perma.cc/H57U-UFX8].
454
Jack M Balkin, supra note 12, at 94 (proposing that if intermediaries bear distributors’
liability for advertising, such a regime will incentivize them to supervise ads more
carefully).
455
See id.
456
See Thompson, supra note 433, at 1034–35.
457
See Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 629–31 (D. Del. 2007)
(recognizing an intermediary’s right to free speech in the context of page-rank and rejecting
their liability for optimization); RICHARDS, supra note 376, at 87; see also Search King,
Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. 02-1457, 2003 WL 21464568, at *4 (W.D. Okla. May 27,
2003); Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 441, at 1193. These rulings have been criticized in
literature. See PASQUALE, supra note 423, at 167; Pasquale, supra note 441, at 524–27; Wu,
supra note 426, at 1496–1503, 1527 (describing the potential harm of computer-generated
speech that invites regulation); supra notes 437–442 and accompanying text.
453
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C. Reevaluating Exceptionalism in Light of Technological
Developments
Once upon a time, people thought the internet was the harbinger
of “disintermediation”—a sovereign-free medium controlled from
the bottom-up by users, not subject to governmental laws and regulations.458 This perception reflects the concept of internet exceptionalism.459 However, today’s intermediaries are not mere conduits.460
While it may seem like any internet user can publish freely and instantly online, many intermediaries actively curate the content their
users post.461 They can promote or withhold ideas, organize the flow
of information, and influence social dynamics.462 They possess an
essential role in directing user attention.463 For example, intermediaries moderate user-generated content.464 Different intermediaries
have varying attitudes towards moderation and diverse community
rules.465 Intermediaries can also use algorithms to determine what
users view.466 Moreover, through algorithmic recommendations,
they can influence what is valued, posted, and shared. They collect
users’ information, personalize content,467 and manipulate meanings
458

See Lavi, supra note 74, at 11–12.
Barlow started the spirit of wide-eyed techno utopianism. See Barlow, supra note 215;
see also MARANTZ, supra note 88, at 68.
460
See Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV.
2296, 2297 (2014); Derek E. Bambauer, Middlemen, 64 FLA. L. REV. F. 64, 64–65 (2012);
Sylvain, supra note 308, at 268 (explaining that because intermediaries structure, sort, and
sometimes sell user data, they are not passive conduits).
461
See MARANTZ, supra note 88, at 70; Bloch-Wehba, supra note 364, at Part II.A.
(addressing the practice of intermediaries that remove content following government
pressure); Klonick, supra note 109, at 1601.
462
See Michal Lavi, Online Intermediaries: With Power Comes Responsibility, JOLT DIG.
(May 11, 2018), https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/online-intermediaries-with-powercomes-responsibility [https://perma.cc/9Y83-UJ4J].
463
See id.
464
See GILLESPIE, supra note 27, at 5–6.
465
See Shannon Bond, Critics Slam Facebook but Zuckerberg Resists Blocking Trump’s
Posts, NPR (June 11, 2020, 11:58 AM), https://n.pr/37mIoqm [https://perma.cc/88655YHN] (“When Trump tweeted an identical message, Twitter took the novel step of hiding
the tweet behind a warning label, saying it broke its rules against glorifying violence.
Zuckerberg saw it differently. Even though he was personally disgusted by the president’s
inflammatory rhetoric, he said, the post did not break Facebook’s rules against inciting
violence.”).
466
See, e.g., Hern, supra note 25.
467
Cf. ZUBOFF, supra note 90, at 8–9; VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 29, at 54.
459
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in undisclosed ways and for undisclosed purposes.468 They microtarget advertisements to specific users at the most effective times,469
subvert user decision-making,470 and even threaten democracy.471
As technology advances and algorithmic influencers become a
fundamental aspect of any platform, intermediaries’ duty in moderating information flows should be reconsidered.472 Reevaluating the
role of intermediaries’ is particularly important, especially in light
of recent attacks on Section 230.473
Recent scholarship acknowledges that twenty-first century intermediaries cannot be treated as mere passive conduits and that policymakers should formulate a model to understand platforms’ roles
and duties.474 Different scholars have observed intermediaries’ influences in different ways and have proposed various legal obligations.475 Even though intermediaries are private entities, some scholars have proposed that since they control the information
468

See COHEN, supra note 90, at 96.
See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 433, at 1023 (explaining that Facebook allowed
advertisers to target advertisements on specific topics to hate groups); Julia Angwin et al.,
Facebook Enabled Advertisers to Reach ‘Jew Haters’, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 14, 2017, 4:00
PM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-enabled-advertisers-to-reach-jewhaters [https://perma.cc/U43D-EC3V].
470
See GILLESPIE, supra note 27, at 23 (“Platforms may not shape public discourse by
themselves, but they do shape the shape of public discourse. And they know it.”).
471
See Zittrain, supra note 206, at 336; see also Carole Cadwalladr & Emma GrahamHarrison, Revealed: 50 Million Facebook Profiles Harvested for Cambridge Analytica in
Major Data Breach, GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2018, 6:03 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence-us-election
[https://perma.cc/V8Z8-G9KS].
472
See Cohen, Internet Utopianism and the Practical Inevitability of Law, supra note
141, at 96 (“Advancing human freedom through the absence of law was never really in the
cards.”).
473
See Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (May 28, 2020), repealed by Exec.
Order No. 14,029, 86 Fed. Reg. 27,025 (May 14, 2021); see also Transparency in
Technology Act, S.B. 7072, 2021 Leg., (Fla. 2021); H.B. 20, 87th Leg., 2d Special Sess.
(Tex. 2021).
474
Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO. L.J. 1353, 1373
(2018); Lavi, supra note 55, at 463.
475
See, e.g., Orit Fischman-Afori, Online Rulers as Hybrid Bodies: The Case of
Infringing Content Monitoring, 23 J. CONST. L. 351, 407 (2021); Jack M. Balkin, Fixing
Social Media’s Grand Bargain, in AEGIS PAPER SERIES 2018, at 11 (Hoover Inst., Aegis
Ser. Paper No. 1814, 2018) [hereinafter Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain]; Neil
Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, A Duty of Loyalty for Privacy Law, 99 WASH. UNIV. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2021).
469
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infrastructures that serve the public, they should be treated as public
forums,476 or at least as hybrid bodies.477 Thus, these scholars have
argued that intermediaries should be considered state actors, thereby
subjecting them to the First Amendment and other public law standards.478 Though this was rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Prager University v. Google,479 such perception is reflected in Trump’s Order480 declaring that, “[i]t is the policy of the United States that large
online platforms, such as Twitter and Facebook, as the critical
means of promoting the free flow of speech and ideas today, should
not restrict protected speech.”481 Recently, in Biden v. Knight First
Amendment Institute,482 Justice Thomas criticized Section 230, emphasizing that highly-concentrated, privately-owned platforms are
the infrastructure for information and noting that “[i]t seems rather

476

See Kyle Langvardt, A New Deal for the Online Public Sphere, 26 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 341, 380–81 (2018) (proposing that nonstate regulators such as online platforms can
be perceived as state agencies); Langvardt, supra note 474, at 1353 (exploring the
possibility of outlining an administrative monitoring and compliance regime to ensure that
the online intermediaries content moderation policies are in line with First Amendment
principles); see also K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Public Values,
and the Revival of the Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1668 (2018)
(proposing to apply public utilities concept on online platforms); cf. Bhagwat, supra note
6, at 2402.
477
See Fischman-Afori, supra note 475, at 407 (proposing that online platforms should
be treated as hybrid bodies and subject them to public law standards).
478
See Rahman, supra note 476, at 1671. It should be noted that profiles of the
government and government representatives are already treated as public forums. For
example, the court ruled that U.S. former-President Donald Trump could not block Twitter
followers due to their dissenting views because it is a violation of their First Amendment
right to participate in a “designated public forum.” Knight First Amend. Inst. v. Trump,
302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019), cert.
granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst., 141 S. Ct. 1220
(2021) (vacating the Second Circuit’s opinion); see also Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666,
688 (4th Cir. 2019), as amended (Jan. 9, 2019).
479
See Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Despite
YouTube’s ubiquity and its role as a public-facing platform, it remains a private forum, not
a public forum subject to judicial scrutiny under the First Amendment.”).
480
See Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (May 28, 2020), repealed by Exec.
Order No. 14,029, 86 Fed. Reg. 27,025 (May 14, 2021).
481
Id. It should be noted that “[t]his sentence changed in the final draft. In the prior draft,
the sentence referenced the public forum doctrine.” Goldman, supra note 360.
482
See Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1221 (2021); see also
Goldman, supra note 360.
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odd to say that something is a government forum when a private
company has unrestricted authority to do away with it.”483
Imposing the full spectrum of public forum obligations on intermediaries is undesirable. Functionally, it could even cause more
problems. “It would do nothing to prevent third parties from using
social media to manipulate end users, stoke hatred, fear, and prejudice, or spread fake news. And because social media would be required to serve as neutral public forums, they could do little to stop
this.”484 Even if social media platforms ceased curating feeds, they
can still collect and harvest user data directly or through third parties,485 as the recently leaked Facebook documents demonstrate.486
In turn, this data could be sold to third parties who could use it on
their sites (or elsewhere) and influence the flow of information.487
A related proposal advocates for subjecting platforms to obligations not as public forums, but rather as public utilities or monopolies.488 This position was expressed by Justice Thomas in the Supreme Court’s ruling in Biden v. Knight First Amendment Institute,489 analogizing private platforms to common carriers or public
483

Biden, 141 S. Ct. at 1221.
Balkin, Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain, supra note 475, at 6; see Langvardt,
supra note 474, at 1367 (“[T]he more significant difficulty with applying the state action
doctrine to the platforms lies in the fact that internet platforms can ‘evict’ unwanted
speakers without involving the courts.”); see also Balkin, supra note 12, at 71 (“[T]reating
social media companies as state actors or as public utilities does not solve the problems of
the digital public sphere.”); Jack M. Balkin, To Reform Social Media, Reform
Informational Capitalism, in SOCIAL MEDIA, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE FUTURE OF OUR
DEMOCRACY 107–08 (Lee Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., forthcoming), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3925143
[https://perma.cc/5SHPYJ57] [hereinafter To Reform Social Media]; Citron & Franks, supra note 340, at 66 (“If
platforms are treated as governmental actors or their services deemed public fora, then they
could not act as ‘Good Samaritans’ to block online abuse. This result would directly
contravene the will of Section 230’s drafters.”).
485
See Balkin, Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain, supra note 475, at 6.
486
See Facebook Sold a Rival-Squashing Move as Privacy Policy, Documents Reveal,
supra note 154; Skelton & Goodwin, supra note 154 (revealing the leaked documents and
explaining that Facebook planned to use its Android app to match users’ location data with
mobile-phone base station IDs to deliver “location-aware” products without user consent.
Facebook also gave preference to deals if they shared their user data with Facebook).
487
See Balkin, Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain, supra note 475, at 6.
488
See Rahman, supra note 476, at 1668.
489
See Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1224 (2021); cf. Goldman,
supra note 360.
484
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accommodators. He proposed that the Supreme Court should determine how to apply such doctrines to “highly concentrated, privately
owned information infrastructure[s] . . . .”490 Due to the importance
of the services social media companies offer, some states went a step
further and signed bills subjecting social media platforms to “must
carry” rules.491
However, requiring that platforms serve all customers, carry all
lawful traffic, and host all content—much like phone companies
that carry all calls despite their content—might not be a functional solution. Intermediaries are different than common carriers.492 Restricting their right to exclude will result in the same problematic results as subjecting them to public forum obligations—
stripping their ability to keep services safe from scammers,
spammers, and other harmful posts. 493
A third proposal is to view intermediaries as a hybrid between a
conduit and a media company.494 Intermediaries not only host content, but also use their editorial discretion to moderate content and
enforce community guidelines.495 Moreover, they connect users, prioritize and recommend relevant content to specific users, and give
preference to specific items on newsfeeds, all based on relevancy
and user-retention considerations.496 Intermediaries create ecosystems of networked journalism through personalized recommendations and targeted advertisements, thereby contributing to how news

490

Biden, 141 S. Ct. at 1221.
See Transparency in Technology Act, S.B. 7072 (Fla. 2021); H.B. 20, 87th Leg., 2d
Special Sess. (Tex. 2021).
492
See Lavi, supra note 55, at 866.
493
See Balkin, To Reform Social Media, supra note 484, at 108 (“[L]aws preventing
social media from moderating any content would also make it useless for most people, as
social media would quickly fill with pornography and spam. But the fact that content
moderation is an important function of social media does not mean that government should
require it.”).
494
See Mary Louise Kelly, Media or Tech Company? Facebook’s Profile Is Blurry, NPR
(Apr. 11, 2018, 5:59 PM), n.pr/30ULTA7 [https://perma.cc/E9PX-LHRK].
495
GILLESPIE, supra note 27, at 21(“[P]latforms do, and must, moderate the content and
activity of users, using some logistics of detection, review, and enforcement.”).
496
See id. at 43 (“As soon as Facebook changed from delivering a reverse chronological
list of materials that users posted on their walls to curating an algorithmically selected
subset of those posts in order to generate a News Feed, it moved from delivering
information to producing a media commodity out of it.”).
491
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is made.497 They are a key pathway to news and even surpass print
newspapers as information sources.498 Arguably, as similarities between intermediaries and media companies increase, intermediaries
should be subjected to the professional norms and standards applicable to traditional media.499 Indeed, some intermediaries already
apply professional standards and restrict specific types of content
through their terms of services and community policies.500 However,
the law still has a role in shaping the framework501 by outlining duties or narrowing the scope of immunity for the roles intermediaries
play.502
A fourth proposal by Professors Balkin, Hartzog, and Richards503 is the concept of information fiduciaries.504 This approach
likens intermediaries’ obligations toward user information to the fiduciary duties of doctors and lawyers with their patients and clients.505 Much like the duties of care, confidentiality, and loyalty, the
law should impose special duties on intermediaries—such as

497

See Erin C. Carrol, Platforms and the Fall of the Fourth Estate: Looking Beyond the
First Amendment to Protect Watchdog Journalism, 79 MD. L. REV. 529, 556 (2020).
498
See Katherine Schaeffer, U.S. Has Changed in Key Ways in the Past Decade, from
Tech Use to Demographics, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 20, 2019), pewrsr.ch/2PSoOLs
[https://perma.cc/D48P-MZYP] (“Social media is now a key pathway to news for
Americans. In 2018, for the first time, social media sites surpassed print newspapers as a
news source for Americans.”).
499
See GILLESPIE, supra note 27, at 43; Balkin, Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain,
supra note 475, at 8 (explaining that social media companies should live up to certain
professional standards; for example, apply codes of ethics, promote norms of civility on
the platform, reduce violent and harassing content, and be transparent regarding editorial
standards).
500
See, e.g., Community Standards: Bullying and Harassment, FACEBOOK,
www.facebook.com/communitystandards/bullying
[https://perma.cc/6TAH-NJBV]
(“[Facebook will] remove content that’s meant to degrade or shame, including, for
example, claims about someone’s sexual activity.”).
501
See Balkin, Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain, supra note 475, at 10 (explaining
that professional norms should apply with transparency and should not be arbitrary).
502
See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 12, at 94 (proposing that governments might establish
distributor liability for paid advertisements to incentivize intermediaries to supervise the
ads they target).
503
See Balkin, Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain, supra note 475, at 11; Richards &
Hartzog, supra note 475, at 4.
504
See generally Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016).
505
See Balkin, Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain, supra note 475, at 12.
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Facebook, Google, and Twitter—in relation to their users. Intermediaries resemble fiduciaries because, much like lawyers and doctors,
they receive and even actively collect personal information506 and
are trusted to treat it with care. Therefore, some have argued that the
law should impose these three duties and limit how social media
companies profit from their users and beneficiaries.507 Intermediaries should neither breach user trust nor take actions that users would
consider unexpected or abusive.508 As information fiduciaries, the
platforms would have a duty not to misuse user data or otherwise
manipulate users.509 Professor Balkin further proposes that “digital
businesses who want the Section 230 immunity must agree to be
regulated as information fiduciaries . . . [and] allow interoperability
for other applications, as long as those applications also agree to act
as information fiduciaries.”510 In addition, these businesses should
“allow government regulators to inspect their algorithms at regular
506

Intermediaries obtain information that their users knowingly disseminate on their
platforms and actively collect incidental information on users’ platform engagement that
leaves digital traces. See Susser, supra note 98, at 30 (“[B]oth the information individuals
knowingly disseminate about themselves (e.g., when they visit websites, make online
purchases, and post photographs and videos on social media) and the information they
unwittingly provide (e.g., when those websites record data about how long they spend
browsing them, where they are when they access them, and which advertisements they
click on) reveals a great deal about who each individual is, what interests them, and what
they find amusing, tempting, and off-putting.”); see also TUROW, supra note 91, at 34–65
(explaining that intermediaries can collect data on consumers online by tracking browsing
activities, clicks, cookies, and actual purchases); ZUBOFF, supra note 90, at 80 (“[T]hese
include websites visited, psychographics, browsing activity, and information about
previous advertisements that the user has been ‘shown, selected and/or made purchases
after viewing.’”).
507
Balkin, Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain, supra note 475, at 12–13; Lavi, supra
note 55, at 491.
508
See Balkin, Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain, supra note 475, at 14; Balkin,
supra note 504, at 1229; Jack M. Balkin, The First Amendment in the Second Gilded Age,
66 BUFF. L. REV. 979, 1008 (2018).
509
It should be noted that this approach strives to impose a duty on intermediaries to
operate their platforms with good faith, respect for users, and non-manipulation. The
information fiduciary approach raises challenges regarding feasibility, enforceability, and
scope. See Balkin, Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain, supra note 475, at 14. But see
Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV.
L. REV. 497, 498 (2019) (“This Article seeks to disrupt the emerging consensus by
identifying . . . tensions and ambiguities in the theory of information fiduciaries, as well as
a number of reasons to doubt the theory’s capacity to resolve them satisfactorily.”).
510
Balkin, To Reform Social Media, supra note 484, at 131.
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intervals for purposes of enforcing competition law, privacy, and
consumer protection obligations” to ensure trustworthy and publicregarding behavior.511
Intermediaries’ growing influence on the information flow justifies a nuanced approach that targets exceptions to exceptionalism,
adapting intermediaries’ immunity based on their influences on the
flow of information.512 The following Part proposes model, contextbased, nuanced guidelines for intermediary immunity that refine and
target exceptions while simultaneously preserving freedom of expression.
III. Contextualizing Exceptionalism and Targeting Exceptions
Online content dissemination exists in many contexts.513 Each
context facilitates distinct kinds of expressions and interactions
among users. Intermediaries’ roles affect three main factors that
shape the context and flow of information: (1) whether the source of
the message and subsequent disseminator are influential entities or
opinion leaders in the social network;514 (2) the message’s context
and the way it is represented;515 and (3) the audience in a given network that forms the situation’s context.516 Arguably, these contextual factors have even more impact than the content of the message
itself.517
The message’s source, presentation, and recipients influence the
magnitude and credibility ascribed to the content and the likelihood

511

Id.
See Sylvain, supra note 137 (“[T]hese developments undermine any notion that online
intermediaries deserve immunity because they are mere conduits for, or passive publishers
of, their users’ expression.”); Sylvain, supra note 308, at 220; see also Balkin, supra note
12, at 94 (proposing a careful balance of intermediary liability and intermediary immunity
rules).
513
Notably, Jaron Lanier has decried how social media giants apply context to user
generated content. See LANIER, supra note 78, at 63–65 (“Speaking through social media
isn’t really speaking at all. Context is applied to what you say after you say it, for someone
else’s profit.”).
514
See Lavi, supra note 26, at 150; see generally GLADWELL, supra note 82.
515
See Lavi, supra note 26, at 150.
516
See id.
517
See Lavi, supra note 55, at 859; Lavi, supra note 26, at 151.
512
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that users will further share it.518 Simple changes to these factors
create a new context. Dissemination of user-generated content is not
uniform and should be viewed contextually. Hosting and moderating content through communication tools and editorial discretion is
different than recommending specific content, rendering its repetition, and placing it prominently on a user’s newsfeed. Targeted advertisements that aim to influence a specific audience have even
greater influence in the online environment and the way users perceive it due to the role of the intermediary in dissemination. In some
contexts, intermediaries “are as much publishers as platforms, as
much media as intermediary.”519 In such cases the intermediary can
be perceived as the source of the message and not just a mere platform. Differentiating between various intermediary roles allows for
a better understanding of internet exceptionalism’s proper scope and
provides a more consistent interpretation of terms like “content creation” or “development.”
To develop a nuanced policy of liability that accommodates
challenges in the algorithmic society, one should consider how intermediaries’ different dissemination practices can influence a message’s context and importance. A second factor to consider is the
causal link: who is particularly responsible for taking the information out of context? In other words, the question is whether the
intermediary framed the context of dissemination, or whether the
contextual change was initiated primarily by user signals.520 Taking
these axes together makes it possible to outline nuanced guidelines
for intermediary liability for four main roles: (1) basic intermediation; (2) moderation; (3) algorithmically personalized recommendations; and (4) targeted advertising.
A. Basic Intermediation
Hosting user content and providing tools for dissemination incentivizes users to share all types of information, whether true or
false. Intermediaries harness technology and their platforms’ design
518

See, e.g., BENKLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 270–74, 284–85 (explaining that adoption
and dissemination of messages by an influential (Breitbart) was a springboard to their wide
dissemination on social media).
519
PASQUALE, supra note 33, at 94.
520
See Lavi, supra note 26, at 194.
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to increase the likelihood that users will reach their threshold to disseminate ideas they would not otherwise share.521 In this capacity,
intermediaries are neutral to the type and substance of content disseminated, as long as dissemination increases profits. The platforms
enhance content’s circulation, increase its availability, and expand
the audience of recipients by designing tools that allow users to sort
through vast amounts of information and share content.522 However,
they do so by using neutral tools; they neither frame specific content
items nor direct audience attention to unlawful content in particular.
Rather, they are conduits for good and evil.523 If the proportion of
unlawful falsehoods increases relative to true statements, it is mainly
because of the network’s structure and social dynamics,524 and less
attributable to the intermediary’s role as host. Users generally have
equal choice to publish and disseminate whatever content they prefer. Intermediary functions take content out of context only to a mild
degree. Thus, the intermediary neither creates nor develops content
because the context and source of the disseminated message does
not go through extensive changes.
Imposing liability on intermediaries for hosting falsehoods and
designing communication tools would lead them to design fewer
communication tools, making it difficult for users to exchange ideas
and find relevant information. Alternatively, it would lead to prescreening of content that could cause disproportionate removal of
legitimate content. The result would be an imbalanced chilling effect
on speech and public dialogue concerning political issues. While
hosting rarely takes user content out of context, imposing liability
for this role has significant social costs. Therefore, internet exceptionalism is justified for basic intermediation and intermediaries
should be immunized in this capacity.

521

See supra Part II.A.
Lavi, supra note 105, at 494.
523
Id. (referring to Balkin, The First Amendment in the Second Gilded Age, supra note
508, at 997 (“[B]ecause social media companies encourage as many people as possible to
use their sites, the inevitable result is incivility, trolling, and abuse.”)).
524
See Vosoughi et al., supra note 19 (explaining that lies circulate faster than truths).
522
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B. Moderation
Moderation weeds out particular types of content through enforcement of terms of services and community guidelines. The intermediary’s role in moderation is to determine what types of content to filter, screen, or hide from the public. The intermediary neither frames specific content items nor directs audience attention to
content. Screening of this type preserves the online environment
while neither creating nor developing content.
It is impossible for the intermediary to moderate with precise
accuracy. It can fail to remove harmful, defamatory content or remove too much content, including legitimate information.525 Imposing liability for failure to remove harmful content will result in overmoderation and aggressive collateral censorship. Even if obligations
to remove content depend on user-reported, defamatory fake news
items, anyone could abuse this regime to remove negative information about himself, even if true. Moderation preserves the context
of public discourse by enforcing community guidelines.
Intermediaries are likely to self-regulate discourse on their platforms without legal liability. This is due to the intrinsic motivation
to reduce falsehoods on their platforms and market pressures from
advertisers—advertisers might stop placing monetizable advertisements on a platform due to the intermediary’s failure to curb harmful
expressions.526 Intermediaries are thus likely to change their moderation policies to enhance profit.527 Both intrinsic motivation and
market forces can provoke an intermediary to voluntarily curb dissemination of false and harmful content by changing the platform’s
design, moderation policies, or otherwise.528

525

See Langvardt, supra note 474, at 1359.
See Brett Molina, More Companies Halt Ads on Facebook Despite New Plans to Curb
Hate Speech, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2020/06/26/markzuckerberg-facebook-update-policies-hate-speech/3265725001/ [https://perma.cc/NUL7UMRN] (June 29, 2020, 6:10 AM).
527
GILLESPIE, supra note 27, at 168 (describing pressures of users that are in fact market
pressures that led Facebook to change its policy regarding pictures of breastfeeding).
528
Cf. Klonick, supra note 109, at 1616–30 (explaining the intrinsic motivations to
moderate without legal obligations to do so); Lavi, supra note 55, at 497–510 (proposing
to use nudges to dissuade users from publishing harmful content and embedding
technological features for efficient removal of content).
526
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Trump’s Order subjected moderators to state actor obligations
and good faith requirements, stripping immunity for content moderation and “selective censorship.”529 However, abiding by the Order
would undermine good Samaritan practices. Intermediaries would
neither use their editorial discretion to moderate content, nor set
community guidelines to avoid being considered discriminatory toward specific viewpoints. Without moderation, platforms would become a library without a catalogue.530 Moreover, subjecting moderation to “good faith” and “neutrality” requirements would hinder diversity among platforms with different attitudes toward content
moderation.531 Consequently, every platform would look like the
other, impairing the marketplace of ideas.
1. Transparency of Moderation Practices and Consumer
Protection
Moderation helps enforce the framework of community guidelines and changes context only to a mild degree. Internet exceptionalism is justified in this role. Accordingly, failure to remove content
should be immunized over content removal or discrimination by
moderation. Intermediaries are likely to self-regulate the discourse
on their platforms without legal liability because of intrinsic motivation and market pressures.532
The desirable diversity in attitudes toward moderation on different platforms would remain, allowing everyone to find a suitable
forum to express opinions, enhancing the public’s rights to receive
information, and facilitating free expression. This is even truer in
cases of vulgar expressions that do not quite reach the level of defamation and expressions that are defamatory but might benefit from
the law’s defenses. As private actors, intermediaries are not subject
529

Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (May 28, 2020), repealed by Exec.
Order No. 14,029, 86 Fed. Reg. 27,025 (May 14, 2021).
530
See infra Part III.C.
531
See, e.g., Klonick, supra note 109, at 1620–21; Mike Isaac & Cecilia Kang, While
Twitter Confronts Trump, Zuckerberg Keeps Facebook Out of It, N.Y. TIMES (May 29,
2020),
www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/technology/twitter-facebook-zuckerbergtrump.html [https://perma.cc/ADH9-FNEZ] (explaining the different attitudes of Facebook
and Twitter toward moderation of fake news).
532
See Klonick, supra note 109, at 1625–30 (explaining the intrinsic motivations to
moderate without legal obligations to do so).
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to the First Amendment.533 Some intermediaries can choose to use
their editorial discretion and remove, hide, validate, or label users’
posts, while others can allow the same post on their platform for all
to see.534 Platforms should be transparent about their moderation
practices to allow users the opportunity to find the proper forum for
their expressions.
Trump’s Executive Order advocated for transparency.535 In contrast to other policy statements and the Order’s potential chilling effect,536 transparency obligations do not chill speech. Intermediaries
operate platforms that function as the town square537 and provide
essential public needs, such as access to information and a space to
express oneself freely.538 Due to these central functions, subjecting
intermediaries to transparency obligations is desirable. Scholars
have long called for greater transparency in platforms’ application
of community standards and content moderation decisions.539 Some
even advocate subjecting platforms to a set of norms that govern the
process of decision-making, such as transparency, reasoning, and judicial review.540
Following recent public concerns, Facebook moved toward
transparency and due process in moderation.541 Facebook
533

See Prager Univ. v. Google, LLC, 951 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2020).
See Isaac & Kang, supra note 531 (comparing the different attitudes of Twitter and
Facebook towards moderation).
535
See Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079, 34,080 (May 28, 2020), repealed
by Exec. Order No. 14,029, 86 Fed. Reg. 27,025 (May 14, 2021) (“We must seek
transparency and accountability from online platforms, and encourage standards and tools
to protect and preserve the integrity and openness of American discourse and freedom of
expression.”).
536
See, e.g., id. (stripping the shield provided for moderation decisions that the
government does not see as moderation in “good faith.”).
537
See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) (acknowledging
access to online social media as part of the right to freedom of speech and striking down
state legislation that prevented convicted criminals from accessing social media as violative
of First Amendments rights).
538
See Amélie Heldt & Stephan Dreyer, Competent Third Parties and Content
Moderation on Platforms: Potentials of Independent Decision-Making Bodies from a
Governance Structure Perspective, 11 J. INFO. POL’Y 266, 268 (2021).
539
See Evelyn Douek, Facebook’s “Oversight Board:” Move Fast with Stable
Infrastructure and Humility, 21 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 (2019).
540
See Fischman-Afori, supra note 475 and accompanying text.
541
See Klonick, supra note 253, at 2473–74.
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established an independent decision-making body to determine the
type of content users would be allowed to post.542 It also created an
oversight committee (“the Board”) to review appeals regarding Facebook’s content takedowns that is empowered to overrule decisions
made by Facebook’s moderators or executives.543 Such a body can
highlight weaknesses in a platform’s policy formations, provide an
independent forum for discussing disputed content moderation decisions, and allow publicly available reasoning necessary for users.544 The Board focuses only on cases with significant real-world
impact, selecting cases referred to them by Facebook and users’ appeals.545 Furthermore, the Board only focuses on content moderation; decisions regarding algorithmic content management or microtargeting are beyond its jurisdiction.546 Yet despite its limitations,
the Board is a step in the right direction toward promoting transparency—setting new precedents for both user participation in a private
platform’s governance and users’ right to due process in content
moderation.547 Transparency would allow users to contest platforms’ creation of proportionality guidelines, balance values, and
enhance the legitimacy of platform policies and community guidelines.548

542

See Nick Clegg, Welcoming the Oversight Board, FACEBOOK (May 6, 2020),
about.fb.com/news/2020/05/welcoming-the-oversight-board/
[https://perma.cc/D2LAC6A4]; see also Douek, supra note 539, at 28–49; Kate Klonick & Thomas E. Kadri,
Opinion, How to Make Facebook’s ‘Supreme Court’ Work, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2018),
nyti.ms/2Ds8Ba3 [https://perma.cc/NCY4-BWZ7].
543
See Douek, supra note 539, at 26.
544
See id. at 67–68.
545
See id. at 26.
546
See Klonick, supra note 253, at 2488 (“From a regulatory perspective, many see
Facebook’s creation of the Board as a display of self-regulation in order to stave off actual
government regulation. The Board might also be a purposeful distraction of public attention
away from more critical technological concerns like algorithmic content management or
microtargeting.”).
547
Id. at 2492.
548
See Douek, supra note 236, at 785–89 (explaining that without transparency,
platforms are not likely to apply principles of proportionality correctly and giving an
example of Facebook and Twitter’s attitudes regarding President Trump’s Posts and
Tweets and their understanding that transparency and explanations are important).
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The law should ensure transparency in moderation by treating
community guidelines and moderation practices549 as consumer protection matters. Doing so would be another step in the direction toward greater transparency and due process. Thus, intermediaries
should be obligated to make their moderation practices public and
adhere to them. Such duties are not revolutionary; similar duties already exist in the privacy context where policies are regulated as a
matter of consumer protection. Relatedly, the FTC developed privacy jurisprudence that is equivalent to common law.550 Similar to
privacy policies, the FTC should mandate transparency in moderation practices and community standards and require adherence under
Section 5 of the FTC Act—prohibiting “unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce.”551
Much like privacy policies, moderation practices and the boundaries of free speech should be transparent on every platform. The
FTC should have the authority to investigate and bring Section 5
actions against intermediaries that fail to adhere to their declared
moderation practices. A similar idea is reflected in Trump’s Executive Order552 and can be adjusted and adopted to promote transparency. Transparency in community standards and moderation practices as a matter of consumer protection will allow users to know the
boundaries of free expression before participating on a platform. Users can choose the platform most appropriate for them, thus promoting freedom of expression and diversity. This solution is superior to
subjecting intermediaries to public law standards, because it preserves their status as private actors and avoids subjecting them to
other public law standards that would hamper diversity and undermine moderation altogether.

549

See id. at 829 (“Therefore the role of public regulation can be to turn the inwardlooking and unsatisfying systems of content regulation outward.”).
550
See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 586 (2014).
551
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1); see also Solove & Hartzog, supra note 550, at 599.
552
See Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079, 34,082 (June 2, 2020), repealed by
Exec. Order No. 14,029, 86 Fed. Reg. 27,025 (May 14, 2021) (asking the FTC to “consider
taking action,” using its existing Section 5 authority to enforce deceptive and unfair trade
practices, against “entities covered by Section 230 that restrict speech in ways that do not
align with those entities’ public representations about those practices.”).
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C. Algorithmically Personalized Recommendations
Hosting and moderating specific types of content applies equally
to all users. It is different from algorithmically personalized recommendations that may select defamatory fake news stories and deliver
them to specific, receptive users. Algorithmic content selection can
be an act of self-expression.553 Intermediaries that include unlawful
content in their selections and personally recommend it to users can
exacerbate damages inflicted by such content.554 The selection affects the source of the message. As a result, the public might get the
impression that an intermediary’s choice to recommend or prioritize
specific content indicates its importance. A platform’s recommendation of specific content to users influences the message, makes it
more visible, and creates a framing effect.555 Thus, users are likely
to pay more attention to the information and consider it more credible.556 This is even more true where personalized recommendations
deliver content to “receptive” users that are inclined toward the content, easily surpassing their threshold to share it.557 Consequently,
the proportion of specific types of content on the platform can increase. Algorithmically selected recommendations significantly
take content out of context.558 When the algorithm recommends unlawful content, it exacerbates the harm such content inflicts.559 Intermediaries should bear responsibility for content they preference
and not blame “the algorithm” for the consequences of such prioritization.560 Arguably, internet exceptionalism should not apply to algorithmic
recommendations.
Immunity
for
algorithmic
553

See Lavi, supra note 26, at 196 (citing Tim Wu, Is Filtering Censorship? The Second
Free Speech Tradition, in CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 83,
88–89 (Jeffrey Rosen & Benjamin Wittes eds., 2011)).
554
Daphne Keller, Amplification and Its Discontents, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST.
COLUMBIA UNIV., 3–4 (June 8, 2021), https://s3.amazonaws.com/kfai-documents/
documents/aa473e4dad/8.12.2021_-Keller-New-Layout.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z4GXK366].
555
Individuals react to a particular choice in different ways depending on how it is
presented. This is the “Framing Effect.” See KAHNEMAN, supra note 103, at 374–81.
556
See Lavi, supra note 74, at 31–32.
557
See id. at 16.
558
See Lavi, supra note 26.
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See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1169 (9th Cir. 2008)
(explaining neutral tools).
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PASQUALE, supra note 33, at 93.
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recommendations would foster irresponsibility and fail to strike a
proper balance between the aforementioned normative considerations.
It can be argued that immunity is not an appropriate response
where collateral censorship of users’ content does not occur. An intermediary that shares the same incentives as the original speaker
need not be encouraged to facilitate speech, and thus, the rationale
for immunity diminishes.561 However, one can also argue discussions regarding liability for this choice architecture are moot because algorithmic recommendations are unavoidable and never neutral.562 One content item will always be on top of the other in a user
newsfeed. Even a chronological presentation of content is not a neutral tool because it prefers a time parameter over other parameters
such as the frequency of interactions with users posting organic content. Furthermore, presenting all content that a user’s friends share
chronologically would make it difficult for users to find relevant information and impair efficiency.
However, it is not always clear whether the incentives for recommendations reflect the intermediary’s incentive to “speak” or are
merely an intermediation of content.563 The algorithm can be “policy
neutral” and depend on users’ activities, characteristics, and biases.564 Such neutral algorithms reinforce user inclinations without
preferring one viewpoint over another.565 When the algorithm is policy neutral and depends only on users’ features, the incentives to
recommend content are more similar to incentives underlying intermediation. Because the recommendations rely only on users’ characteristics and activities the causal link between the intermediary’s
actions and potential harm weakens. Thus, extending immunity to
the intermediary is justified. Imposing liability on such

561

See id. at 331–33.
See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 86 (2008) (suggesting that it is pointless to discuss
liability for choice architecture because it is unavoidable); Lavi, supra note 74, at 10.
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Wu, supra note 389, at 304–08; see Wu, supra note 553, at 85; Wu, supra note 426,
at 1521–22.
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See id.
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intermediation would result in censorship of useful recommendations.566 Liability would result in tremendous social costs on freedom of expression, exceeding the benefits of liability.
Arguably, the intermediary can reduce unlawful recommendations, even if delivering recommendations according to user signals,567 and should be accountable for failing to do so. However, in
the context of defamatory fake news, which can benefit from defamation law defenses as opposed to recommendations that incite terrorism, the social costs of liability for policy neutral, algorithmic
recommendations exceed the benefits.568 Intermediaries’ efforts to
voluntarily reduce recommendations of falsehoods might be desirable, but doing so under the threat of liability is problematic. Collateral censorship of legitimate recommendations bearing public importance is too high of a price for society to pay in this context, particularly when the algorithm is policy neutral.
Yet the algorithm can be “policy directed” to promote the intermediary’s agenda, moving beyond mere responses to user signals,
thereby representing the intermediary’s biases and views.569 Much
like the Facebook cognition experiment that increased the proportion of recommendations for negative content,570 algorithmic recommendations can increase the proportion of content in favor of a
specific political candidate, including negative falsehoods about

566

See Stern, supra note 406, at 589–90 (2009) (arguing that a narrow interpretation of
the term “neutral tools” will turn the internet into a “gigantic library with no cataloging
system”).
567
See The Youtube Team, supra note 425 (“[W]e’ll begin reducing recommendations
of borderline content and content that could misinform users in harmful ways . . . .”).
568
See generally Lavi, supra note 105 (discussing the need to reduce algorithmic
recommendations that incite terrorism due to the tremendous harm they inflict and the risk
of violence offline that can even cost life).
569
Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 126, at 137–42 (differentiating between policy neutral
algorithms and policy directed algorithms); cf. Pelle Guldborg Hansen & Andreas Maaløe
Jespersen, Nudge and the Manipulation of Choice: A Framework for the Responsible Use
of the Nudge Approach to Behavior Change in Public Policy, 4 EUR. J. RISK REGUL. 3, 6,
9 (2013) (distinguishing given contexts that accidentally influence behavior from situations
involving choice architects who intentionally attempt to alter behavior by manipulating
such contexts).
570
See Kramer et al., supra note 130.
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political rivals.571 Such algorithms channel content distribution according to the intermediary’s preferences.572 In these cases, internet
exceptionalism should not apply because the recommendations reflect intermediary preferences. Therefore, a causal link can be drawn
between the intermediary’s preferences and the recommendations.
In this capacity, the intermediary’s incentives are different from
those of the users who publish organic content.573 Moreover, the intermediary does not use neutral tools.574 In fact, the intermediary
provides individualized content and becomes the information’s developer, at least in part; therefore, it should not be immunized.575
1. Differentiating Between Types of Algorithms: The Black
Box Challenge
Differentiating between policy neutral and policy directed algorithms and outlining a nuanced liability regime depending on the
type of algorithm may appear a just and efficient framework.
Though this Article addresses nuanced liability for algorithmically
personalized recommendations, it should be noted that a recently
proposed regulations in the European Union on Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) reflects a similar approach by differentiating between
types of algorithms. It classifies AI practices to distinguished

571

See Frank Swain, How Robots Are Coming for Your Vote, BBC (Nov. 25, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20191108-how-robots-are-coming-for-your-vote
[https://perma.cc/S4CZ-98JA].
572
See Douek, supra note 236, at 777–78.
573
See Wu, supra note 389, at 304–08 (explaining the divergence of incentives).
574
See Douek, supra note 236, at 777–78.
575
See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1167–68 (9th Cir.
2008); Kim, supra note 29, at 927 (“Algorithms that control the flow of information and
determine who sees what are contrary to the vision of ‘maximizing user control’ articulated
in the statute.”); Sylvain, supra note 308, at 218; Catherine Tremble, Note, Wild
Westworld: Section 230 of the CDA and Social Networks’ Use of Machine Learning
Algorithms, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 825, 829 (2017). Even Kosseff, who advocates for broad
immunity, does not discount narrowing the immunity when platforms increasingly develop
more sophisticated algorithmic based technology to process user data content. See
KOSSEFF, supra note 48, at 188–89 (“As platforms increasingly develop more sophisticated
algorithmic based technology to process user data, it remains to be seen whether courts will
conclude that they are ‘responsible’ for the ‘development’ of illegal content. For example,
if a social media site allows companies to target their job advertisements to users under
forty, could the site be liable for ‘developing’ ads that violate employment discrimination
laws? . . . [S]uch liability is possible, though far from certain.”).
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categories576 and bans certain uses of AI algorithms altogether.577 In
order to ban them, or otherwise impose liability, such algorithms
should be recognized as AI that poses unacceptable risks in manipulating human behavior.578 The EU proposal is vague and the categorial ban on AI uses altogether risks impairing beneficial uses.
There are also obstacles in application of this approach that are relevant to our context of algorithmically personalized recommendations. Automated algorithms recommend content in the “black
box.”579 In other words, they hide the values and prerogatives enacted by the encoded rules, as well as the methods and parameters
for recommending content.580 The algorithmic analysis is opaque
and difficult to challenge.581 Additionally, one must bear in mind
that algorithms are guarded trade secrets; therefore, there are legal
difficulties imposing disclosure obligations on their operation.582
Without transparency and procedural fairness, plaintiffs and courts
576

See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying
Down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and
Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts, COM (2021) 206 final (Apr. 21 2021)
[hereinafter Artificial Intelligence Act] (addressing (1) unacceptable risks (Title II); (2)
high risks (Title III); (3) limited risks (Title IV); (4) minimal risks (Title IX)).
577
See id.; cf. Thomas Burri & Fredrik von Bothmer, The New EU Legislation on
Artificial Intelligence: A Primer, at 2 (Apr. 21, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3831424
[https://perma.cc/S8XT-JJ26] (“The proposed regulation prohibits certain uses of AI. It
bans the use of AI: a) to materially distort a person’s behaviour; b) to exploit the
vulnerabilities of a specific group of persons; c) public social scoring and d) for real time
remote biometric identification in public places.”).
578
Article 5(1) of the Artificial Intelligence Act deals with prohibited AI practices such
as an “AI system that deploys subliminal techniques beyond a person’s consciousness in
order to materially distort a person’s behaviour in a manner that causes or is likely to cause
that person or another person physical or psychological harm.” Artificial Intelligence Act,
supra note 576. For further discussion, see Michael Veale & Frederik Zuiderveen
Borgesius, Demystifying the Draft EU Artificial Intelligence Act, 22 COMPUT. L. REV. INT’L
(forthcoming
2021),
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/2107/2107.03721.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BJ7K-6XTQ].
579
PASQUALE, supra note 423, at 8; see PASQUALE, supra note 33, at 116; Waldman,
supra note 123, at 618–18.
580
PASQUALE, supra note 423, at 8.
581
See PASQUALE, supra note 423, at 8–9 (explaining that the judgement of software is
secret and operates under laws of secrecy and technologies of obfuscation, creating a
“black box” that is difficult to challenge).
582
See Dennis D. Hirsch, From Individual Control to Social Protection: New Paradigms
for Privacy Law in the Age of Predictive Analytics, 79 MD. L. REV. 439, 481 (2020); Lavi,
supra note 26, at 203 (referring to the type of algorithm in the case of voting systems).
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lack knowledge about the type of algorithm.583 Therefore, they also
lack knowledge about whether the algorithm reflects users’ characteristics, activities, and biases, or rather just those of the intermediary.584 Intermediaries should not be immunized for algorithmic decisions, but rather should be able to contest the algorithm based on
societal standards of fairness and accuracy,585 especially given the
decade’s worth of research on algorithmic accountability.586 Therefore, scholars have proposed ways to audit and attribute algorithmic
systems’ actions to their controllers.587
One way to accommodate this problem is to encourage research
and public review to reveal policy directed practices. Regulators can
call upon or even employ independent researchers to specifically analyze digital practices and attempt to uncover biased algorithms and
platforms’ manipulative practices.588 This solution has the potential
to mitigate the problem. Nevertheless, independent research would
reveal only some cases of biased algorithms. Consequently, the public would be left with insufficient knowledge regarding the utilization of biased algorithms and intermediaries’ manipulative influences.
Another path to accommodate this problem is process-based.
Scholars have proposed a range of mechanisms, such as promoting
algorithmic transparency, due process, and accountability

583

See Hirsch, supra note 582, at 458–59; Lavi, supra note 26, at 203.
See Hirsch, supra note 582, at 458–59; Lavi, supra note 26, at 203.
585
See PASQUALE, supra note 33, at 107 (“[A]lgorithmic arrangements of information
should be subject to contestation based of societal standards of fairness and accuracy. The
alternative is to privilege rapid and automatic machine communication over human valued,
democratic will formation, and due process.”).
586
See Frank A. Pasquale, Data-Informed Duties in AI Development, 119 COLUM. L.
REV. 1917, 1937 (2019).
587
See PASQUALE, supra note 33, at 92.
588
See Lavi, supra note 26, at 204; cf. Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking
Economy: Uber, Information, and Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1684 (2017).
584
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obligations.589 For example, a whistleblower mechanism590 could be
adopted to protect media giants’ individual employees who might
come forward to address issues of the flawed practices of biased
personalized recommendations, thereby promoting disclosure.
Other scholars have argued that the way to achieve transparency is
through data protection legislation.591 Legal protections for automated decision-making592 and individuals’ rights to receive explanations concerning algorithmic models,593 (such as the protections
included in the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”)),594 are likely to achieve more transparency and procedural justice. Yet, the GDPR focuses on protection of the data
subject’s rights595 and is therefore less suitable to reduce the harm
algorithmic recommendations inflict on third parties.
Another idea is pre-implementation of a licensing regime. Accordingly, regulators would require companies to disclose algorithms’ parameters and the methodology they employed, create an
“audit trail that records the basis of the predictive decisions, both in

589

See Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1308,
1314 (2020); Citron & Pasquale, supra note 423, at 18–27; Waldman, supra note 123 at
618–19 (reviewing different approaches for algorithmic transparency); see generally
PASQUALE, supra note 423; Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 UNIV. ILL. L.
REV. 1503 (2013).
590
See Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66
UCLA L. REV. 54, 126 (2019).
591
Margot E. Kaminski, The Right to Explanation, Explained, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
189, 198–99 (2019).
592
See Council Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC
(General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR]; see
Kaminski, supra note 591, at 196–98 (referring to the rights outlined by the GDPR to
explanation, namely the rights to information about individual decisions made by
algorithms).
593
See Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable
Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1087 (2018).
594
See GDPR, supra note 592, at arts. 5–6 (referring to lawfulness of processing
information); id. at arts. 13–14 (obligations of data controllers to provide information to
data subjects regarding the purpose of processing their data); id. at art. 15 (the right of data
subjects to access the data collected on them); id. at art. 7122 (the right of data subjects not
to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing).
595
Id. at art. 1 (referring to the objectives of the GDPR), art. 2 (referring to the material
scope of the GDPR).
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terms of the data used and the algorithm employed[,]”596 and give
individuals and regulators alike the opportunity to access audit trails
on demand.597 This could allow regulators—such as the FTC or an
agency like the Food and Drug Administration—to review algorithmic systems and protect against unfairness.598 This approach removes the burden from individuals and places it on companies and
licensors. But in doing so, it creates a regulatory bottleneck for companies that must move quickly to compete.599 Furthermore, it involves substantial administrative costs that might not be feasible and
may hinder innovation.600
Transparency, in the form of source code publication or an explanation of the results, sheds some light on the opaque process.
However, such transparency is functionally useless to most individuals without specialized knowledge or factual evidence to determine
whether the algorithm complies with the law.601 Furthermore, the
focus on documentation and process elevates a structure that promotes compliance with the law, obscures the fact that algorithmic
decision-making erodes substantive values of fairness, equality, and
dignity, and discourages both users and policymakers from taking
more robust actions.602
Many scholars advocate a different solution that extends beyond
the design stage—an algorithmic impact assessment.603
596

Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to
Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 127–28 (2014).
597
Citron & Pasquale, supra note 423, at 28.
598
See id.; see also Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 115–
16 (2017).
599
See Hirsch, supra note 582, at 477.
600
See Adam Thierer et al., Artificial Intelligence and Public Policy, MERCATUS CTR.
GEO. MASON UNIV. at 18–20, 35 (2017), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/thiererartificial-intelligence-policy-mr-mercatus-v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KJ8-2UFF] (arguing
that this solution might hinder innovation and that the creation of a new regulatory body to
audit algorithms, datasets, and techniques advances a “transparency paradox” of its own).
601
See Waldman, supra note 123, at 628–29.
602
See id.
603
See id. at 618, 628–29 (“Algorithmic impact assessments can identify and evaluate
risks, consider alternatives, identify strategies to mitigate risks, and help articulate the
rationale for the automated system.”); see also Katyal, supra note 590, at 126
(“[R]egulatory monitors could question platform coders or ask to see the internal reports
that those coders produced. In the context of privacy, for instance, regulators could ask
platforms to provide privacy impact assessments.”); Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A.

2021]

TARGETING EXCEPTIONS

161

Accordingly, intermediaries would have to ensure their algorithms
and tools undergo regular safety evaluations by independent auditors and technology experts.604 Algorithmic impact assessments can
mitigate the risk of error and failure at the design stage and decrease
unexpected, unlawful recommendations.605 This idea is not so revolutionary. Recently, legislators proposed to apply impact assessments in the discrimination context. The Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019606 requires entities that use, store, or share personal
information to conduct automated decision system impact assessments and data protection impact assessments. Such regular evaluations mitigate discrimination and correct accordingly in a timely
manner.607 The need to evaluate algorithms is also reflected in proposed regulation in the EU608 referring to high-risk AI algorithms
and proposing a comprehensive risk management system when AI
algorithms are brought into circulation. 609
Indeed, such solutions are not optimal.610 They leave opacity regarding the algorithms’ functions. Further, implementation guidelines and enforcement should be outlined more clearly,611 as any
regulatory system would have to develop substantive standards.

Bamberger, Procurement as Policy: Administrative Process for Machine Learning, 34
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 781, 830–31 (2019); Hartzog & Richards, supra note 374, 1758–59
(discussing the Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, requiring algorithmic impact
assessments for “high-risk automated decision systems” to “regularly evaluate their tools
for accuracy, fairness, bias, and discrimination.”); Rory Van Loo, The Missing Regulatory
State: Monitoring Businesses in an Age of Surveillance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1575
(2019); Frank Pasquale, The Second Wave of Algorithmic Accountability, LAW & POL.
ECON. PROJECT (Nov. 25, 2019), https://lpeproject.org/blog/the-second-wave-ofalgorithmic-accountability/ [https://perma.cc/Z3MJ-Y76H].
604
See Waldman, supra note 123, at 628–29.
605
Lavi, supra note 105, at 565.
606
See Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 2231, 116th Cong. (2019). For
further analysis and criticism, see Margot E. Kaminski & Andrew D. Selbst, Opinion,
The Legislation that Targets the Racist Impacts of Tech, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2019),
nyti.ms/2Ybb8MT [https://perma.cc/WMD7-463D].
607
See H.R. 2231.
608
See Artificial Intelligence Act, supra note 576.
609
See id. at art. 9; cf. Burri & von Bothmer, supra note 577, at 4.
610
See Kaminski & Selbst, supra note 606 (analyzing the flaws of the Algorithmic
Accountability Act of 2019).
611
See Hartzog & Richards, supra note 374, at 1759.
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This solution is, however, flexible and preferable in that it provides
full disclosure to the regulator.612
A recent proposal in this direction tasks the FTC with evaluating
algorithmic impact and enforcing against unfair and deceptive algorithmic practices.613 In order to evaluate and police harmful algorithmic practices, scholars have proposed that the FTC use its authority to prohibit “unfair or deceptive” trade practices under Section 5 of the FTC Act614 to curb the use of algorithms that harm victims’ reputations and to protect public interest. Section 5 is the most
obvious existing mechanism that can regulate algorithmic dark patterns and other forms of manipulation.615 Similar to the proposal
subjecting moderation practices to the FTC’s authority as a matter
of consumer protection,616 here, the FTC would create a framework
and evaluate companies’ algorithmic determinations to decide if
they are unfair. Over time, the FTC could formulate “unfairness”
precedent to which companies could refer before deploying their algorithms.617 The “unfairness” approach would avoid a regulatory
bottleneck of pre-deployment licensing requirements and task a regulator—one with a long record of substantial expertise in information economy—with evaluation.618 Such evaluations of unfair algorithmic practices can shed light on opaque algorithmic practices.

612

See generally id.
See generally Hirsch, supra note at 582, at 494.
614
Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45; see CHRIS J. HOOFNAGLE,
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY 31–53 (2016); Hirsch, supra note
582, at 447 (“Section 5 of the FTC Act gives the FTC the power to declare and enforce
against ‘unfair or deceptive [business] acts or practices.’ This short phrase gives the FTC
two distinct powers: the authority to enforce against business practices that are ‘deceptive;’
and the ability to enforce against business practices that are ‘unfair.’”).
615
See generally, e.g., FTC v. AMG Cap. Mgmt., 910 F.3d 417 (9th Cir. 2018), rev’d,
141 S. Ct. 1341 (2021); Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction & Monetary Judgement,
FTC v. Off. Depot, No. 9-19-cv-80431 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2019) (perceiving dark patterns
as lies and misrepresentations); see Luguri & Strahilevitz, supra note 156, at 82–84
(explaining that legal commentators have largely failed to notice that the FTC is beginning
to combat dark patterns with some success, at least in court, although not using the
terminology of dark patterns).
616
See Part III.B.1.
617
See Hirsch, supra note 582, at 503–04.
618
See id.
613
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2. Liability for Algorithmic Recommendations: Remedies and
Enforcement
The FTC’s evaluation and enforcement of algorithmic practices
would make it possible to differentiate between policy neutral and
policy directed algorithms. If evaluation reveals an algorithm as policy directed, the intermediary would not be immunized. Instead, the
FTC might issue a complaint that could lead to an administrative
proceeding resulting in a cease and desist order. An intermediary’s
failure to comply and fix the biased policy directed algorithm would
lead to civil penalty.619 Such a failure could render the intermediary’s practice “unfair.”
Declaring a practice unfair might even pave the path for private
litigation. However, defamation lawsuits might be futile. Indeed, the
intermediary develops content by changing the context and creates
personalized recommendations. Further, its incentives are not those
of mere intermediation. However, holding the intermediary responsible under defamation law as direct publishers of such “machine
speech” might be far-reaching.620 Moreover, even if the law recognizes policy directed algorithmic recommendations as the intermediaries’ direct publication, entities are only compensated when the
falsehood reaches the level of defamation,621 an especially difficult
task for plaintiffs that are public figures or officials.622 However, an

619

See HOOFNAGLE, supra note 614, at 109; Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy Law’s False
Promise, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 773, 806 (2020) (“The FTC requires companies operating
under consent decrees to submit assessments roughly every two years for the life of the
order. Assessments have to be completed by a ‘qualified, objective, independent thirdparty’ auditor with sufficient experience. And they must describe specific privacy controls,
evaluate their adequacy given the size and scope of the company, explain how they meet
FTC requirements, and certify they are operating effectively.”).
620
For further information on machine speech, see Grimmelmann, supra note 440.
621
See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717–18 (2012) (explaining that lies are
protected expressions). For criticism, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 59, at 48 (“the plurality in
Alvarez was myopic in focusing largely on established categories of cases, such as
defamation, in which false statements of fact can sometimes be regulated or sanctioned. In
the modern era, false statements falling short of libel are causing serious problems for
individuals and society; if they cause such problems, there is a legitimate argument that
they should be regulable.”).
622
A public figure must prove the standard of actual malice, in which case defamation
law defenses are narrower. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80
(1964). Contra Sunstein, supra note 17, at 413.

164

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXII:1

FTC declaration concerning unfair practices can pave the way for
litigation on the grounds that a company was negligent for failing to
exercise reasonable standards of care in designing algorithms that
result in harm.623
D. Targeting of Advertisements
Targeting advertisements aims to promote a specific agenda, not
just enhance engagement on the platform. The intermediary utilizes
personal user data and targets advertisements for profit, using policy
directed algorithms that aim to create behavioral changes that promote specific brands or agendas.624 Moreover, the intermediary
shapes the context of the information flow by using special strategies of refined ad targeting.625 By designing targeting tools and using enormous amounts of user data, the intermediary offers advertisers the opportunity to display “the right ad, to the right person, at
the right time,” and manipulate users.626
Data-driven targeting tools and strategies of influence frame the
advertisement, enhance the magnitude ascribed to it, and influence
the context of the message that the advertisement promotes. The

623

For more information regarding holding intermediaries responsible for the design of
their platform, see Sylvain, supra note 308. Such an idea can be adopted regarding the
design of algorithmic recommendations. The law has yet to develop in the field of duty of
care for algorithmic design and might need to develop standards of reasonableness of
algorithms. See RYAN ABBOT, THE REASONABLE ROBOT: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND
THE LAW 58 (2020); Alina Glaubitz, How Should Liability Be Attributed for Harms Caused
by Biases in Artificial Intelligence? 3 (senior thesis, Yale University) (Apr. 29, 2021),
available
at
https://politicalscience.yale.edu/sites/default/files/glaubitz_alina.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V5EZ-G2E5].
624
PARISER, supra note 142, at 15; Thompson, supra note 433, at 1026 (“[T]he
advertising algorithms offer the same speech over and over, limiting the marketplace of
ideas to one familiar store. This kind of personalized advertising ‘serve[s] up a kind of
invisible auto propaganda, indoctrinating us with our own ideas, amplifying our desire for
things that are familiar and leaving us oblivious to the dangers lurking in the dark territory
of the unknown.’”).
625
Such refined personalized ad targeting shapes what one sees on social media and when
he sees it and “what one sees and likes on social media may shape what one thinks and
believes.” See Thompson, supra note 433, at 1027 n.51; see also Kim, supra note 29, at
892 (“The platforms themselves play an important role in how job opportunities are
distributed because they design the targeting or matching algorithms that control
information flows.”).
626
See Kim, supra note 29, at 878.
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intermediary functions as a social actor and users may even perceive
it as the source of the advertisement. Due to the intermediary’s centrality, users are likely to ascribe importance to the message since it
originates from an influential entity.627 By targeting vulnerable “receptive” target audiences at the right time, the intermediary also increases the likelihood that the target user will spread the advertisement.
Targeting fake news advertisements exacerbates the gravity of
harm such advertisements inflict on reputation, foundationally
threatening markets, integrity of elections, and democracy itself.628
Intermediaries that use data-driven targeting participate together
with the advertisers to develop the information in the advertisements.629 The tools and strategies intermediaries use in targeting,
channel the distribution of advertisements without neutrality and
subvert the target’s reflective decision-making.630 Targeting does
not enable user-informed choices. It exposes each user to different
recommendations in light of algorithmic conclusions based on parameters set by the intermediary. This distances the user from positive and meaningful choices because targeting influences how users
perceive their available choice sets.631 Given this substantial influence narrowly targeted advertising has on context, the immunity regime can no longer be justified. Intermediaries are “responsible,” at
least “in part,” for creating or developing illegal content, because
they use data-driven information and targeting tools and co-develop
content with users.632

627

See WALDMAN, supra note 79, at 146; BENKLER ET AL., supra note 22 and
accompanying text; GLADWELL, supra note 82 and accompanying text.
628
See Jim Balsillie, Data Is Not the New Oil – It’s the New Plutonium, FIN. POST (May
28, 2019), https://financialpost.com/technology/jim-balsillie-data-is-not-the-new-oil-itsthe-new-plutonium [https://perma.cc/QU3V-DAC4].
629
See Thompson, supra note 433, at 1023; see generally Balkin, supra note 12, at 84.
630
See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1175 (9th Cir.
2008) (noting the differentiation between neutral tools and tools that are not neutral).
631
See Kim, supra note 29, at 894.
632
See Sylvain, supra note 308, at 211.
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1. Liability for Targeting of Advertisements: Remedies and
Enforcement
An intermediary should not be immunized for data-driven, targeted advertising for profit. Liability as the speaker of an unlawful
message is over-broad since an intermediary targets a tremendous
number of advertisements. The transaction between an intermediary
and an advertiser is conducted by automatic auction, where algorithms make bids and target advertisements.633 Arguably, the intermediary can fact-check political ads before running them and stop
micro-targeted falsehoods.634 Yet fact-checking every political advertisement and filtering advertisements before targeting users has
its costs. It can impair the efficiency of markets and innovation.
Moreover, liability can hinder free speech. Subjecting intermediaries to the same obligations as publishers would turn intermediaries
into arbiters of truth. Intermediaries would over-censor advertisements because they lack tools to differentiate between true and false.
In the context of advertisements, there is an extensive grey area between false or misleading content and mere puffery that is not entirely false,635 making fake news ad-filtering an even more difficult
task.
Knowledge-based distributor liability for false advertisements
mitigates concerns regarding the burdening enforcement costs and
over-censorship concerns. Under this regime, victims, the public,
and civil society organizations would report fake news advertisements to the intermediary, and the intermediary would not bear liability if it removed the advertisements. Failure to remove an advertisement would not result in automatic liability and would only be
imposed if content was false.
Indeed, reports about unlawful advertisements can be incorrect
and directed at legitimate advertisements. Yet, knowledge-based
distributor liability gives the intermediary the opportunity to decide
633

See, e.g., About Smart Bidding, GOOGLE ADS, https://support.google.com/google-ads/
answer/7065882?hl=en [https://perma.cc/H3KM-4G2E].
634
See Cohen, supra note 24.
635
See, e.g., Carlucci v. Han, 886 F. Supp. 2d 497, 522 (E.D. Va. 2012) (excluding
puffery statements from legal liability); Adi Osovsky, Puffery on the Market: A Behavioral
Economic Analysis of the Puffery Defense in the Securities Arena, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV.
333, 336–37 (2016).
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how to best handle advertising that reflects the core of its business.
Knowledge-based distributor liability balances freedom of expression, dignity, and the public interest. This regime is less likely to
lead to collateral censorship because intermediaries solicit advertisements for fees and would still have incentives to run ads, even if
immunity is narrowed.636 Knowledge-based distributor liability preserves the incentive to remove advertisements that include absolute
falsehoods. For example, under this regime, Facebook is more likely
to remove advertisements that include false conspiracies upon
knowledge to avoid risking liability.637
Enforcement of knowledge-based distributor liability for advertisements raises difficulties. Arguably, targeting is personalized; different individuals are exposed to different advertisements, making
enforcement difficult. Yet to some extent, FTC enforcement can
bridge the gap, mitigate reputational harm to public figures, and protect the public interest. The FTC already addresses certain aspects
of advertisements (such as disclosure requirements for endorsements)638 and enforces violations of disclosure obligations under
Section 5.639 The FTC has imposed a legal duty on businesses to not
engage in deceptive advertising and can police such practices.640
Section 5 is vague and open to interpretation; its definitions are general and the confines of misleading and “unfair” practices remain

636

See generally Balkin, supra note 12, at 94.
See Stewart, supra note 11 (explaining the fake news story on Joe Biden that opened
this Article).
638
In its March 2013 guide, the FTC addresses how businesses can modify their practices
to comport with fair advertising. While .com disclosures focus on all advertising mediums,
it provides specific recommendations regarding disclosures for advertisements on social
media platforms. The 2013 guide does not have the force and effect of law. Yet, noncompliance may lead to FTC enforcement actions for unfair or deceptive practices in
violation of the FTC Act. There is an underlying legal duty for businesses not to engage in
deceptive advertising and the guidelines articulate rules of conduct. See generally FED.
TRADE COMM’N, .COM DISCLOSURES: HOW TO MAKE EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURES IN DIGITAL
ADVERTISING (2013).
639
Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
640
See id.; COHEN, supra note 90, at 56 (“In the absence of a regulatory framework
specifically tailored to the problems of surreptitious tracking and ‘behavioral advertising,’
the FTC attempted to fill the regulatory gap by asserting its general authority to police
unfair and deceptive practices in commerce.”); see generally HOOFNAGLE, supra note 614.
637
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open.641 Regardless, the FTC’s baseline rule is clear: “do not lie.”642
Arguably, the FTC can initiate an interrogation or respond to user
complaints regarding misleading political advertisements even
though the advertisements do not market tangible products. This is
because intermediaries are compensated for targeting users and are
likely to mislead consumers of internet services.
The FTC has broad investigatory authority that provides the basis for enforcement.643 The FTC does not generally monitor platforms.644 It starts investigations in response to complaints by the
Consumer Sentinel Network,645 political candidates, civil society organizations, and members of Congress.646 It resolves pending investigations by seeking consent orders or issuing complaints, allowing
for settlement of allegations.647
The FTC brings cases in federal court and adjudicative proceedings before administrative law judges.648 To enforce civil penalties
or seek redress, the FTC must pursue litigation in court.649 Therefore, judicial enforcement is advantageous. When the FTC issues a
complaint and an advertiser contests the allegations, the parties may
proceed with an administrative trial, resulting in a judge’s

641

See Hirsch, supra note 528, at 499 (“Courts that have reviewed Section 5 and its
legislative history have consistently reinforced the idea that Section 5 unfairness is broad,
flexible, and capable of addressing new business practices and harms.”); HOOFNAGLE,
supra note 614, at 130 (explaining that the FTC has broad power to prevent unfair trade).
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recommendation to enter a cease and desist order.650 An advertiser
can be held civilly liable for up to $40,000 per violation of a cease
and desist order.651 Once the order is final, the FTC can hold a nonparty liable for committing a deceptive act that violates the order,
and thus can hold intermediaries responsible.652
A second remedial path, based on Professor Balkin’s proposal,
is private litigation under defamation law for an intermediary’s failure to remove a false advertisement upon notification.653 In such
cases the intermediary would be held responsible under knowledgebased distributor liability for false advertisements. Whereas FTC enforcement applies to false and misleading advertisements, liability
in civil litigation under defamation laws applies only when the falsehood reaches the level of defamation.654 However, other causes of
action, such as negligence, might offer remedies to individuals that
prove the dissemination of falsehood caused them legally recognized harm.655
CONCLUSION
Online intermediaries are the governors of speech.656 They provide communication tools and moderate the flow of information
with insufficient transparency. Intermediaries are not just hosts and
moderators; they recommend and target specific types of content.
They profit from amplifying lies and providing targeting tools, allowing political operatives and other stakeholders to engage in a
new level of information warfare.657 Data-driven business models
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allow advertisers to show users a different version of the truth and
manipulate users with hyper-customized advertisements full of fake
news stories, turning social media into a dangerous weapon.658 In
the data-driven internet era, it becomes almost impossible to separate true from false and to engage in honest discussion on matters of
public importance, impinging upon the general public interest, impairing the political security of citizens, and eroding democracy.
Section 230 of the CDA immunizes intermediaries for content
created by other content providers, reflecting the internet exceptionalism approach, which differentiates between the internet and other
media that preceded it.659 However, as technologies advance, the
role of intermediaries becomes a fundamental aspect of any platform. With the transition from an internet society to an algorithmic
society, intermediaries’ duties should be reconsidered. This Article
argues that the overall immunity regime should be nuanced, as a
one-size-fits-all approach to liability is inappropriate. It endeavors
to contextualize internet exceptionalism, target exceptions to overall
immunity, and refine immunity to different roles intermediaries fulfill. This Article provides guidelines for deciding when immunity
should apply and when it should not. It also proposes to subject intermediaries to complementary duties that promote accountability in
shaping the flow of information, such as transparency obligations
for moderators and algorithmic impact assessments as part of consumer protection regulation enforced by the FTC.
It is particularly important to reevaluate intermediaries’ roles
and duties, provide guidelines for the scope of immunity, and outline
complementary transparency obligations—especially in light of recent attacks on Trump’s Executive Order that strives to abolish the
editorial discretion of intermediaries altogether.660 Rethinking the
scope of immunity is also important in considering recent proposals
in scholarship to narrow the immunity provided for sophisticated,
algorithmic-based technologies that structure, sort, target, and sell
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user data, thereby shaping the flow of information.661 As Section
230’s immunity gradually erodes and judicial orders continue to result in inconsistent decisions,662 nuanced and clearer guidelines for
applying immunity are necessary. This Article therefore concludes
with a call for courts, policymakers, and legislators to adopt such a
nuanced framework for immunity.
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